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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines determinants of post-bankruptcy performance by using 
insolvent firms under the bankruptcy reorganization proceedings of the 1940 Thai 
Bankruptcy Act. The purpose of the study is to investigate whether the key 
governance mechanisms within this process are factors which may contribute to 
successful reorganization and how they affect a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance.  
Using agency theory, a sample of 111 filing companies whose plans have been 
confirmed by the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court during 1999-2002 provide the data 
of the study. Descriptive statistics and ordinary least squares regression analysis are 
employed for data analysis.  
 
The results indicate that among three types of governance mechanisms in the 
bankruptcy reorganization process, namely, monitoring, incentive and restructuring 
mechanisms, monitoring and incentive mechanisms are significant determinants of a 
firm’s post-bankruptcy performance. The key monitoring mechanism is ownership 
concentration of common shares held by the largest shareholder, whereas the critical 
incentive mechanisms are cash compensation for the plan administrator and 
percentage of common shares held by the plan administrator. Asset restructuring is 
statistically insignificant but positively links to post-bankruptcy performance. The 
results indicate that these mechanisms can mitigate agency problems of insolvent 
companies and increase post-bankruptcy performance over a three year period. 
 
 
 
Key words: agency theory, bankruptcy reorganization, corporate governance, post-
bankruptcy performance, Thailand  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
 
In the event of bankruptcy, reorganization through the court is viewed as a strategic 
tool for resolving financial distress of insolvent companies (Moulton & Thomas 
1993). It gives these companies an opportunity to restructure their assets, operations, 
liabilities and other obligations, enabling them to return to normal business 
operations and sound financial health (Bradley & Rosenzweig 1992; White 1989). In 
comparison to out-of-court reorganization - workouts, this legal process has become 
increasingly important since previous studies found that bankruptcy reorganization 
can overcome the holdout problems among creditors and mitigate information 
asymmetries between conflicting parties (Brown 1989; Chatterjee, Dhillon & 
Ramirez 1995; Gertner & Scharfstein 1991; Gilson, John & Lang 1990; Li & Li 1999; 
Roe 1987; Schwartz 1993). After the 1997 Asian economic crisis, it has been widely 
used in both Western and Asian countries around the world (Armstrong & Riddick 
2000; Frankel 2003; Urapeepatanapong, Sethsathira & Okanurak 1998; 
Vongvipanond & Wichitaksorn 2004).  
 
Evidence from empirical studies has shown that when firms face financial trouble, 
they prefer to choose bankruptcy reorganization to negotiate with a firm’s creditors 
rather than liquidation (Berkovitch & Israel 1991; Denis & Rodgers 2002). The 
reason is the legal process allows debtor firms to continue managing their business 
and receive court protection from creditors’ actions to exercise control over the 
property of a debtor. Creditors are unable to take action against the debtor during this 
period. The bankruptcy reorganization proceedings provide provisions, such as 
automatic stay, creditors’ voting procedure and many rules relating to a plan of 
reorganization that facilitate insolvent firms to improve their financial stability.  
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However, some previous researchers have argued that the bankruptcy reorganization 
process is not the best filtering mechanism to provide firms the opportunity to 
reorganize. The process attracts all insolvent firms - both economically viable and 
nonviable firms to reorganize, even though nonviable firms should liquidate 
(Chatterjee, Dhillon & Ramirez 1996; Mooradian 1994; Routledge & Gadenne 2000; 
White 1994). Moreover, there is no set process that ensures success of the formal 
reorganization process (Denis & Rodgers 2002; Fisher & Martel 2003; Routledge & 
Gadenne 2000). There are many factors relating to successful bankruptcy 
reorganization such as the recontracting framework (Frank & Torous 1989),  
investment decisions (Gertner & Scharfstein 1991), debtor-in-possession (DIP) 
financing (Chatterjee, Dhillon & Ramirez 2004), the ability of the planner to 
establish a plan (Michel, Shaked & McHugh 1998), the accurate selection of 
restructuring methods (Datta & Datta-Iskandar 1995; Hotchkiss 1994), the feasibility 
of the reorganization plan which is associated with realistic projections (Michel et al. 
1998) and the capability of the plan administrator to oversee business operations of 
an insolvent firm during the period of distress (Pornavalai 1998; Urapeepatanapong 
et al. 1998). It appears that successful rehabilitation is complex and needs substantial 
effort to deal with a distressed company’s financial problems.  
 
Previous researchers have attempted to find which factors are crucial to successful 
reorganization, but there has only been limited research examining the relationship 
between outcomes of the bankruptcy reorganization process and governance factors 
(e.g., board composition and equity ownership) of bankrupt firms (Daily 1995, 1996; 
Daily & Dalton 1994a; Gales & Kesner 1994). There is still doubt whether the 
mechanisms of the bankruptcy reorganization process only facilitate more 
opportunity for recovery of insolvent companies or enable an increase in overall 
financial performance. Thus, the present study will contribute to this investigation of 
determinants of post-bankruptcy performance of insolvent companies in Thailand. 
 
 
1.2 Research question and objectives 
 
As suggested by agency theory, this study will use monitoring, incentive and 
restructuring mechanisms to explain a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance (Agrawal 
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& Knoeber 1996; Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Keasey, 
Thompson & Wright 1997). The aim of the study is to investigate the effectiveness 
of governance mechanisms in the Thai bankruptcy reorganization process, that is, 
whether these can support a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance to achieve the 
reorganization plan. The primary research question is: 
 
How do the key governance mechanisms in the bankruptcy reorganization 
proceedings affect a firm’s post - bankruptcy performance?  
 
Based on the primary research question, the main governance mechanisms in the 
reorganization proceedings and a firm’s actual post – bankruptcy performance during 
the first three-year period of rehabilitation will be investigated. The research 
objectives of the study are:  
 
1. To examine the existing key governance mechanisms in the Thai bankruptcy 
reorganization proceedings from an agency perspective.  
 
2. To examine the impact of the key governance mechanisms in the Thai 
bankruptcy reorganization proceedings on a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance 
over a three year period.  
 
 
1.3 Significance of the study 
 
The results of this study are significant to regulators, debtor firms, creditors, 
shareholders and investors who are related to and may be impacted upon during the 
bankruptcy reorganization process. This research will extend and supplement prior 
research in this area by providing a unique contribution to the growing literature on 
agency theory in a number of directions.  
 
First, this study will extend and adapt Agrawal & Knoeber’s (1996) work by 
examining the effect of monitoring, incentive and market mechanisms of the 
bankruptcy reorganization process on a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance.  
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Second, much previous research attempted to evaluate the total efficiency of 
mechanisms in the process by measuring post-bankruptcy performance in various 
ways, including the percentage of firms emerging from bankruptcy, accounting 
performance, cash flow performance compared with financial projections of the 
reorganization and stock performance (for example, the studies of Morse & Shaw 
(1988), Hotchkiss (1995) and Alderson & Betker (1999)). These measures produced 
mixed results and this study will adopt a new measure of post-bankruptcy 
performance. 
 
Third, there has been minimal research investigating governance patterns in a 
bankrupt firm. Thus, the current study will attempt to extend research in this area by 
investigating governance mechanisms of the bankruptcy reorganization process 
implemented in Thai bankrupt firms.  
 
Fourth, most previous studies used public companies which had traded in a national 
stock exchange for analysis. There is very little information on empirical studies 
regarding unlisted companies. Thus, this study will contribute through the 
investigation of both listed and unlisted bankrupt companies.  
 
Fifth, limited prior research in this area has been undertaken in Asian countries; the 
current study will investigate the effectiveness of mechanisms in the formal 
reorganization process in Thailand. 
 
The study will have relevance for decision-makers including debtor firms, creditors, 
shareholders, financial consultants, planners and plan administrators, the bankruptcy 
court and the official receiver as regulators. It will investigate important monitoring 
and incentive mechanisms of agency theory including outside directors, ownership 
concentration, prevalence of managerial remuneration, and restructuring methods in 
the Thai bankruptcy reorganization proceedings. The results will inform all parties 
about the quality and direction of mechanisms and their relationship with a firm’s 
post-bankruptcy performance. This will assist decision-makers to understand more 
clearly the control mechanisms in the bankruptcy reorganization of Thai insolvent 
companies and may result in their being able to make better decisions in dealing with 
financial distress.  
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The results of the study will be important for understanding the effectiveness of the 
rules and regulations in the Thai bankruptcy reorganization process. The study aims 
to identify significant mechanisms of the process that enhance post-bankruptcy 
performance, which  may enable regulators and other parties to gauge which 
regulations are efficient and should be retained or improved. Overall, the results will 
show the efficacy of the bankruptcy reorganization process and as a consequence, 
debtor firms, creditors, shareholders and related parties may have more confidence in 
the likely outcomes when employing this law to resolve their financial problems.  
 
      
1.4 Organization of the thesis 
 
The thesis contains seven chapters including the introduction. This chapter has 
provided the background to the study and addressed research question and objectives. 
It also elaborates on the significance of the study.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews previous research concerning bankruptcy reorganization and post-
bankruptcy performance including the literature of the Thai bankruptcy 
reorganization proceedings. Its objective is to investigate important mechanisms of 
the Thai process and seek the critical factors of a firm’s post-bankruptcy 
performance. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the theoretical framework of agency theory, the research model 
and hypothesis development. It presents the research paradigm of the study and then 
explains a model of agency theory and its governance mechanisms that aim to 
control agency problems and improve firm value. It examines previous studies 
concerned with the effects of governance mechanisms on a firm’s post-bankruptcy 
performance and selects those of relevance to the present study.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the research methodology. It provides definitions of the technical 
terms of the Thai reorganization proceedings and variable measurement of all 
variables of the study. It also describes data sources, sample selection, data collection 
methods and statistical analysis to be undertaken.  
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Chapters 5 and 6 report the results of the study and address the research question and 
objectives of Chapter 1. Chapter 5 describes the features of all the variables of the 
study and their inter-relationship with the view to highlighting the key mechanisms 
impacting on success in reorganization and the recovery rate of bankruptcy 
reorganization.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the predictors of a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance and the 
impact of governance mechanisms of the bankruptcy reorganization process on a 
firm’s post – bankruptcy performance. A discussion of the main assumptions of 
univariate statistical analysis and ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis 
is also provided.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 contains a summary of the study and the implications of the 
research findings, describes its limitations and offers suggestions for future research.   
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Literature review 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews previous research to investigate important mechanisms for the 
bankruptcy reorganization proceedings and the critical factors impacting on post-
bankruptcy performance. It is divided into two sections. Section 2.2 presents a 
general review of the literature regarding bankruptcy reorganization and post-
bankruptcy performance while Section 2.3 describes the literature specific to the 
Thai bankruptcy reorganization process and its key governance mechanisms.  
 
In Thailand, reorganization is an extensive alteration of a financially distressed firm 
regarding capital, organizational and management structure following a plan worked 
out during the reorganization proceedings under the Bankruptcy law. The objectives 
of reorganization are to eliminate the cause of the failure, settle with creditors and 
allow the firm to remain in business (Ross, Westerfield & Jordan 2000). Legally, 
there are two alternatives for firms which have filed for bankruptcy; liquidating and 
reorganizing. Liquidation is the process of winding up the operation of firms that are 
not viable whereas bankruptcy reorganization provides for rehabilitating the debtor. 
The reorganization process involves the debtor, who is known as the debtor-in-
possession (DIP) or incumbent manager, remaining in possession of his or her 
property and developing a plan to generate funds, while the business’s debts are 
restructured in order to allow the debtor to continue business operations. It enables 
valuable firms to improve and continue their operations by providing several 
mechanisms for ensuring that these firms can emerge from bankruptcy adequately 
(Brigham & Houston 2001; White 1989).  
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2.2 Bankruptcy reorganization and post-bankruptcy performance 
 
In an attempt to investigate the practical worth of the bankruptcy reorganization 
process, a great deal of research has been undertaken. A summary of the major 
empirical studies relating to the bankruptcy reorganization proceedings is shown in 
Table 2.1. A literature review of previous research is given in the following sections. 
 
 
2.2.1 Measures of success in the bankruptcy reorganization process 
 
Initial studies of outcomes of bankruptcy reorganization were focused on an 
examination of a number of insolvent firms emerging from the reorganization 
process. Morse and Shaw (1988) studied the effect of the 1978 Bankrupt Reform Act 
by examining the proportion of US bankrupt firms that were reorganized or 
liquidated before and after the 1978 Act between 1973 and 1982 and found that of 
162 firms that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization1, 98 firms, 60%, had 
survived as independent companies and 11 firms, 7%, reorganized through a merger. 
Weiss (1990)’s study, however found 95 percent of 37 sample firms from 1979 to 
1986 emerged from the process successfully but the sample was small.  
 
Later, Moulton and Thomas (1993) tried to find the effectiveness of the process by 
classifying the reorganization outcomes into four categories; 1) successful 
reorganization, 2) partially successful reorganization, 3) mergers and acquisitions, 
and 4) liquidation. According to their definitions, successful reorganization means 
firms emerging from the reorganization process which maintain the original 
corporate identity, continue as publicly traded firms, and have assets after 
reorganization of more  than 50 % of  its  pre-bankruptcy levels.  Partially  successful  
reorganization,  however, is  defined as emerging firms  that fail to meet one or  more  
of the qualifications of the first group.  Mergers and  acquisitions  are emerging firms. 
 
______________________________________ 
1
 In this study, Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization or Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
reorganization proceedings or Chapter 11 means Chapter 11, the bankruptcy reorganization 
proceedings of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  
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Therefore through mergers and acquisitions, the emerging firm is acquired by the 
existing firms. The last is the group of liquidating firms. Although their results were 
in line with the study of Morse & Shaw (1988), 44 of 73 sample firms, 61 %, 
emerged from bankruptcy but only 6 achieved successful reorganization and 12 firms 
attained partially successful reorganization while the remainder were mergers and 
acquisitions. Importantly, they found some reorganized firms remained weak and 
continued to decline. Hotchkiss’s (1994, 1995) studies confirmed these results. She 
examined post-bankruptcy performance of reorganized firms in terms of accounting 
profits and a firm’s ability to meet cash flow projections of the reorganization plan 
and found that the performance that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
reorganization proceedings was significantly negative.  
 
Hotchkiss’s results in 1994 showed that nearly 40 percent of firms continued to 
experience operating losses within the two years following bankruptcy and more than 
16 percent of the sample failed a second time. Firms emerging were not viable and 
needed further restructuring. A substantial number of these firms provided little 
evidence that the bankruptcy reorganization process effectively rehabilitated 
distressed firms. Hotchkiss’s study in 1995 also provided support for this view.  She 
documented the operating performance of firms emerging from Chapter 11 over the 
period 1979-1988.  The findings showed that more than 40 percent of the firms 
continued to experience operating losses in the three years after emergence and 32 
percent subsequently filed for bankruptcy again. The median industry-adjusted 
operating performance was negative. The median forecast errors between actual post-
bankruptcy performance and projected performance in each year were also negative 
and significantly different from zero. Firms in the sample often failed to meet the 
cash flow projections prepared. From these results, she concluded that firms filing 
for Chapter 11 continued to perform poorly during a five-year period following 
reorganization.   
 
Alderson and Betker (1999) in a similar approach to Hotchkiss (1995) on the 
accounting measures of performance, evaluated the operating performance of 62 
sample reorganized firms from 1983-1993 for the first three years following 
emergence from bankruptcy. They found that during each of the three fiscal years 
following emergence from bankruptcy reorganization, at least 60% of the firms with 
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available information reported operating profit margins that fell below the median 
level for the industry. They concluded that their findings were similar to Hotchkiss’s 
(1995) study i.e. that the majority of firms exhibited poor accounting performance. 
Consistent with these results, an investigation by Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) 
also confirmed that the mechanisms of Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization 
proceedings cannot enhance insolvent firms to reorganize efficiently.  
 
Alderson and Betker (1999) tried to investigate another type of post-bankruptcy 
performance by refocusing their analysis on the post-bankruptcy cash flows provided 
by the firm. They explained that a firm which emerges from bankruptcy must show 
that its reorganization plan is in the best interests of all claimants. Thus, in their 
method, they used data from cash flow statements creating net cash flows paid to all 
claimants and then calculated an annualized return. They compared the annualized 
return on the reorganized firm with the annualized return on Standard & Poor 
(S&P)’s 500 index. The results showed that the total cash flow returns for their 
samples were significantly higher than the returns on the S&P 500 index. Obviously, 
the results of analyzing cash flow performance are different from the results of 
analyzing accounting performance.  
 
The evidence from Japan of Eisenberg & Tagashira’s (1994) study argued that 
reorganized firms under the Japanese bankruptcy reorganization proceedings in 1982 
– 1987 could create firm value. Daily (1995) also tried to reinvestigate its 
effectiveness by using the four bankruptcy reorganization outcomes of Moulton & 
Thomas (1993). Daily (1995)’s results suggested that 79% of sample firms could 
survive and continue business operations efficiently even though some of them 
needed to merge with other companies. Further, the findings of reexamining the 
effectiveness of the process by Platt and Platt (2002) asserted that post-bankruptcy 
performance of sample emerging firms as measured by abnormal returns and forecast 
errors in both operating and net income were relatively strong. Only 20% of the 
sample received negative operating income after emerging from bankruptcy. Kalay, 
Singhal and Tashjian (2007) also examined whether firms filed for bankruptcy 
reorganization improve their operating performance during Chapter 11. They found 
that firms with higher ratios experienced greater improvements in operating 
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performance and concluded that Chapter 11 provided net benefits to their sample 
firms.  
 
Hubbard and Stephenson (1997) investigated stock prices of 68 bankrupt firms that 
submitted reorganized plans during the period 1988-1993 and found that on average, 
during the reorganization, the market price of stocks in their sample was higher than 
the price that the shareholders expected to receive under the reorganization plan. 
Eberhart, Altman and Aggarwal (1999) also checked equity performance of 
emerging firms between 1980 and 1989 and found that the stock return performances 
of 131 sample firms were better than the market’s expectation. Jayaraman, 
Sabherwal and Shrikhande (2001) considered recovery time and stock performance 
by a comparison of two companies in different countries (the US firms, the Colombia 
Gas system and the German firms, Metallgesellschaft). The results showed that 
country economic fundamentals made the post-reorganization performance of the US 
firms better than the performance of the German firms but the resolution time to 
emerge from bankruptcy of the US firms took longer than the German firms.  
 
 
2.2.2 The critical factors influencing successful bankruptcy reorganization 
 
Research studying the critical success factors include the institutional features of 
bankruptcy reorganization such as the recontracting framework and the automatic 
stay (Frank & Torous 1989; Gertner & Scharfstein 1991), DIP financing (Chatterjee, 
Dhillon & Ramirez 2004; Dahiya, John, Puri & Ramirez 2003), financial indicators 
(Chen 2003; Fisher & Martel 2003;), financial projections (Michel, Shaked & 
McHugh 1998; Platt & Platt 2002), refocusing and restructuring strategies (Datta & 
Iskandar-Datta 1995; Dawley 1999; Hotchkiss & Mooradian 1998;), and the 
efficiency of insolvent firms (Routledge & Gadenne 2000; White 1994). A review of 
this literature follows. 
 
Frank and Torous (1989) attempted to investigate the institutional features of Chapter 
11 bankruptcy reorganization proceedings in two applications; investment and 
financing decisions and found the recontracting process between creditors and 
stockholders in Chapter 11 can overcome the underinvestment problem. Gertner and 
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Scharfstein (1991) also studied investment in Chapter 11. Their model proved that 
underinvestment is likely to be a problem and Chapter 11 could be helpful. The 
option to file for Chapter 11 protection can increase the efficiency of investment. 
Mooradian (1994) built on Gertner & Scharfstein’s (1991) work and believed that 
investment policy related to the maintenance of equity value. The bankruptcy code 
promotes bargaining in Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization proceedings among 
management, equity holders and debt holders. This allows stockholders to retain 
some valuable equity in the firm. According to Mooradian’s (1994) simple model of 
a distressed firm, the bankruptcy reorganization process can reduce overinvestment 
for bad firms that file for Chapter 11 and allows more good firms to renegotiate with 
debtholders, reducing underinvestment. Chen, Weston & Altman’s (1995) study also 
confirmed that the automatic stay of bankruptcy reorganization has the effect of 
extending debt maturity, thereby increasing the firm’s ability to obtain new financing 
to make the investments required for its recovery.   
 
Dahiya et al. (2003) studied the benefits of debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing in 
reorganized firms. Significantly, DIP financing was associated with a higher 
probability of emergence and a shorter time in bankrupt reorganization. There was 
little evidence indicating overinvestment of DIP financing. The findings suggested 
that it was helpful for investment in positive net present value projects of those firms. 
Consistent with these results, Chatterjee et al. (2004) also examined the effect of DIP 
financing on security prices. They considered DIP loans of sample firms by 
analyzing stock and bond prices and found that abnormal stock and bond returns at 
the announcement of DIP loans were significantly positive. Fayez and Meyer (2001) 
also found a positive and statistically significant impact of DIP financing on 
successful reorganization and a shortened duration under Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
reorganization proceedings. Much research accepted that DIP financing under 
Chapter 11 was valuable for a reorganized firm’s future prospects (see Carapeto 
2003; Chen, Weston & Altman 1995; Dhillon, Noe & Ramirez 1995; John 1993; 
John & Vasudevan 1996; John, John & Vasudevan 2000) However, there are 
arguments against DIP financing as some researchers have pointed out that this may 
influence managers to undertake risks by possibly investing in negative net present 
value projects. This may lead to overinvestment problems for firms in financial 
distress (Gertner & Scharfstein 1991; Triantis 1993).   
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Fisher and Martel (2003) examined the probability of reorganization by exploring the 
financial characteristics of reorganizing and liquidating firms filing for protection 
under the Bankruptcy Act. Their results showed that firms in reorganization had a 
mean asset/debt ratio of 57%, whereas firms in liquidation were in an even worse 
financial position with a mean asset/debt ratio of just 21 percent. The probability of 
reorganization increased with the level of free assets, the amount of debt reduction, 
and firm size, while it decreased with the firm’s liquidation value. The results 
confirmed that the relative size of Crown (Government) claims, the legal form of the 
firm, and the asset/debt ratio are significant determinants of the reorganization 
decision. Chen (2003) also found the firm’s financial structure was the important 
variable of a bankrupt firm to restructure its debt. Denis and Rodgers (2002, 2007) 
also examined reorganization success in the U.S.A.  They used a sample of 224 
Chapter 11 filings reported from 1985-1994. They related operating and financial 
characteristics to the decision to reorganize in Chapter 11 and measures of success 
following reorganization. The findings showed that the reorganization decision rather 
than selling a firm, whether piecemeal or as a whole, was related to the amount of 
restructuring methods done while in Chapter 11. Reorganization success was related 
to firm profitability measured as of the year-end just prior to Chapter 11 filing and to 
firm and industry profitability measured as of the year-end just prior to bankruptcy 
resolution. Importantly, the results also showed that reductions in assets and 
liabilities while in Chapter 11 were associated with reorganization success. 
 
Michel et al. (1998) focused their research on evaluating the reliability of financial 
and operational projections that are a crucial part of a reorganization plan. They 
stated that the appropriate projections can explain the success of a firm’s emergence 
from bankruptcy, therefore, the projections should not be overestimated. By 
investigating deviations between actual and projected performance of sample firms, 
their findings disclosed that the operational and financial projections that filing firms 
provided to the bankruptcy court prior to their emergence from Chapter 11 were 
frequently overstated. In a different approach, Gilson, Hotchkiss and Ruback (2000) 
used the market value of bankrupt firms to compare with estimates of value based on 
management’s published cash flow projections. Their findings show that the ratio of 
estimated value to market value in the sample was very wide. It varies from less than 
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20% to greater than 250%. They pointed out that the reason for the variation in these 
errors were claimholders’ incentives to overstate and understate the firm’s value. In a 
similar manner, Platt and Platt (2002) also compared pro forma forecasts from the 
plan of reorganization with actual financial performance. They found that empirical 
evidence concerning the accuracy of operational and financial forecasts in 
reorganization plans were mixed. Large variance in forecast errors in both operating 
income and net income indicated that firms were inconsistent in their forecasting 
ability within their reorganization plan. However, the median forecast error for 
operating income was not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, median and 
mean forecast errors for net sales and net income were not significantly different 
from zero as well. This implied that on average, forecasts of reorganization plans 
were not significantly different from actual results.   
 
Regarding turnaround strategy, the study found that a great deal of previous research 
suggested the utility of corporate refocusing and restructuring for improving post-
bankruptcy performance (Dawley 1999; Dawley, Hoffman & Lamont 2002; Denis & 
Rodgers 2002; Hotchkiss 1994; Sudarsanam & Lai 2001). Dawley (1999) and 
Dawley et al. (2002) examined how the performance effects of refocusing or the 
reduction in the scope of a firm’s business activities in the case of bankrupt firms. In 
their results, post-bankruptcy performance as measured by 3-5 year averages of 
industry adjusted return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS) and Altman’s Z-
score improved significantly in bankrupt firms that implemented this strategy. They 
suggested that refocusing was an effective bankruptcy management strategy. 
Similarly, much evidence confirmed that most bankrupt firms engaged in turnaround 
strategies, particularly, strategic restructuring methods. Hotchkiss (1994) examined 
the asset sale decision by large public companies that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
reorganization and found that abnormal announcement returns were positively 
related to the restructuring strategy. Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1995) also examined 
the restructuring strategy in four types – financial restructuring (i.e. extension of 
maturity, reduced interest rates), asset restructuring (i.e. divestitures, sale and 
leaseback) and governance restructuring (i.e. Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
turnover, turnover in the boards) including labor recontracting (i.e. employee layoffs, 
wage concessions) before and during a Chapter 11 filing. They found that 
divestitures played a significant role in restructuring firms both before and after 
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filing. Consistent with Datta & Iskandar-Datta (1995), Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) 
also examined various types of restructuring strategy – managerial, operational, asset, 
and financial restructuring methods. They found that recovery firms preferred to 
choose investment and acquisition whereas non-recovery firms focused on 
operational and financial restructuring. Their results confirmed the efficiency of asset 
restructuring methods. Chatterjee et al. (1996) studied determinants of debt 
restructuring decision of financial distressed firms by examining the firms that 
undertook Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, prepackaged bankruptcies, and 
workouts. They found that firms facing economic distress chose to file for 
bankruptcy reorganization, while economically viable firms used workouts and 
economically viable firms that faced immediate liquidity problems preferred 
prepackaged bankruptcies. A firm’s debt restructuring decision depended on the 
degree of the firm’s leverage, the severity of the liquidity crisis, the extent of the 
creditor’s coordination, and the magnitude of the firm’s economic distress.  
 
To investigate the efficiency of insolvent firms, White (1994) examined bankruptcy 
as a screening mechanism by developing a game theoretic model of the interaction 
between the two corporate bankruptcy procedures, Chapter 11 - the reorganization 
proceedings and Chapter 7 - the liquidation proceedings2. White’s (1994) conclusions 
showed that Chapter 11 is not a perfect screening device; it encourages managers to 
reorganize when they should liquidate. The results are similar to the studies of other 
researchers (e.g., Chatterjee et al. 1996; Mooradian 1994; Routledge & Gadenne 
2000). Mooradian’s (1994) study also found that Chapter 11 procedure provided an 
incentive for inefficient firms to reorganize rather than mimic out-of-court 
restructurings.  The procedure allowed firms that should be liquidated to continue 
operation.  A significant proportion of firms filing for Chapter 11 were inefficient.  
In addition,  Mooradian (1994) stated  that economically viable firms  file  for 
Chapter 11 because  it  was the   most effective  mechanism   for   resolving  the 
creditor’s coordination problem.  Chatterjee et al. (1996)  confirmed that empirically,  
most   firms  filing   for   Chapter 11  were   not   economically   viable.      However, 
 
_______________________________________ 
2
 Chapter 7 – the liquidation proceedings in this study means Chapter 7, the liquidation 
proceedings of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  
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economically viable firms may choose a formal Chapter 11 bankruptcy to restructure 
their debt due to strategic reasons such as severe information asymmetries, and the  
need for funding. The advantages of Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization 
proceedings,  according to Berkovitch and Israel (1991) were  that creditors preferred 
to renegotiate under Chapter 11 rather than provide debt relief to firms facing 
overinvestments via a workout. Thus, when distressed firms faced an overinvestment  
problem, firms often opted for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization over a workout. 
Routledge and Gadenne (2000) studied the model of successful/unsuccessful 
reorganization by using data of financially distressed companies in Australia. Their 
study was undertaken after Australia’s insolvency law had offered a chance for 
distressed companies to reorganize their affairs by the introduction of voluntary 
administration as an alternative to liquidation. They stated that the insolvency law 
should provide an important filtering mechanism by providing the opportunity for 
inefficient firms to be liquidated. The law should be designed to ensure that only 
efficient firms reorganize. In their results, it appeared that the reorganization decision 
was biased towards permitting inefficient firms to reorganize. 
 
 
2.2.3 The critical governance factors influencing successful bankruptcy 
reorganization 
               
Research involving governance patterns includes board size and composition (Daily 
1995; Daily & Dalton 1994a, 1994b; Gales & Kesner 1994), Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) - board chairperson structure/CEO duality (Brockmann 1997; Brockmann, 
Hoffman, Dawley & Fornaciari 2004; Daily 1995), CEO turnover (Daily & Dalton 
1995; Hotchkiss 1995), equity ownership (Daily 1996; Daily & Dalton 1994a; Kim 
2006), and audit committee (Charitou, Lambertides & Trigeorgis 2007; Chen 2003; 
Daily 1996;). A review of this literature related to each pattern is as follows:   
 
Gales and Kesner (1994) analyzed board of director (BOD) composition and size in 
bankrupt firms and found that at the time of bankruptcy, the BOD size of bankrupt 
firms was smaller than non-bankrupt firms but interestingly, the percent of outside 
directors in the board for bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms was almost the same (i.e. 
54% vs. 55%). These results suggested that although corporate boards are 
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significantly affected by bankruptcy, outside directors still play an important role in 
monitoring management in bankrupt firms.  Daily and Dalton (1994a, 1994b) also 
found BOD quality as a significant predictor of bankruptcy. They indicated that 
boards with many outsiders are more likely to be highly involved in performance 
improvement. Daily’s (1995) findings also showed that the proportion of 
outside/independent directors were positively related to the success of reorganization. 
Daily (1995) confirmed the role of outside director members in the board of bankrupt 
firms and suggested that a board with a high proportion of outsiders was an effective 
board.  
 
Daily and Dalton (1994a, 1994b) attempted to investigate board leadership structure 
particularly the structure of chief executive officer (CEO) - board chairperson 
positions in bankrupt firms while Daily (1995) tried to examine the relationship 
between board leadership structure and outcomes of the bankruptcy reorganization 
process. Daily and Dalton (1994a, 1994b) found that bankrupt firms in the sample 
have joint CEO - board chairperson structures and higher proportions of affiliated 
directors than the survivor firms. On the other hand, Daily (1995) found that CEO 
duality was not significantly associated with the success of the bankruptcy 
reorganization. Daily and Dalton (1995) extended their research to changes in 
leadership structure and found evidence supporting changes in CEO structure were 
toward a separate CEO and board chairperson. Further, Brockmann (1997) and 
Brockmann et al. (2004) found a significant impact of a separate CEO - board 
chairperson structure on bankruptcy reorganization. Bankrupt firms that have the 
incumbent CEO separated from the board chairperson position can reduce the 
reorganization time. However, they also found that CEO power - duality can increase 
the odds of survival. These results suggest that board leadership structures have 
significant influence on firms during bankruptcy reorganization. 
 
In addition, Daily and Dalton (1995), who focused their research on CEO and 
director turnover in failing firms and its impact on board structure and composition 
in the 5-year period prior to bankruptcy, found that the rate of CEO and director 
turnover for the bankrupt firms was significantly different from the non-bankrupt 
control firms. These changes may lead to greater proportions of outside directors in 
the bankrupt firms. Hotchkiss (1995) also concentrated her study on management 
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turnover of firms under the reorganization process by investigating CEO 
replacements of firms emerging from bankruptcy. She found that 70% of sample 
firms had CEO turnover and these changes were significantly associated with high 
post-bankruptcy profitability. Consistent with these results, Charitou, Lambertides 
and Trigeorgis’s (2007) findings also showed that top-level management turnovers in 
bankruptcy-filing firms can mitigate the negative abnormal returns during the 
distressed period.  
 
Regarding equity ownership, Daily & Dalton’s (1994a) study that used equity 
ownership by institutional investors, the officers and directors of a firm and holders 
of 5 percent or more as control variables for studying governance patterns in 
bankrupt firms, common stock holdings by institutional investors had a significant 
relation to profitability (net income divided by total assets) of these firms at p < .05 
level. This was an interesting discovery that has become increasingly important in 
the area of bankruptcy reorganization. Later, Daily (1996) tried to investigate 
institutional equity holdings again as a monitoring mechanism of bankruptcy 
reorganization. However, Daily’s (1996) results did not confirm the efficiency of this 
mechanism on successful reorganization. The relationship between equity holdings 
by institutional investors and a bankruptcy reorganization filing were not statistically 
significant. Contrary to Daily’s (1996) results, the studies of Kim (2006) and 
Charitou et al. (2007) provided evidence suggesting that equity shareholdings by 
managers and institutional investors played a significant  role in improving post-
bankruptcy performance.  
 
The audit committee is another governance pattern that Daily (1996) attempted to 
examine, i.e. the proportion of affiliated directors on an audit committee and the 
incidence of a bankruptcy reorganization filing for the 5-year period preceding the 
filing. The results did not find the significant relationship between the incidence of 
bankruptcy and the proportion of affiliated directors on a bankrupt firm’s audit 
committee. Chen (2003) also investigated auditor’s opinions as the proxy for the 
asymmetric information that may affect the choice between the Chapter 11 
bankruptcy reorganization proceedings and workouts of distressed firms. The 
findings showed that Chapter 11 firms received more adverse opinions from the 
auditors than workout firms. These results suggested that firms that suffer from 
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severe problems in accounting report had only Chapter 11 as the choice for 
reorganization. Evidence from Charitou et al.’s (2007) research  asserted that 
qualified audit opinions during bankruptcy reorganization were important and 
affected the quality of earnings and the level of abnormal returns.   
 
 
2.2.4 Related Thai research  
 
In Thailand, many previous studies have been undertaken on private workouts rather 
than restructuring via a legal reorganization procedure (Claessens, Djankov & 
Klapper 1999; Claessens, Djankov & Wu 2000; Dasri 2001; Haksar & Kongsamut 
2003; Santipraphob 2003; Siamwalla 2001). To date, only three research studies 
about formal methods of corporate workout have been conducted. It may be that the 
legal procedure about the reorganization of the Thai Bankruptcy Act is a new issue 
for practitioners and researchers. The first research was the study of Vongvipanond, 
Jumpa and Wichitaksorn (2002) regarding systematic analysis and empirical 
evidence of court - supervised corporate restructuring in Thailand in terms of 
economic and legal perspectives. The second study was undertaken by Pipatsitee, 
Kuldilouk and Ekukara (2003), at the Center for Applied Economics Research, 
Faculty of Economics, Kasetsart University, Thailand. They extended the first piece 
of research concerning the efficiency and effectiveness of the Thai bankruptcy court 
in terms of managing and controlling debt restructuring proceedings comparing it 
with the Corporate Restructuring Group, Bank of Thailand and the Thai Asset 
Management Corporation. The third study was also undertaken by Pipatsitee, 
Kuldilouk, Ekukara and Kuntong (2004) who extended their previous research by 
referring to their 2003 research results in order to determine ways for law 
development and the development of the law enforcement to improve debt 
restructuring efficiency. It was found that only the first, the research of 
Vongvipanond et al. (2002) investigated the implementation of the reorganization 
plan and a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance.   
 
Vongvipanond, Jumpa and Wichitaksorn (2002) attempted to study the process, 
problem and outcome of Thai corporate restructuring in the post-1997 crisis during 
the period 1998 - 2002. They used a survey research method to examine attitudes and 
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opinions of various stakeholders about the role of the Thai bankruptcy law towards 
the formal reorganization process. Their findings showed that the pattern of business 
restructuring under Thai Bankruptcy Act represents a US-based quasi-Chapter 11 
which gives priority to debtors in managing filing firm during the bankruptcy 
reorganization process. More than 80% of bankruptcy petitions were voluntary 
petitions filed by debtors, who were also plan preparers and plan administrators. 
When they examined reorganization plans and actual post-bankruptcy performance, 
the findings revealed that the average recovery rate for reorganization was higher 
than the percentage of bankruptcy liquidation.  This study found 49% as the average 
recovery rate for reorganization while the rate of bankruptcy liquidation was only 
17%.  They emphasized that this ratio showed the effectiveness of the reorganization 
plan that enhanced the firm’s financial performance. In addition, the survey results 
also showed that most stakeholders were quite happy with the Thai bankruptcy law 
regarding the formal reorganization process because court-based corporate 
reorganization through the Central Bankruptcy Court had both facilitated and 
quickened debt settlement and business restructuring. 
 
The Thai research thus concentrated very much on the law development to debt 
reorganization procedure rather than investigating financial characteristics of the 
process. No research has been done about the effectiveness of mechanisms of the 
formal reorganization process of the Thai Bankruptcy Act and post - bankruptcy 
performance in the finance field. It has not been researched whether governance 
mechanisms in the Thai reorganization proceedings are critical variables to revive 
bankrupt companies. This study will, therefore, consider these variables based on the 
theoretical framework of agency theory and endeavour to find the importance of 
governance mechanisms in the Thai reorganization proceedings. 
 
 
2.3 The Thai bankruptcy reorganization process 
 
The study proposes to examine determinants of post-bankruptcy performance by 
using insolvent firms under the Thai bankruptcy reorganization process. Some 
knowledge concerning the Thai reorganization process is required to understand the 
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administration process in reorganized firms and key governance mechanisms within 
the process. A brief review of this literature is as follows. 
 
 
2.3.1 General background 
 
The Bankruptcy Court in Thailand opened on June 18, 1999 after the National 
Assembly passed an amended 1940 Bankruptcy Act and approved the establishment 
of special bankruptcy courts in March 1998 (Debt Restructuring Regimes in Thailand 
n.d.; Urapeepatanapong, Sethsathira & Okanurak 1998). The primary purpose of the 
establishment of new reorganization provisions was to deal with the economic fallout 
from the Asian economic crisis in 1997. This was the first time Thailand had had a 
formal reorganization procedure in bankruptcy law since the original Thai 
Bankruptcy Act established in 1940. 
 
The original Act included no provisions for the reorganization of a debtor. Under the 
old law, there was only one result of the proceedings, the liquidation of the debtor. 
Often these proceedings did not lead to a full realization of the debtor’s assets. It 
never gave a good prognosis for the business survival of the debtor company and 
there was no chance for the restructuring of his/her business. In addition, it did not 
have the concept of a voluntary bankruptcy. There were only creditors initiating 
bankruptcy (Chandler, Sarawichitr & Nimmansomboon 2004; Pornavalai 1998). 
 
A judicial process for the reorganization of debtors was established by Bankruptcy 
Act Amendment No. 4 B.E. 2541 which came into force in April 1998. It added a 
new Chapter 3/1 which involved sections 90/1 through 90/90 to the original 
Bankruptcy Act. The Amendment introduced a new legal proceeding - the 
reorganization proceeding intended to achieve the financial rehabilitation of 
insolvent companies. The new chapter was entitled “Proceedings for Reorganizing 
Business of Debtor”.  
 
However, there remained several issues unanswered for future legislation. Thus, in 
April 1999, the Bankruptcy Act No. 5 B.E. 2542 came into effect. This was a 
refinement of the new principles established in the 1998 Amendment. It covered a 
number of editorial and substantive subjects such as monetary thresholds, capital 
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injection, creditor voting, and approval of the plan. It may be said that the 1999 
amendment was a step forward and could always be used as a basis for further legal 
development (Pornavalai 1999). 
 
The new Bankruptcy Act includes elements of the US bankruptcy Code’s Chapter 11, 
British Insolvency law and the Singapore Companies Act concerning Judicial 
Management (Anonymous 1997; Pornavalai 1998; Urapeepatanapong, Sethsathira & 
Okanurak 1998). Being similar to Chapter 11, the aim of amending the 1940 
Bankruptcy Act was to give an opportunity to economically distressed companies to 
restructure their assets, operations, liabilities, and other obligations. The amendment 
was designed to encourage creditors and debtor companies to cooperate in 
maintaining future viability of debtor companies. In addition, it allows creditors to 
extend additional loans to insolvent firms in the hope that the new investment can 
keep the firm in operation without losing the right to claim compensation during a 
future restructuring or liquidation process (Pornavalai 1999; Sullivan 2002). The 
Amendments are important contributions for they seek to greatly enhance the success 
of reorganization (Bankruptcy Act of 1940 - in Thai n.d.; Chandler, Sarawichitr & 
Nimmansomboon 2004; Pornavalai 1998, 1999; Urapeepatanapong, Sethsathira & 
Okanurak 1998). 
 
 
2.3.2 The legislative reorganization procedure 
 
Based on the legislative reorganization procedure of the Business Reorganization 
office, Legal Execution Department, Ministry of Justice, Thailand (see Appendix 1: 
Chart of Business Reorganization Process), its important points are shown in Figures 
2.1 - 2.3  (Bankruptcy Act of 1940 - in Thai n.d.; Chandler et al. 2004; Chart of 
Business Reorganization Process n.d.; Pornavalai 1998, 1999; Urapeepatanapong et 
al. 1998). These are as follows. 
 
Figure 2.1 presents the process of filing a petition for reorganization. It starts when a 
firm files a petition for reorganization giving the court two alternatives; dismissal or 
acceptance of the petition. The petition will be accepted if the person who petitions 
for reorganization is: 1) a creditor(s) to whom the debtor owes at least 10 million 
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Baht, 2) an insolvent debtor owing creditor(s) at least 10 million Baht, 3) the Bank of 
Thailand, Securities and Exchange Commission, the Insurance Department and other 
certain government agencies being responsible for overseeing the operations of the 
debtor (see Figure 2.2: a petitioner and criteria for bankruptcy reorganization). If the 
petition is accepted, the court will examine the facts following the criteria for 
reorganization (see Figure 2.2). These include four main items; firstly, the debtor 
must be a juristic person (section 90/1). Secondly, the debtor must be insolvent, have 
more liabilities than total assets (section 90/3). Thirdly, the debtor owes creditor(s) at 
least 10 million Baht and fourthly, the reasons for and methods of reorganizing have 
been prepared. In addition, the nomination of the reorganization planner must have 
qualifications as specified by ministerial regulations. After examining the facts, the 
court will then decide whether to order business reorganization and appoint a plan 
preparer or dismiss the petition.  
 
Once the court orders reorganization, proceedings commence and automatic stay 
comes into effect (see Figure 2.3: an insolvent firm during the bankruptcy 
reorganization proceedings). The debtor may no longer manage the business but the 
firm can continue business operations under the governance mechanisms of the 
reorganization process. Shareholders will retain only the right to dividend payments. 
The court will appoint an interim manager to act under the official receiver’s 
supervision until the planner is appointed. However, the interim manager may be the 
management of the debtor’s operation. When a planner is appointed, powers to 
manage the business and shareholder rights will be vested in the planner who must 
have qualifications as required by ministerial regulations. If the planner is not 
appointed at this stage, the process of the selection of the planner will be organized 
by the official receiver (see the selection process of the planner in Figure 2.4). 
 
As shown in Figure 2.3, the planner has three to five months or around 90-150 days 
to prepare a reorganization plan for approval at the creditors’ meeting or creditor 
committee and confirmation by the Bankruptcy Court. In the reorganization plan, the 
Bankruptcy Act only specifies broad requirements of the plan (section 90/42). They 
comprise reasons for the reorganization, details of the debtor’s assets, guidelines and 
methods for reorganization, and releases of the security of secured creditors. 
Moreover, the reorganization plan must involve guidelines for the transfer of rights 
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of claim, a period for the implementation not exceeding five years, and the name and 
qualifications of the plan administrator including creditors’ approval of the plan. 
Specifically, the plan must be able to show to the court that reorganization value 
exceeds liquidation value. 
 
When the court issues an order accepting the reorganization plan, it will appoint a 
plan administrator who has rights and duties pursuant to section 90/59 of the 
Bankruptcy Act. The plan administrator must also have qualifications as stated in 
ministerial regulations. Once the court appoints the administrator, the duties of the 
planner immediately pass to the plan administrator who must manage the debtor’s 
business in accordance with the plan until reorganization of the debtor’s business 
operations is achieved.  At this stage, according to the Act, the plan may be amended 
or the time period may be extended. Furthermore, a number of corporate activities 
such as an increase of capital and a sale of assets can be waived without shareholder 
approval as long as they are carried out in cooperation with the plan. During the 
implementation of the approved plan, the plan administrator must continuously 
report its progress to the official receiver.  
  
If the plan administrator or the official receiver by the court or even the debtor’s 
previous management believes that reorganization has been achieved, he/she may 
request the court to order the cancellation of the business reorganization. The court 
will schedule a hearing to determine whether the reorganization has been 
accomplished. When the court orders a termination of the reorganization process 
owing to successful reorganization, a debtor firm’s executives resume the authority 
to run the business. If the implemented plan has been unsuccessful, it will examine 
the evidence in order to adjudge the debtor company as bankrupt by issuing an 
absolute receiving order or only declare the organization terminated.  
 
It should be noted that the success of the process is directly related to the 
reorganization plan and its implementation. Two important persons are involved in 
this success: first the planner as the person who propose the plan and second the plan 
administrator who implements it. The planner is nominated by a petitioner and 
approved by the Bankruptcy Court while the plan administrator is determined within 
the plan by the planner. Once the plan is approved by the court, the plan 
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administrator is also approved and appointed automatically. The law only specifies 
broadly that they must have an academic degree and work experience in this field. 
There is no restriction regarding the kind of person. They may be the existing 
management of a debtor company or external experts and may be the same person, 
the planner and the plan administrator. The critical factor is their ability to help the 
firm survive by making a fresh start. It will be interesting to examine who the real 
experts are - the planner and plan administrator – insiders or outsiders and how they 
influence post-bankruptcy performance. These factors will be analyzed in this study. 
 
2.3.3 The administration process of a reorganized firm during the bankruptcy 
          reorganization proceedings 
 
Based on Chapter 3/1 bankruptcy reorganization, a reorganized firm’s administration 
process has been described in this study. It has particular procedures for managing 
the debtor company which are unique in its Thai style (see Figure 2.5: the 
administration process of a reorganized firm during the bankruptcy reorganization 
proceedings). The debtor cannot continue to manage its assets, or even prepare the 
reorganization plan, that has to be done by an appointed planner during the planning 
period and by an appointed plan administrator after the plan has been approved.  
 
If the court orders a business reorganization but has not yet appointed a planner, the 
power and duties of the debtor's executive in managing the business and assets will 
cease. The court will appoint one or more persons or the debtor's executive to be the 
interim executive with the power and duties in managing the business and assets of 
the debtor under the supervision of the official receiver until a planner is appointed. 
During the time in which it is not possible to issue an order to appoint an interim 
executive, the official receiver will have the temporary power to manage the business 
and assets of the debtor (Section 90/20 of the 1940 Thai Bankruptcy Act). 
 
The planner and plan administrator may be nominated by creditor(s) or the debtor for 
court approval. This depends on who files the petition: creditor(s) or the debtor. They 
must have qualifications as stated in ministerial regulations but the law only specifies 
a broad range of qualifications such as a bachelor’s degree in finance and accounting 
and experience in this area of at least three years.  
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During the implementation of the approved plan, the creditors may pass a resolution 
at a meeting to appoint a committee of creditors to monitor and give guidance to the 
plan administrator. The plan administrator must manage the debtor firm following 
the plan, continuously report the progress of its implementation to a creditor 
committee and then submit it to the official receiver. It can be seen that the planner 
or the plan administrator acts as a board of directors to manage business operations 
relating to the reorganization plan including normal business operations as 
mentioned in the plan, while the existing management team of an insolvent firm still 
manages the day to day business by cooperating with the planner and the plan 
administrator. 
 
This administration process will finish when the reorganization, which has or has not 
been accomplished, is terminated. The court will examine the outcomes of the 
implementation according to the plan. If it fails, the court will order the termination 
of the reorganization and/or adjudicate the debtor company as bankrupt. If it is 
successful, the court will order the reorganization to be terminated as well and 
normal business operations by the existing management team of the debtor company 
may be resumed shortly after.  
 
 
2.3.4 The key governance mechanisms in the process 
 
According to the administration process of the reorganized firm, there are several 
control mechanisms set up by Chapter 3/1 of the Thai Bankruptcy Act which are 
important factors to enable debtor firms to achieve success. The key mechanisms are: 
 
              2.3.4.1 The owner of a debtor firm: The law gives the owner of the debtor 
firm a chance to choose to file a petition for reorganization, if the owner considers 
there is an appropriate opportunity to continue its business.  Once a firm is filed for 
reorganization by the debtor, he/she has first priority to nominate the planner, 
entrusted with the plan of reorganization who in turn nominates the plan 
administrator to manage the debtor firm after the plan has been approved by the court.   
 
              2.3.4.2 The planner: The planner has the duty to prepare a firm’s formal 
reorganization plan in three to five months and manage the debtor firm during the 
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time the plan is being proposed. The planner may be any person, company or 
committee nominated by the petitioner (the debtor or the creditor) and approved by 
the court. His duties commence upon the court’s order for business reorganization 
and finish when the court approves the plan. 
                
              2.3.4.3 The reorganization plan: The plan which is prepared by the 
planner must be accepted by three-fourths of the creditors voting at a creditors’ 
meeting. It must contain all the information required in Section 90/42 such as reasons 
for the reorganization, details of the debtor’s assets, guidelines and methods for 
reorganization namely restructuring methods, and name and qualifications of the plan 
administrator including creditor’s approval of the plan. When the court issues an 
order accepting the reorganization plan, it will be used as guidelines for the plan 
administrator for managing a reorganized firm.  
 
              2.3.4.4 The plan administrator: The plan administrator may be any person, 
company, or committee nominated by the planner, accepted by the creditor voting 
and approved by the court. The appointment, tenure, qualifications and compensation 
of the plan administrator are specifically contained in the plan. Once the court 
approves the plan and appoints the plan administrator, his/her duties commence and 
the duties of the planner immediately pass to him/her. He/she must manage the 
debtor’s business in accordance with the plan until reorganization of the debtor’s 
business operations is achieved. In addition, a remuneration package such as cash 
compensation and equity shareholding for the plan administrators is specified in the 
plan as a mechanism to motivate them to do their best for success in reorganization.   
 
              2.3.4.5 The creditors and a creditor committee: In the reorganization 
process, the creditors participate in all activities beginning with filing a petition and 
nominating the planner (if the debtor does not do so). Furthermore, approving the 
reorganization plan by the creditor voting, monitoring the plan administrator by a 
creditor committee are also their activities. A creditor committee is defined as a 
board of the plan administrator. It is required to provide guidance to the plan 
administrator and monitor the plan implementation. According to the law, the 
committee must be composed of at least three, but not more than seven members, 
from among the creditors or people assigned by the creditors to act on their behalf.   
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Although these mechanisms are generally viewed as important governance 
mechanisms of the process, no empirical evidence has assessed them in terms of 
agency theory. Thus, this study proposes to investigate the mechanisms expected by 
the theory as they may affect a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance and use them to 
design a research model and develop hypotheses to be tested. This will be described 
in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The process for filing a petition for bankruptcy reorganization  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from a chart of the Business Reorganization Process of the Business 
Reorganization Office, Legal Execution Department, Ministry of Justice, 
Thailand (see Appendix 1)  
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Figure 2.2: A petitioner and criteria for bankruptcy reorganization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from a chart of the Business Reorganization Process of the Business 
Reorganization Office, Legal Execution Department, Ministry of Justice, 
Thailand (see Appendix 1) and Bankruptcy Act of 1940 in Thai n.d.; 
Urapeepatanapong, Sethsathira & Okanurak 1998;  Pornavalai 1998. 
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Figure 2.3: An insolvent firm during the bankruptcy reorganization proceedings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from a chart of the Business Reorganization Process of the Business 
Reorganization Office, Legal Execution Department, Ministry of Justice, 
Thailand (see Appendix 1) 
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Figure 2.4: The selection process of the planner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from a chart of the Business Reorganization Process of the Business 
Reorganization Office, Legal Execution Department, Ministry of Justice, 
Thailand (see Appendix 1) 
  
 
Figure 2.5: The administration process of a reorganized firm during the bankruptcy 
reorganization proceedings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed from Chapter 3/1, bankruptcy reorganization proceedings of the    
Thai Bankruptcy Act (Bankruptcy Act of 1940 (in Thai) n.d.) and information 
from the reorganization plan of insolvent firms in the sample of the study 
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2.4 Summary 
 
This chapter reviews the literature of prior research findings relating to bankruptcy 
reorganization and post-bankruptcy performance. They involve measures of success 
in the bankruptcy reorganization process, the critical factors influencing successful 
bankruptcy reorganization, and the critical governance factors influencing successful 
bankruptcy reorganization. It also reviews the literature of the bankruptcy 
reorganization process of the Thai Bankruptcy Act and its key governance 
mechanisms as new incentives for studying an insolvent firm’s post-bankruptcy 
performance in this study.  
 
In the literature review, significant aspects of previous research findings were 
grouped as follows.  
 
            (1) measures of success in the bankruptcy reorganization process. Those 
studies included the percentages of firms emerging from bankruptcy, categories of 
emerging firms (successful reorganization, partially successful reorganization, and 
mergers and acquisitions), accounting performance, cash flow performance 
comparing with financial projections of the reorganization, and stock performance. 
The evidence shows that these measures gave mixed results.  
 
            (2) The critical success factors in the reorganization process. Those studies 
included the recontracting process, debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing, 
management changes, a firm’s profitability, financial and operational projections in 
the reorganization plan, refocusing and restructuring strategy, and the efficiency of 
insolvent firms. Evidence confirms that some of these mechanisms (i.e. DIP 
financing, restructuring strategy) are helpful for renegotiating with creditors, 
increasing the efficiency of investment decision and enhancing bankruptcy recovery.  
 
            (3) The critical governance factors in reorganization. Those studies included 
board size, board composition, the structure of chief executive officer (CEO) - board 
chairperson positions, CEO and director turnover, equity ownership, and audit 
committee. Among them, the crucial governance factors influencing successful 
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bankruptcy reorganization tend to be outside directors in the board, board leadership 
structure and CEO power.  
 
As to related research in Thailand, the literature review found only one survey by 
Vongvipanond, Jumpa & Wichitaksorn (2002) which examined the implementation 
of the reorganization plan and post-bankruptcy performance. Their findings 
confirmed that the reorganization plan was efficient and can increase post-
bankruptcy performance. Thai research generally concentrated on the legal 
development of debt reorganization procedures rather than investigating financial 
characteristics of the process.  
 
The literature reveals that the bankruptcy reorganization proceedings of the 1940 
Thai Bankruptcy Act provides provisions, such as filing petitions, automatic stay, 
creditors’ voting procedure and other useful mechanisms relating to a plan of 
reorganization and the appointment of a planner and plan administrator. These 
should help firms mitigate holdout problems and asymmetric information problems 
among claimants and enable an increase of creditor and investor confidence.  
 
The reorganization plan, planner and plan administrator are the most important parts 
of the Thai reorganization process. The process commences from the court 
appointing a planner, nominated by the petitioner or a debtor, to be responsible for 
preparing the plan and managing the company. Once creditors and the court approve 
the plan, its administration will be overseen by the plan administrator who is 
nominated by the planner. The administrator will assume all management powers 
over the debtor company’s business operations and assets that are previously held by 
the planner. However, the management team of the debtor company still exists to 
manage day-to-day business operations. If the implementation of the plan is 
successful, the debtor will be returned the power to control its business operations 
and assets and the debtor company’s shareholders will regain their full legal rights as 
shareholders. 
 
From the above literature, it is evident that no prior research has measured 
bankruptcy reorganization outcomes in terms of the percentage difference of actual 
financial performance to predicted performance and in relation to the governance 
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factors of the reorganization process (A summary of the major empirical studies 
relating to the bankruptcy reorganization proceedings is contained in Table 2.1). 
Most studies were undertaken in Western countries particularly the U.S. and used 
public companies which had been traded in a national stock exchange for analysis. 
There seems to be little evidence concerning the status of reorganization proceedings 
in Asian countries or on unlisted companies. No research has been completed around 
the effectiveness of mechanisms of the formal reorganization process of the Thai 
Bankruptcy Act and post – bankruptcy performance in the finance field within an 
agency theory framework.  
 
Thus, the present study provides a unique contribution to this field by using both 
public and private insolvent companies in Thailand as an empirical study. Based on 
agency theory, the study will measure actual post-bankruptcy performance by 
comparing it with predicted financial performance in the reorganization plan. This 
will show the efficiency of the plan approved by the court. Importantly, the results of 
the study will inform debtor firms and related persons such as creditors and 
shareholders, including the bankruptcy court and the official receivers as regulators, 
around key mechanisms of the process that can enable reorganized firms to improve 
post-bankruptcy performance and achieve successful reorganization.  
 
The next chapter presents the theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
between key governance mechanisms of the Thai reorganization proceedings and a 
firm’s post-bankruptcy performance in the context of agency theory. It also describes 
a model of agency theory and its governance mechanisms that can control agency 
problems and enhance post-bankruptcy performance. The research model of the 
study is also presented in this chapter.  
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 Table 2.1: A summary of the major empirical studies relating to the bankruptcy reorganization proceedings  
 
 
Study 
 
 
Objective 
 
Sample  
 
Findings 
 
Morse & 
Shaw (1988) 
To examine the risk and return 
characteristics of the stocks of firms 
that had been actively traded and 
entered bankruptcy reorganization 
before and after the implementation of 
the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act in the 
U.S. 
162 bankrupt firms in the U.S. between 
1973 and 1982 
Trading in bankrupt firms had become much more common and 
been accepted.  
 
Although the systematic risk of firms was not affected by the 
bankruptcy announcement, the return on investment as 
measured by three-year average returns of sample firms did not 
increase significantly. 
 
Of 162 sample firms, around 25 percent disappeared and/or 
were liquidated while about 67 percent emerged from the 
process. 
 
The findings indicated that the bankruptcy reorganization 
process affected stock and bond prices adversely.  
 
Frank & Torous 
(1989) 
To examine the institutional features of 
Chapter 11, bankruptcy reorganization 
30 bankrupt firms in the U.S. that 
emerged from reorganization between 
1970 and 1984 
Although the recontracting framework of Chapter 11 process 
was complex, lengthy, and costly, it can overcome the 
underinvestment problems of bankrupt firms. 
 
Weiss 
(1990) 
To examine the direct costs of 
bankruptcy and violation of priority 
claims.  
37 industrial firms from a list of New 
York and American Stock Exchange 
firms declaring bankruptcy from 
November 1979 to December 1986 
Direct costs of bankruptcy of sample firms averaging 3.1 
percent of the book value of debt plus the market value of equity 
at the end of the fiscal year preceding bankruptcy were lower 
than previous researchers and priority claims were violated in 29 
cases. 
 
 
The evidence found 95 percent of sample firms emerged from 
the bankruptcy reorganization.  
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 Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Objective 
 
Sample 
 
Findings 
Moulton & 
Thomas (1993) 
To investigate bankruptcy and 
bankruptcy reorganization as remedies 
for financially distressed firms. 
73 publicly-traded firms in the U.S. 
filed for bankruptcy reorganization 
from 1980 through to 1986 
All sample firms were voluntary bankruptcies filed for 
reorganization. 
 
There were 44 firms (61 percent) of the sample that emerged 
from the process. Of the 44, only 6 achieved successful 
reorganization and 12 were partially successful.  
 
Some of the reorganized firms remained weak and continued to 
decline. 
 
 
Daily & 
Dalton 
(1994a) 
To investigate the impact of board 
composition and chief executive officer 
(CEO) – board chairperson structure on 
corporate bankruptcy status. 
57 bankrupt firms and 57 surviving 
firms from archival sources such as 
Dun and Bradstreet and Funk and 
Scott’s Index of Corporate Change 
during the period 1972 -1982  
Bankrupt firms had a CEO-board chairperson structure and 
lower proportions of outside directors in the board.  
 
The evidence suggested that the quality of the board and 
corporate governance structure can predict bankruptcy status. 
 
In addition, control variables which included financial indicators 
(profit, liquidity and leverage) and constituent common stock 
holdings by institutional investors, the officers and directors, 
and holders of 5% or more of a firm’s stock were also predictors 
of bankruptcy. 
 
Daily & 
Dalton 
(1994b) 
To examine the impact of 
independent/dependent directors in the 
board and the dual leadership structure 
on the incidence of bankruptcy.   
50 bankrupt firms and 50 survivor 
firms during the year 1990 from 
Predicast’s F & S Index of Companies 
and Ward’s Business Directory of U.S. 
Private & Public Companies 
The findings were supportive of the impact of CEOs and boards 
of directors on the incidence of bankruptcy. 
 
The evidence confirmed that bankrupt firms relied more heavily 
on the dual leadership structure and fewer independent directors.  
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 Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Objective 
 
Sample 
 
Findings 
Eisenberg 
& Tagashira 
(1994) 
 
To investigate the effectiveness of the 
Japanese bankruptcy reorganization 
system. 
124 small Japanese firms under the 
bankruptcy reorganization process 
during the period 1982 -1987 
The value of payments promised to creditors exceeded 
liquidation values. 
 
The evidence indicated that Japanese bankruptcy reorganization 
proceedings can create firm value. 
 
Gales & 
Kesner 
(1994) 
To analyze the board of director size 
and composition in bankrupt 
organizations.  
127 bankrupt firms and 127 matching 
non-bankrupt firms between 1978 and 
1985 from Funk and Scott’s Index of 
Corporate Change and Ward’s 
Directory 
 
 
Bankrupt firms had significantly smaller boards than non-
bankrupt firms but the proportion of outside board members in 
bankrupt firms was almost equal to that in non-bankrupt firms. 
Hotchkiss 
(1994) 
Essay # 1 
To examine the performance 
of firms that have emerged 
from the Chapter 11 process.  
197 public companies which filed for  
Chapter 11 between October 1979  and 
September1988 and emerged from 
Chapter 11 by fiscal year end 1989 
A large number of reorganized firms continued to 
perform poorly after emerging.  
 
Little evidence confirmed the efficiency of the process. 
 
  
Hotchkiss 
(1994) 
Essay # 3 
To examine stock price reaction to 
asset sale decisions by large public 
companies entering the chapter 11 
process.   
50 large public companies which filed 
for Chapter 11 between October 1979  
and September1988 and used asset 
sales as corporate restructuring 
Abnormal announcement returns were positively related to asset 
restructuring.  
 
The evidence confirmed that the divestiture decision was an 
important method for restructuring financially distressed firms.  
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 Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Objective 
 
Sample 
 
Findings 
Daily 
(1995) 
 
To examine the relationship between 
board composition and leadership 
structure and bankruptcy reorganization 
outcomes. 
70 listed firms filing for Chapter 11, 
bankruptcy reorganization during the 
years 1980 through to 1986 
The evidence supported hypotheses regarding board 
composition which were the proportion of outside directors 
being positively associated with successful reorganization and 
negatively associated with liquidation.  
 
 However, the evidence provided no support for the impact of 
board leadership structure on the success of bankruptcy 
reorganization. 
 
Following the definition of reorganization outcomes by Moulton 
& Thomas (1993), 15 sample firms succeeded in reorganization, 
29 achieved partially successful reorganization, 11 were 
acquired, and the remaining 15 firms (21 percent) were 
liquidated.  
 
Daily & 
Dalton 
(1995) 
To examine CEO and director turnover 
in failing firms. 
Sample 1 - 57 bankrupt firms and 57 
surviving firms from archival sources 
such as Dun and Bradstreet and Funk 
and Scott’s Index of Corporate Change 
during the period 1972 -1982 
 
Sample 2 - 50 bankrupt firms and 50 
survivor firms during 1990 from 
Predicast’s F & S Index of Companies 
and Ward’s Business Directory of U.S. 
Private & Public Companies 
 
The rate of director turnover was substantially higher for 
bankrupt firms. 
 
Regarding the CEO-board chairperson structure,   the results 
from sample 1 indicated that there was no tendency for bankrupt 
firms to change this structure while sample 2 suggested that the 
position of CEO and board chairperson was likely to be 
separate. 
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 Tabled 2.1 (continued) 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Objective 
 
Sample 
 
Findings 
Datta & 
Iskandar-Datta 
(1995) 
 
To examine various forms of 
restructuring of firms under the 
bankruptcy reorganization process. 
135 firms that filed a Chapter 11 
reorganization petition between 
January 1980 and December 1989 
Among various types of restructuring – financial, asset and 
governance restructuring including labor recontracting, asset and 
governance restructuring played significant roles in reorganized 
firms.  
 
Hotchkiss 
(1995) 
To investigate the relationship between 
post-bankruptcy performance and 
management changes during the 
restructuring process. 
197 public companies which filed for  
Chapter 11 between October 1979 and 
September1988 emerged  
from Chapter 11 by fiscal year  
end 1989 
Pre-bankruptcy management which retained control of the firm 
in the reorganization process is strongly related to poor post-
bankruptcy performance. 
 
More than 40 percent of the reorganized firms in the sample 
continued to experience operating losses in the three years after 
emergence and 32 percent filed for bankruptcy again.  
 
Chatterjee, 
Dhillon & 
Ramirez 
(1996) 
To examine debt restructuring of 
sample firms undertaking bankruptcy 
reorganization, prepackaged 
bankruptcies, and workouts as 
mechanisms for resolving financial 
distress. 
70 Chapter 11 filings, 21 prepacks, 65 
private workouts, and 45 public 
workouts in the U.S. from January 
1989 - December 1992 
The debt restructuring decision of sample firms depended on the 
degree of a firm’s leverage, the severity of the liquidity crisis, 
the extent of creditor’s coordination, and the magnitude of the 
firm’s economic distress. 
 
Firms facing economic distress chose to file for bankruptcy 
reorganization while economically viable firms used workouts 
and economically viable firms that faced immediate liquidity 
problems preferred prepackaged bankruptcies. 
 
Daily 
(1996) 
To examine the impact of two 
monitoring groups - audit committee 
composition and institutional investor 
holdings on the incidence and nature 
(prepackaged plans and length of time 
spent in reorganization) of firms’ 
bankruptcy reorganization. 
53 firms filing bankruptcy 
reorganization and 53 matching firms 
not declaring bankruptcy in the U.S. 
during the period 1988 - 1993 
The relationship between affiliated directors serving on the audit 
committee or institutional investor holdings and the incidence of 
bankruptcy was not statistically significant. 
 
They were significantly related to the nature of bankruptcy filing 
during the 5-year period preceding the filing. 
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 Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Objective 
 
 
Sample 
 
Findings 
Hubbard & 
Stephenson 
(1997) 
To investigate stock prices of bankrupt 
firms that submitted reorganization 
plans.   
68 bankrupt firms from a list of New 
York and American Stock Exchange 
firms during the period 1988 and 1993 
On average, the market price of stocks in their sample was 
higher than the price that the shareholders expected to receive 
under the bankruptcy reorganization plan.  
 
Maksimovic & 
Phillips 
(1998) 
To investigate whether bankruptcy 
reorganization provides a mechanism 
that enhances insolvent firms to 
reorganize efficiently and the efficiency 
of asset reallocation decision of these 
firms.  
 
302 firms in the U.S filed for 
reorganization 1978 - 1989 
The bankruptcy reorganization process was relatively less 
important than industry and plant-level productivity factors in 
influencing the decisions of sample firms. 
 
Asset efficiency and reallocation decisions of bankrupt firms 
also depended on industry conditions. 
 
Michel, Shaked & 
McHugh 
(1998)  
To analyze the future of firms that file 
for bankruptcy reorganization by 
evaluating the reliability of the 
projections provided in the 
reorganization plan.  
 
35 firms filed for Chapter 11 between 
1989 and 1991 and meeting the 
determined criteria 
 
 
The operating and financial projections in the reorganization 
plan of sample firms were frequently overstated.   
Hotchkiss & 
Mooradian 
(1998) 
To investigate acquisitions as a means 
of restructuring firms in Chapter 11. 
55 restructuring firms acquired by 
public companies 
Acquisitions can create more value of restructuring firms 
according to post-merger performance of firms acquired in 
bankruptcy. 
  
Alderson  
& Betker 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
To assess post-bankruptcy performance 
by analyzing reorganized firms’ cash 
flows. 
 
 
 
89 firms that reorganized in Chapter 11 
process between 1983 and 1993 
Overall, post-bankruptcy performances of sample firms were 
poor.  
 
Investment behavior following reorganization affected the 
performance. Firms with high growth and more investment 
earned superior returns.  
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 Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Objective 
 
Sample 
 
Findings 
Dawley 
(1999) 
 
To examine the effects of strategic 
change (refocusing), organizational 
size, slack, and environmental 
munificence on post-bankruptcy 
performance in terms of recovery and 
recovery time.  
208 manufacturing firms filing for 
Chapter 11, bankruptcy reorganization 
from 1980 to 1992 
The effect of refocusing on post-bankruptcy performance was 
statistically significant. 
 
The results from the base net income, return on assets (ROA), 
return on sales (ROS), and Z-score models also supported that 
greater organizational size, slack, and environmental 
munificence positively affected post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
Eberhart, 
Altman & 
Aggarwal 
(1999) 
 
 
To assess the stock return performance 
of firms emerging from bankruptcy 
reorganization. 
131 reorganized firms in the U.S. 
between 1980 and 1989 
The equity performances of sample firms were positive and 
large in the long-term. 
 
The evidence showed that they were better than the market’s 
expectation. 
   
Gilson, 
Hotchkiss & Ruback 
(2000) 
To examine the market value of 
reorganized firms by comparing it with 
an estimated value based on the 
management’s published cash flow 
projections. 
 
63 public companies filed for Chapter 
11, bankruptcy reorganization between 
1984 and 1993 
The ratio of estimated value to market value in the sample was 
very wide – less than 20 percent to greater than 250 percent. 
 
 
Rose-Green & 
Dawkins 
(2000) 
To investigate the relationship between 
bankruptcy outcome and reaction to 
bankruptcy filings of the capital 
market. 
77 firms filing for bankruptcy petitions 
in the U.S. between 1980 and 1996 
The market was able to differentiate between subsequently 
liquidated firms and subsequently reorganized firms.  
 
Significantly, liquidated firms had larger negative price 
reactions than reorganized firms. 
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 Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Objective 
 
Sample 
 
Findings 
Fayez & Meyer 
(2001) 
To examine the impact of receiving 
debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing 
on the probability of successful 
reorganization and time spent under 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. 
47 Chapter 11 firms with 67 DIP 
financing agreements between 1980 
and 1995 from F & S Index of 
Corporate Changes, Moody’s Manuals 
and Wall Street Journal Index 
  
Statistically, there was a positive and significant impact of DIP 
financing on the probability of successful reorganization and a 
shorter time spent under bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
The evidence suggested that DIP financing can reduce the 
probability of liquidation. 
  
Jayaraman, 
Sabherwal & 
Shrikhande 
(2001) 
To examine the impact of financial 
distress, the bankruptcy code, and 
related procedures on the post-
reorganization performance of two 
companies engaged in similar 
businesses across two countries. 
The US firms, Colombia Gas system 
(CGS) and the German firms, 
Metallgesellschaft AG (MG) 
Unanticipated changes in energy prices were the cause of both 
the companies being driven into bankruptcy reorganization. 
 
The resolution time to come out of bankruptcy reorganization of 
the US firms was longer than that of the German firms but the 
post-reorganization performance of the US firms had been 
excellent while the performance of the German firms had been 
poor. 
 
The evidence indicated that the underlying economic 
fundamentals were more likely to be the important determinants 
of post-bankruptcy performance rather than the country specific 
bankruptcy code.   
 
Sudarsanam 
& Lai 
(2001) 
To investigate the effects of corporate 
turnaround strategies which include 
operational, asset, managerial and 
financial restructuring on post-
bankruptcy performance in terms of 
corporate recovery. 
166 bankrupt UK firms from 1985 - 
1993 
Recovery firms preferred to choose asset restructuring, 
particularly investment and acquisition whereas non-recovery 
firms focused on operational and financial restructuring. 
 
These results indicated that recovery firms chose more forward-
looking, expansionary and external market focused strategies 
than non-recovery firms which still kept internal changes.  
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 Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Objective 
 
Sample 
 
Findings 
Dawley, 
Hoffman 
& Lamont 
(2002) 
To investigate two important factors 
(choice situation and refocusing) of a 
firm’s post-bankruptcy performance. 
207 publicly traded manufacturing 
firms having assets greater than US$ 10 
million that filed for Chapter 11 
reorganization between 1980 and 1992 
The evidence confirmed that choice situation and refocusing 
were significant impacts on post-bankruptcy performance as 
measured by 3-5 year averages of industry-adjusted ROA, ROS 
and Altman’s Z-score.  
 
 
Denis & 
Rodgers 
(2002) 
To investigate critical factors of 
reorganization success. 
 
 
 
 
224 bankrupt firms in the U.S. from 
1985 – 1994 
Firm profitability and restructuring methods were significantly 
positive factors of reorganization success. 
 
The evidence also indicated that only 43 percent of the sample 
firms were successful.   
 
 
Lehavy 
(2002) 
 
 
 
 
To investigate fresh start equity value 
in companies emerging from Chapter 
11 bankruptcy. 
72 firms emerging from Chapter 11 and 
adopting fresh start reporting in 
accordance with Statement of Position 
no. 90-7 (SOP 90-7) 
The fresh start equity value was, on average, 4 percent 
understated relative to the market equity value immediately after 
emergence from Chapter 11.  
 
The cross-sectional variation in the misstatements between the 
fresh start equity value and the market equity value was 
significant. 
 
The characteristics of the bankruptcy reorganization process (i.e. 
percentage ownership of former unsecured creditors and former 
shareholders in the reorganization firm) were significant factors 
that related to the misstatement in the fresh start value of equity. 
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 Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Objective 
 
Sample 
 
Findings 
Platt & Platt 
(2002) 
To re-examine the effectiveness of the 
bankruptcy reorganization process 
78 public companies emerging from 
Chapter 11, bankruptcy reorganization 
The median and mean forecast errors for sales, operating income 
and net income were not significantly different from zero. 
 
The financial positions of sample emerging companies were 
relatively strong.  
 
 
Dahiya, John, Puri 
& Ramirez 
(2003) 
To investigate how debtor-in-
possession (DIP) financing is related to 
the probability and speed of bankruptcy 
resolution. 
107 debtor-in-possession financed 
firms in the U.S. between 1988 and 
1997 
Significantly, DIP financing was associated with a higher 
probability of emergence and a shorter time in bankruptcy 
reorganization. 
 
Little evidence indicated overinvestment of DIP financing.  
 
Chen 
(2003) 
To examine information (i.e. auditor’s 
opinion) and several other factors (i.e. 
financial status, stock returns) that 
affect a firm’s debt restructuring choice 
between Chapter 11 and workouts. 
820 firms from Moody’s Credit Risk 
management Services 
A firm’s choice between a workout and Chapter 11 to resolve its 
financial distress depended on the degree of the firm’s leverage, 
the severity of the liquidity crisis, coordinating among 
claimholders, the asset structure, the magnitude of the firm’s 
economic distress and severity of information. 
 
Financially distressed firms with more severe accounting 
problems chose Chapter 11 for reorganization. 
 
Firms that had less coordination and information problems and 
used workouts for restructuring their debts were better quality 
firms. 
 
Fisher & 
Martel 
(2003) 
To examine determinants of the firm’s 
reorganization decision by using the 
Bulow-Shoven-White framework. 
640 insolvent Canadian firms during 
the period 1977-1988  
Significantly, free assets, the amount of debt reduction in 
reorganization and the firm’s size had positive effects on the 
reorganization decision. 
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 Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Objective 
 
Sample 
 
Findings 
Brockman, 
Hoffman, 
Dawley & 
Fornaciari 
(2004) 
To examine the influence of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) power both 
formal as determined by duality and 
informal as determined by prestige on 
bankruptcy reorganization as measured 
by reorganization time, organizational 
survival, and recovery time. 
252 publicly traded firms having total 
assets greater than US $ 25 million and 
filing for bankruptcy reorganization 
Significantly, formal power of CEO – duality was associated 
with improved odds of organizational survival, a reduced 
recovery time and a longer reorganization time, whereas CEO’s 
informal power – prestige was associated with reduced odds of 
survival, a longer recovery time and a longer time in 
reorganization. 
 
The evidence pointed out that formal CEO power was a critical 
factor for a firm to survive and return to performance standards. 
Chatterjee, 
Dhillon & 
Ramirez 
(2004) 
To examine the effect of debtor-in-
possession (DIP) financing in 
reorganized firms on security prices 
and the structure and characteristics of 
DIP loans.  
185 publicly traded firms filing for 
Chapter 11 during the period 1988 - 
1997 and receiving DIP financing 
There was a significantly positive stock and bond price reaction 
to the announcement of DIP financing. 
 
DIP loans mostly were in the form of short-term revolving 
credits that restricted the use of proceeds to working capital. 
 
DIP loans incorporated a significant number of affirmative and 
negative covenants. 
Kim  
(2006) 
To explore how managerial ownership 
was associated with two choices of a 
firm’s debt restructuring method - 
Chapter 11 and a private workout, to 
investigate whether concentrated 
ownership by managers can resolve the 
financial distress, and to examine the 
non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and the choice 
between Chapter 11 and a private 
workout. 
98 Chapter 11 firms and 96 private 
workout firms from the Wall Street 
Journal Index (WSJI) and Lexis-Nexis 
over the period 1992 to 2003 
The findings showed that when shareholdings by managers were 
in the 5% and 25% range, an increase in managerial 
shareholdings would increase the probability of firm’s choosing 
Chapter 11 filing as a resolution method, suggesting that the 
5%-25% range of managerial ownership was related to the 
management entrenchment.  
 
The findings also showed a significant curvilinear relationship 
between managerial ownership and the probability of Chapter 
11 firms, suggesting that managerial ownership was significant 
to the corporate decision.   
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Objective 
 
Sample 
 
Findings 
Charitou, 
Lambertides & 
Trigeorgis 
(2007) 
To examine the relationship between 
institutional ownership and earnings 
behaviour of bankruptcy-filing firms in 
conjunction with a top management 
turnover or a qualified audit opinion 
during the distressed period. 
859 U.S. firms that filed for bankruptcy 
reorganization during the period 1986-
2004 and one control sub-sample of 
healthy firms (matched by year-
industry-ROA) from the Compustat 
database of the Wall Street Journal or 
the Internet Bankruptcy Library 
 
Significantly, the results showed that during the distressed 
period, top-level management turnovers, qualified audit 
opinions and the role of institutional ownership can mitigate the 
negative abnormal returns of bankrupt firms as measured by net 
income and cash flow from operations. 
Denis &  
Rodgers 
(2007) 
To examine factors that influence the 
length of time a firm was in Chapter 
11, the initial outcome of Chapter 11, 
and the ex post operating performance 
of firms that reorganize and emerge 
from Chapter 11 as independent 
publicly traded firms.  
224 Chapter 11 filings (141 
reorganized and emerged firms as 
public going concerns, 51 liquidated 
firms, and 32 acquired firms) that first 
appeared in the Securities and 
exchange Commission’s (SEC) reports 
during the 1985-1994 period 
Among firms that were acquired while in Chapter 11, only firm 
size had a significant impact on the time spent in Chapter 11. 
 
Among firms that reorganized and emerged as independent 
firms, the median industry operating margins and restructuring 
assets and liabilities while in Chapter11 were significant factors 
of the time spent in Chapter 11 and a firm’s post-reorganization 
performance. 
  
Kalay, 
Singhal & 
Tashjian 
(2007) 
To examine whether firms filed for 
bankruptcy reorganization improve 
their operating performance during 
Chapter 11. 
459  Chapter 11 firms from the data 
base of New Generation Research 
(www.bankruptcydata.com) during the 
period 1991-1998 
Chapter 11 provided net benefits to sample firms. They found an 
increase in the operating efficiency of firms while in Chapter 11 
as compared with the operating efficiency of firms in a matched 
portfolio. Firms with higher debt ratios experienced greater 
improvements in operating performance and the complexity of 
the renegotiation process negatively affects the improvement. 
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Chapter 3  
 
 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews agency theory and its governance mechanisms as the theoretical 
framework to develop hypotheses for the study. Section 3.2 shows the research 
paradigm of the study. Section 3.3 introduces the general background and a model of 
agency theory and considers types of governance mechanisms to mitigate agency 
problems. It also addresses hypothesis development based on the agency theoretical 
framework and prior research with respect to the effects of governance mechanisms 
on firm performance.  
 
 
3.2 Research paradigm 
 
Two major research philosophies have been identified in business research, namely 
the positivist and interpretivist approaches (Bryman & Bell 2003). The positivist 
approach believes that reality is stable and can be observed and described from an 
objective viewpoint (Guba & Lincoln 1988; Levin & Greenwood 1998). Phenomena 
should be isolated and observations should be repeatable. The advantage of positivist 
research is that it can identify the precise relationships between chosen variables. The 
interpretivist approach indicates that reality is fully understood only through the 
subjective interpretation of and intervention in reality. The study of phenomena in 
their natural environment is a key point to the interpretivist philosophy.  
 
For this study, the positivist paradigm is the research framework. It assumes 
determinants of post-bankruptcy performance as social facts which can be identified 
and their relationships with performance can be measured and are repeatable 
(Easterby-Smith 1991; Glesne & Peshkin 1992). The ontology assumption shows 
that the successful/unsuccessful reorganization of Thai insolvent firms is the salient 
phenomenon that should be verified and observed and that the epistemological 
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perspective will be the way of testing hypotheses which are constructed of the 
relationships among the main factors surrounding a formal reorganization process. 
Following positivism, the quantitative approach will be applied in the research and 
financial and statistical analyses will be used for measuring given variables and 
testing hypotheses. These perspectives guide the research design of the thesis and 
determine the research model. 
  
 
3.3 Conceptual framework and hypothesis development 
 
3.3.1 General background 
 
Agency theory has been studied since the early 1970s and deals with the relationship 
of two parties, principals and agents (Fama & Jensen 1983). Generally in business, 
the principals are owners or shareholders and other stakeholders, such as potential 
investors and creditors, and the agents are professional managers (Hatch 1997). 
When a principal promises an agent to give a reward, he or she hopes that the agent 
will be willing to do given jobs. The principal will form a contract with the agent to 
represent the principal's interests in return for some form of compensation. This is 
the principal-agent relationship. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship as a theory of the firm 
based upon conflicts of interest between principals (owners) and agents (professional 
managers). It is also seen as the control problem for corporations from the point of 
view of owners or shareholders and other stakeholders (Hatch 1997). In the 
relationship between all stakeholders and professional managers, managers are hired 
to act as agents for owners, and for the interests of stakeholders. They are the key 
persons to make decisions on activities in corporations to pursue organizational 
objectives, maximize a firm’s profits and create corporate value so that stakeholders 
can receive high returns. However, agents are expected to have their own interests 
and consequently they may pursue strategies and goals to serve these interests rather 
than those of stakeholders (Eisenhardt 1989). 
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Nevertheless, there are economic advantages from using operational skills of 
professional managers (Byrd, Parrino & Pritsch 1998; Krakel 2004). Most modern 
corporations use this form of management to run their businesses because the 
specialized skills of managers give corporations access to a much larger pool of 
capital than management by sole proprietorships or partnerships. Investment projects 
and production levels may be on a scale beyond other forms of business organization. 
In addition, the ability of professional managers can combine the capital of many 
dispersed investors. Shareholders may receive more value from delegating decisions 
to their managers.  
 
However, to handle agency problems, agency costs will incur. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) define agency costs as the sum of monitoring cost, bonding cost and residual 
loss. Monitoring costs are expenditures paid by the principal/shareholders. They are 
designed to limit the aberrant behavior of managers and may include the cost of 
controlling the behavior of managers and compensation incentives for managers. 
Bonding costs are borne by the agent/managers but are not always pecuniary costs. 
These costs, such as the cost of additional information disclosures to shareholders, 
are set up to guarantee that managers will act in shareholders’ best interests. 
However, monitoring and bonding costs cannot make shareholders sure that 
managers will make optimal decisions from shareholders’ viewpoints. Therefore, 
there are still costs or losses of the agency relationship. These are known as residual 
losses or efficiency losses (Godfrey & Hill 1995). All agency costs are extraordinary 
costs for a firm and are very expensive (Kim 1995; Li & Li 1999; Masimba 1991).  
 
Therefore, the main objective of agency theory is to identify effective mechanisms to 
encourage managers to serve the firm owners’ interests (Keasey, Thompson and 
Wright 1997). It has been found that many prior studies attempted to understand 
agency problems and seek a number of effective mechanisms to reduce these costs, 
for example, the studies of Agrawal & Knoeber (1996), Keasey et al. (1997), Fosberg 
& Rosenberg (2003), and Core, Guay & Verrecchia (2003).  They suggested that a 
better understanding of the problems and efficient control mechanisms enhance the 
implementation of agency theory to generate more benefits for all stakeholders.  
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3.3.2 A model of agency theory 
 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Keasey et al. (1997) mention that several 
surveillance mechanisms are useful for shareholders to alleviate agency problems. 
This study explains these mechanisms in Figure 3.1: A model of agency theory 
which is developed from its theory and prior research in the field. The mechanisms 
are divided into three categories: monitoring, incentive, and market mechanisms. 
Monitoring mechanisms control managers’ behavior. Incentive mechanisms motivate 
managers to act better for maximizing organizational profit, and market mechanisms 
control managers from outside the organization. It is believed that an efficient market 
for corporate control can help a management team to maximize corporate and 
shareholder value. All mechanisms are meant to minimize agency problems and lead 
to a convergence of both the interests of shareholders and managers. Potentially, 
shareholders can receive maximizing wealth, while managers can receive 
maximizing utility as well. Thus, the central target of this model is to achieve interest 
alignment between shareholders and managers. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: A model of agency theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed from the content of agency theory and prior research in the field 
 
Source: Developed from the content of agency theory and prior research in the field  
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3.3.3 Monitoring mechanisms 
 
To investigate and control managers’ behavior, Hatch (1997) and Byrd et al. (1998) 
suggested that shareholders can choose two alternative mechanisms: behavior control 
and outcome control. Behavior control is the method to shape managers’ behavior 
into the same direction as shareholders’ objectives. Basically, it starts from 
controlling the management structure of the company which should be simplified so 
that shareholders can observe and control the behaviors of the managers. Generally, a 
hierarchical power-decentralizing management structure is the optimal structure 
which is used in most modern organizations (Nankervis 2002). The basic thought of 
such a structure is to avoid power-centralizing which might potentially lead to 
power-abuse and self-serving activity. Contracts can also be used to control 
managers (Eisenhardt 1985). The contract control method is known as the result-
control approach. If the final performances of managers satisfy shareholders in terms 
of benefits, managers will achieve the service of their own interests. Nevertheless, 
only relying on this method has high risks because shareholders are not during the 
operation process; this might cause some undetected self-serving, idleness, and 
shirking activity. Thus, shareholders should use additional layers of management 
such as a board of directors to give guidelines or to supervise managers including 
evaluating their performance (Hatch 1997).  Moreover, the development of 
information systems such as a cost accounting system, budget system, and formal 
reporting is another useful method of controlling managers’ performance (Baiman 
1990). However, in setting up and using the process-control methods, shareholders 
should proceed with care for no matter what methods are employed, it will add extra 
overheads to the company, especially in big organizations (Godfrey & Hill 1995).   
 
As regards the high cost and complexity of the process-control methods, the outcome 
control method seems more attractive. Once the outcome can be measured, the 
outcome control method is cost - effective (Hatch 1997). Normally, financial 
performance such as accounting profits, return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE) and market price per share (MPS) are used to measure a manager’s 
management performance (Oswald & Jahera 1991). The underlying theory is that if a 
manager shows good performance in creating corporate value and achieving 
organizational goals, financial returns should reflect an impressive performance. 
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However, under business uncertainty, the accuracy of this theory may be biased. 
Managers’ efforts and performances may be threatened by uncontrollable factors, 
outside elements such as competitors’ actions, government regulation changes, 
natural disasters, and other uncontrollable factors any one of which may influence 
the overall organizational performance. 
 
 
3.3.3.1 Outside directors in the planner and plan administrator 
 
According to agency theory, outside directors are viewed as a monitoring mechanism. 
Fama (1980) and Fama & Jensen (1983) looked at an outsider board as decision 
experts. They suggested a board with a high proportion of outside directors is more 
likely to perform its duties in monitoring business management effectively. Many 
researchers have considered the effect of board control on financial performance, for 
example, the studies of Peng (2004), Coles & Hesterly (2000), Westphal (1999), 
Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1989), Hermalin & Weisbach (1988), and Baysinger & 
Butler (1985).  
 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) explored the relationships between board composition, 
changes in compositions, corporate financial performance and changes in 
performance for a 266-firm sample between 1970 and 1980. The measure of 
financial performance selected was calculated by dividing the firm’s return on equity 
by the average return on equity for all the firms in its primary industry, including 
those not in the sample. Their findings indicated that board composition, in terms of 
the proportion of outside independent directors, had a marginal effect on such 
performance, but that the effect was lagged. A key finding was that the ratio of 
independent to inside directors was higher in firms which had a performance above 
average than firms with a performance below average. 
     
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) identified determinants of board composition. They 
tested whether firm performance, CEO tenure, and changes in market structures lead 
to changes in board compositions. The sample of their study was 142 firms of New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE)-traded companies between 1971 and 1983. The 
change in earnings before interest and taxes and stock returns are used as measures 
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of firm performance. It was seen that in analyzing their model (a Poisson model), 
poor performance, existing industries, possibly new CEOs and imminent CEO 
succession caused inside directors to leave the board and outside directors to join the 
board. 
 
 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) attempted to assess the effectiveness of the 
board of directors as alternative mechanisms for corporate control by using three 
differential measures of performance: average Tobin’s Q, stock market abnormal 
returns, and employment growth rates separately. Their study employed multivariate 
analysis to test performance and management characteristics of 454 of the 1980 
Fortune 500 firms between 1981 and 1985. They found that when firms face troubled 
situations and external control markets namely restructurings, sell-off of assets, 
employee layoffs, and wage reductions come into play, shareholders typically benefit 
from this mechanism.  
 
Westphal (1999) studied board effectiveness and firm performance and found 
significant results in the survey data from 243 CEOs and 564 outside directors in 
April 1995. Westphal used multiple regression analysis and two measures of firm 
performance: return on equity - ROE (an accounting-based measure) and the market-
to-book value of equity - MTB (a market-based measure) to investigate board 
involvement. The findings of this study suggested that board effectiveness may 
increase by encouraging collaboration between top managers and outside directors in 
strategic decision making. Judge and Zeithaml (1992) also found that a high 
proportion of inside directors on boards was associated with lower board 
involvement in strategic decision and a negative impact on firm performance.  
 
Coles and Hesterly (2000) confirmed that there was a critical monitoring role for 
outside directors. They examined the independence of the chairman and board 
composition and shareholder value in the context of poison pill adoptions by using 
247 sample firms reported in the financial press (i.e. the Wall Street Journal, the New 
York Times) during the period 1984-1986. Cumulative abnormal returns which are 
calculated by subtracting the announcement period return for the firm from a 
benchmark specific to that firm are used as a measure of shareholder value for 
analysis.  Significantly, there is a relationship between the announcement period 
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market reaction to the adoption of a poison pill provision and outsider representation 
on the board. When leadership structure is not independent, the monitoring and 
control functions of outside directors are most important and most beneficial for 
shareholders. Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) also indicated that outsiders represent 
shareholder interests better than inside directors. Gales and Kesner (1994), Daily and 
Dalton (1994a, 1994b) and Daily (1995) also confirmed that outside directors in the 
board of bankrupt firms are more likely to be highly involved in improving post-
bankruptcy performance. 
 
Further, the recent study of Peng (2004) was consistent with the study of Coles & 
Hesterly (2000) and Brickey et al. (1994). Peng’s study was based on an archival 
database covering 405 publicly listed firms by taking advantage of China’s 
institutional transitions. It was found that outside directors do make a difference in 
firm performance as measured by sales growth, but they have a little impact on 
financial performance as measured by return on equity (ROE). 
 
However, some studies found that firms with a high proportion of outside directors 
perform worse, for example, the studies of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and 
Yermack (1996). They reported that there was an insignificant relationship between 
the proportion of outside directors and financial performance. Klein (1998) and 
Bhagat and Black (2002) also reported that their results show only minor relations 
between the number of outsiders on a board and financial performance measures. In 
addition, Johnson, Daily and Ellistrand (1996) and Dalton, (1998) reviewing the 
literature concerning these relationships found there was no relationship of a 
meaningful level and concluded that these were not of practical importance. It was 
noted that prior studies have offered mixed evidence on the relationship between 
outside directors and firm performance.  
 
Under the Thai Bankruptcy Act, the planner and plan administrator are key 
governance mechanisms of the reorganization process. The planner has the duty to 
prepare a firm’s formal reorganization plan in three to five months and manage a 
debtor firm during the preparation time. Once the court approves the plan and 
appoints the plan administrator, the duties of the planner immediately pass to him. 
The plan administrator must manage the debtor’s business in accordance with the 
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plan until the reorganization of the debtor’s business operations is achieved. The 
planner and plan administrator may be a person, company or group of persons and 
also insiders or outsiders. There are no regulations limiting the number of planners 
and plan administrators and their composition. Although the evidence from previous 
studies shows mixed results, a larger number of studies support the agency derived 
hypothesis that firms with more outside directors than insiders perform better. This 
leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of outside directors in 
the planner of the firm and post-bankruptcy performance 3.  
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of outside directors in 
the plan administrator of the firm and post-bankruptcy performance.  
 
 
3.3.3.2 Ownership concentration by the largest shareholder 
 
Ownership concentration is also a monitoring mechanism. Shareholders with large 
ownership shares have strong incentives to monitor managerial activities because 
they are likely to receive substantial benefits from such monitoring (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976; Shleifer & Vishny 1986).  However, the findings of some studies 
have suggested that while large shareholders monitor company management, they 
may exploit corporate assets for themselves rather than for shareholders’ interests 
(Johnson, Boone, Breach & Friedman 2000; Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Consequently, 
this may account for the negative result obtained for ownership concentration. 
Empirical results of investigating the firm performance-ownership concentration 
relationship show mixed evidence. 
 
Cubbin and Leech (1983) studied the effect of shareholding dispersion on the degree 
of control in British companies and found a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and profitability,  while Demsetz and Lehn (1985)  on examining these  
 
_____________________________________________ 
3
 The definition of post-bankruptcy performance in the research hypotheses is described in   
Chapter 4.          
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relations in U.S. corporations, found an insignificant relationship between them. 
Later, Shleifer and Vishny (1986)  studied  large  shareholders and  corporate control  
and their findings from a sample of the Fortune 500 firms confirmed that the greater 
the percentage of ownership, the more expected profits.  
 
Wruck (1989) studied equity ownership concentration and firm value from private 
equity financings and concluded that increased concentrated ownership from private 
equity sales have a positive effect on a stock price. McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
also studied equity ownership but their results found no effect of concentration on 
firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Oswald and Jahera (1991) explored the 
influence of ownership on performance by using a large sample size and also by 
controlling firm size differences. Their findings show a significant level of 
ownership on financial performance as measured by excess stock returns even after 
controlling for size. Consistent with Oswald and Jahera (1991), the study of Leech & 
Leahy (1991) which used large British companies as a sample confirmed that 
ownership-controlled firms are profitable and fast growing. The effect of 
concentrated ownership enhances financial performance as measured by profit 
margins, rate of return on a shareholder’s capital (ROE), rate of sales growth, and 
rate of growth of net assets. 
 
Further, Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998) investigated the consequences of block 
share purchases between 1980 and 1989 using a sample of U.S. firms and found that 
return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for a firm’s operating performance improves in 
years two and three after the acquisition of large share blocks by activist shareholders. 
In the same year, Cho (1998) examined the relationship among ownership structure, 
investment and corporate value using ordinary least square regression with the 
control variables; firm size, financial leverage, and industry effect. Cho’s findings 
suggested that ownership structure affects investment and, therefore, corporate value 
(Tobin’s Q). Wiwattanakantang (1999) also studied the effect of ownership structure 
and corporate governance on performance. He used a sample of Thai firms and found 
that firms’ major shareholders enhance higher profitability (ROA and Tobin’s Q) 
compared to firms with no major shareholders. Consistent with Wiwattanakantang 
(1999), the study of Suehiro (2001) concerning ownership patterns and corporate 
performance in Thailand found statistically significant relationships among them as 
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measured by ROA and ROE. In addition, Gorton and Schmid (2000) explored 
concentrated ownership of German universal banks and the performance of German 
firms in the period 1975-1986 and also found a significant improvement of firm 
performance (ROA and the market-to-book ratio-MTB or Tobin’s Q) to the extent 
that bank control rights from equity ownership are concentrated. 
 
Nevertheless, recent research in many countries has revealed insignificant results of 
these relationships. Prowse (1992) studied the relationships in a sample of Japanese 
firms in the mid 1980s and found no effect of ownership concentration on 
profitability. Limpaphayom (2000) studied ownership concentration of Thai listed 
firms which was measured in terms of percentage of shareholdings by the five largest 
shareholders and found that there was not any statistically significant relationship 
between ownership concentration and return on assets (ROA). Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) examined sample firms from all sectors of the U.S. economy in the 
period 1976-1980 and also reported a negative relationship between them. Moreover, 
Holderness’s (2003) survey findings on empirical research showed little evidence 
about the impact of large shareholders on firm value (Tobin’s Q). Hovey, Li and 
Naughton (2003) also found no effect of concentrated ownership of Chinese listed 
firms during the period 1997-1999 on financial performance as measured by Tobin’s 
Q.    
 
The study of Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) in sample firms of eight East 
Asian countries in 1996 including Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand found both 
incentive and entrenchment effects by focusing on the distinction between cash flow 
rights and control rights. They explained that cash flow rights are the rights which 
enable shareholders to receive dividends, while control rights allow shareholders to 
make decisions through voting. When the control rights of a shareholder exceed 
cash-flow rights, he has an incentive to make decisions that increase his benefits 
without any appropriate increase in a firm’s overall cash flows. Using regression 
techniques, Claessens et al. (2002) found large shareholdings improved firm value 
(Tobin’s Q) through better monitoring of managers, but reduced firm value when 
they abused their concentrated rights. Consistent with the empirical results of 
Claessens et al. (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003) studied the effect of ownership 
structure on changes in shareholder value during the East Asian financial crisis that 
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began in July 1997. They found that the crisis which took place in eight East Asian 
countries had a negative shock on the investment opportunities of firms in these 
markets and raised the incentives of controlling shareholders to use corporate assets 
for their own interests. Further, in their study, the large separation between cash flow 
ownership and control rights that arises from the use of a pyramidal ownership 
structure in these markets suggests that corporate insiders have both the incentives 
and the abilities to engage in expropriation. Similar to the study of Lemmon & Lins 
(2003), Hanazaki and Lin (2003) used data from the five East Asian crisis economies 
of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand in the period 1994-2000 
and studied the impact of corporate governance on the performance of firms. Their 
results showed that ownership concentration that enabled controlling shareholders to 
expropriate other shareholders was associated with significantly worse performance. 
 
In the reorganization process, Chapter 3/1 of the Thai Bankruptcy Act gives first 
priority to a shareholder of a debtor firm to file a petition for reorganization 
including the nomination of the planner and plan administrator for court approval 
(see Section 2.3 of Chapter 2). In this case, the reorganization plan and progress 
report of the plan implementation reveal that the shareholding of owners, especially 
the largest shareholder, is still involved in the management of reorganized firms as 
before bankruptcy. It is possible to say that during the time of reorganization when 
investment opportunities decline, large shareholders may attempt to use more power 
in monitoring business management to improve firm performance. In this regard, it 
may result in making positive effects on firm value and a success of reorganization. 
The above literature indicates that the effect of ownership concentration by the 
largest shareholder on performance is important. Many previous studies also found 
that ownership concentration can enhance the profitability of a firm at a significant 
level (e.g., Oswald & Jahera 1991; Bethel et al. 1998; Wiwattanakantang 1999; 
Gorton & Schmid 2000). This leads to the following hypothesis used in the thesis:  
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration by the largest 
shareholder of the firm and post-bankruptcy performance. 
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3.3.4 Incentive mechanisms 
 
In order to maximize shareholders’ wealth, it is necessary to give fringe benefits to 
managers as well (Grant 1998). Compensation packages such as a profit-based bonus 
and stock options are efficient methods to improve the goal alignment of 
shareholders and managers. The advantage of using a profit-based bonus is that it can 
motivate managers to put more effort into managing the company to achieve 
company value. However, it also has relative high costs, the most obvious being that 
as the business environment is very complex, managers’ efforts sometimes might not 
effectively relate to changes in market value. In this situation, if shareholders fail to 
deal with the problems carefully and fairly, it might influence the enthusiasm of 
managers which may lead to decreased performance of managers in the future. Once 
a negative cycle takes place in a company, shareholders and managers will both be 
both victims of this mechanism (Gupta & Bailey 2001). 
 
For stock options, the advantages are very similar to the profit-based bonus. Many 
people often believe that it is more efficient because it can make the manager richer 
and create the feeling of ownership of the company rather than act as some purely 
materialistic reward. In other words, it makes managers feel they are working for 
themselves as well as for shareholders. Theoretically, this method is sound and it is 
widely applied by many companies such as Microsoft Corporation (Makadok 2003). 
Numerous studies support the use of incentive mechanisms for it is believed that this 
is an appropriate way that can help shareholders encourage managers to pursue 
company goals and overcome their tendency to shirk their duties or seek their own 
interests (Baiman & Demski 1980; Kim 1995; Harrison 2003).   
 
 
3.3.4.1 Managerial remuneration for the plan administrator 
 
Managerial remuneration such as salary, a profit-based bonus, and a stock option is 
an efficient incentive mechanism to improve the goal alignment of shareholders and 
managers (Grant 1998; Kaplan & Atkinson 1998). Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
suggested that stock options, equity ownership, performance-related-pay and 
performance-related dismissals can be included as part of remuneration packages in 
order to provide financial incentives for management to make value-maximizing and 
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opportunistic-attenuating behavior, and hence, increase company value. Based upon 
agency theory, there should be a positive relationship between managerial 
compensation and firm performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that higher 
levels of such incentives lead to higher firm performance. Fama (1980) also 
suggested that the wage determination process in managerial labor markets is a 
critical mechanism of agency theory. 
 
Dyl (1988) examined the effect of monitoring activities on managerial compensation 
by using listed firms in the Fortune 500 companies during 1982, and through 
regression analysis found that the levels of management compensation affect the 
degree of corporate control that reduces the residual loss portion of agency costs. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) investigated the pay-performance relationship for chief 
executive officers (CEO) by using the data of the Forbes surveys from 1974 to 1986. 
In their analysis, they measured a regression of change in CEO salary and bonus on 
changes in net accounting income measured before extraordinary items and found a 
statistically significant and positive relationship. Nevertheless, this empirical relation 
is small for an occupation in which incentive pay is expected to play an important 
role.  
 
Goldberg and Idson (1995) also tested the degree of corporate control on executive 
remuneration, using data from the listed firms of Fortune 500 companies during the 
period 1980-1981. Their results which are consistent with Jensen and Murphy’s 
(1990) study indicated that there was a significant agency effect on executive pay, 
though the total magnitude of the effect appears to be small, relative to company 
assets.  
 
In addition, Mehran (1995) examined the executive compensation structure of 
randomly-selected small and large manufacturing firms 1979-1980 and found 
empirical evidence on the relationship between the form of compensation and firm 
value. The findings showed that the form, rather than the level, in particular equity-
based compensation can motivate managers to increase firm value as measured by 
Tobin’s Q and by return on assets (ROA).  Fosberg and Rosenberg (2003) also 
investigated agency cost control mechanisms. Their results, which supported the 
study of Mehran (1995), suggested that share ownership by the firm’s CEO is one of 
 61
the effective mechanisms in controlling a firm’s agency costs. Using data of large 
firms from Business Week executive compensation studies from 1990 to 1996, the 
empirical test on regression analysis revealed that the mechanism can reduce the 
selling, general, and administration expenses to sales ratio and/or enhance firm value 
as measured by the firm’s sales to total assets ratio.  
 
In the Thai reorganization process, cash and equity compensation for the plan 
administrator is specified in the reorganization plan. There are different executive 
payments in each company and the plan administrators of some firms hold equity. 
Evidence from empirical studies in the literature generally confirms a significant link 
between executive remuneration and performance of the firms. Thus, it is possible to 
hypothesize that managerial remuneration for the plan administrators is likely to be 
related to financial performance improvement of insolvent firms. This leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H4a: There is a positive relationship between cash compensation for the plan 
administrator and post-bankruptcy performance.  
 
H4b: There is a positive relationship between percentage shareholding of the plan 
administrator and post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
 
3.3.5 Market mechanisms 
 
Markets can enforce managers to redouble their efforts to increase company share 
price (Byrd, Parrino & Pritsch 1998). External stakeholders such as creditors and 
potential investors need to protect their interests as well as shareholders. In principle, 
the market knows how well managers do their work via market price per share of 
companies. The value of its stock is measured in terms of the value of the stream of 
future profits. If managers create stock value below its potential intrinsic value, the 
stock price will reflect the market that managers are not using a firm’s resources very 
well. This situation can shake up the position of existing managers and is a way that 
the market enforces managers to improve profitability and increase the share price. If 
managers cannot improve financial performance efficiently, the market may use 
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mechanisms such as mergers, acquisitions, privatization and restructuring to develop 
and rebuild corporate value (Bruton, Keels & Scifres 2002). The other mechanism of 
the market is the managerial labor market.  Managers must recognize that 
shareholders offer many incentives to managers because they want them to act to 
maximize stock value (Fama 1980). If managers do not work efficiently or create 
high company value, markets may change them. Managerial labor markets influence 
managers’ careers because their job opportunities, salaries and fringe benefits depend 
upon performance.  
 
 
3.3.5.1 Restructuring methods of insolvent firms 
 
Based on agency theory, the market may use a number of strategies, for example; 
mergers, acquisitions, privatization, and restructuring as enforcement mechanisms to 
improve a firm’s performance and to increase value for stakeholders (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). Many managers use such strategies, particularly restructuring to 
reduce risks when they are under pressure by large shareholders (Bethel & 
Liebeskind 1993). Previous researchers attempted to define typical types of 
restructuring methods and study post-restructuring performance (i.e. Hite, Owers & 
Rogers (1987), Singh (1990), Opler (1992), Zahra (1995), Phan & Hill (1995), and 
Bruton, Keels & Scifres (2002). Statistically, empirical investigations of relationship 
between restructuring activities and a firm’s performance show positive results. 
 
Singh (1990) studied management buyouts as an important method of corporate 
restructuring in the period 1980-87 in order to investigate whether sample firms 
undergoing buyout have higher levels of financial performance than others in their 
respective industries. The results extend Maupin’s (1987) findings and show post-
buyout firms had better operating performances than their industry averages in the 
years preceding public offering. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) also studied 
leverage buyouts (LBOs) of all firms that went public through July 1987 and found 
LBOs created real wealth gains and improvements in operating performance. Opler 
(1992) examined the consequence of LBOs on operating performance as well. Using 
a sample of 44 going-private transactions completed in the period 1985-1989, the 
results found increases in post-LBO operating cash flow to sales ratio in this sample 
and suggested that investors gained significant benefits from this activity. The study 
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of Zahra (1995) also found post-LBO company performance was higher by using a 
sample of manufacturing LBO firms in 1992. These results extend Bull’s (1989) 
findings that financial performance after the buyouts is superior to performance 
before the buyouts. 
 
Later, Bruton et al. (2002) investigated the performance and restructuring activities 
of 39 firms from the time preceding the buyout through the private buyout period and 
into the public reverse buyout period by a form of content analysis. They stated that 
earlier research on buyouts measured firm performance by using historical self 
comparisons because these comparisons have usually shown the performance 
improvements as expected by agency theory (Bull 1989; Muscarella & Vetsuypens 
1990; Opler 1992; Singh 1990; Zahra 1995). Unlike these researchers, to capture the 
effect accurately, Bruton et al. (2002) used three different methods of performance 
evaluation; first, comparing the sample firm’s performance to its own past 
performance, second, comparing each buyout firm’s performance to its relevant 
industry averages, finally, comparing each sample buyout firm’s performance to a 
strategic peer, a matching “no buyout” firm. However, even using different 
evaluations of performance, their results still support the results of prior studies. 
Performance, as measured by sales and profit margin, increased significantly during 
the time buyout firms were privately held. These performance improvements 
remained significant when controlling for industry effects, but sales improvements 
were not significantly different from those experienced by buyout firms’ peers.  
 
Duhaime and Grant (1984) studied corporate divestments as one type of restructuring 
method of large firms by conducting field research, emphasizing semi-structured 
personal interviewing as a data source of their study. The results of 40 of the 1979 
“Fortune 500” firms suggested that a strong relationship between financial 
performance and divestment decision-making exists when a firm’s financial strength, 
such as return on equity (ROE) is low. Further, Montgomery, Thomas and Kamath 
(1984) studied the relationship between the type of divestiture and the financial 
market valuation. Divestitures made by the “Fortune 500” firms and announced in 
the Wall Street Journal during the years 1976-1979 were the sample of their study. 
Similarly, the findings from empirical tests confirmed that overall, the market did 
value divestitures positively, and that the market performance as measured by 
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cumulative abnormal stock returns showed a significant positive relation with this 
strategy.  
Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987) investigated the valuation consequences of 
restructuring methods, in particular, partial sell-offs of sample firms in the period 
1963-1981 and found that the gains in terms of abnormal stock returns from this 
restructuring are positive and significant.  Sicherman and Pettway (1987) also 
examined acquisitions of divested assets 1983-1985 to determine the gains to 
shareholders of acquiring firms. With cumulative abnormal stock returns, the results 
reported that acquiring firms had positive but insignificant gains. Phan and Hill 
(1995) studied the impact of some strategies on post-LBO firm performance by using 
survey research from information of leveraged buyout (LBO) firms between 1986 
and 1989. The regression results confirmed that post-LBO performance as measured 
by change in productivity and profitability, improves after such strategies were 
implemented.  
 
In the Thai reorganization process, the planner employs restructuring methods as 
efficient strategies for reorganization. Restructuring strategies in this thesis focus on 
three areas; operational, asset and financial restructuring following the concepts of  
Datta & Iskandar-Datta (1995), Bowman, Singh, Useem & Bhadury (1999), and 
Sudarsanam & Lai (2001). Operational restructuring involves strategies to change 
internal operations of a firm to improve its financial performance. Asset restructuring 
means strategies to change the assets of a business to help a firm survive financial 
distress and restore its profitability, whereas financial restructuring means strategies 
to change the capital structure between debt and equity to improve performance. The 
evidence from the Thai reorganization plans showed the methods of operational 
restructuring included cutting prices, reducing product diversification, reducing 
luxury/unnecessary costs and reengineering. The methods of asset restructuring 
included divestitures, asset sales, and asset investment. The methods of financial 
restructuring included a haircut strategy (reducing a loan principal), a refinancing 
strategy, and an equity strategy (dividend cuts or omissions and equity issues). It was 
seen that these methods embrace significant changes in financing, investment and 
operational structure in aligning the resources of the company (Reutner 1991; 
Weston, Mitchell & Mulherin 2003).  
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According to the above literature, involving several types of restructuring strategies 
and differing methods to evaluate post-restructuring performance, the results are 
consistent. Restructuring strategy is viewed as a vehicle to increase firm value, 
reduce agency problems and align the interests of managers with those of 
stakeholders (Bethel & Liebeskind 1993; Jensen & Meckling 1976). This leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H5a: There is a positive relationship between an operational restructuring strategy 
and post-bankruptcy performance.  
 
H5b: There is a positive relationship between an asset restructuring strategy and 
post-bankruptcy performance.  
 
H5c: There is a positive relationship between a financial restructuring strategy and 
post-bankruptcy performance.  
 
 
 
A list of the research hypotheses formulated is summarized in Table 3.1 and the 
research model of the study is shown in Figure 3.2.  
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Table 3.1: A list of research hypotheses of the study 
 
 
Hypotheses  
 
 
Items 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
There is a positive relationship between the proportion of 
outside directors in the planner of the firm and post-
bankruptcy performance. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 
There is a positive relationship between the proportion of 
outside directors in the plan administrator of the firm and 
post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 
 
There is a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration by the largest shareholder of the firm and post-
bankruptcy performance.  
 
 
Hypothesis 4a 
 
There is a positive relationship between cash compensation 
for the plan administrator and post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
 
Hypothesis 4b 
 
There is a positive relationship between percentage 
shareholding of the plan administrator and post-bankruptcy 
performance. 
 
 
Hypothesis 5a 
 
There is a positive relationship between an operational 
restructuring strategy and post-bankruptcy performance.  
 
 
Hypothesis 5b 
 
There is a positive relationship between an asset restructuring 
strategy and post-bankruptcy performance.  
 
 
Hypothesis 5c 
 
There is a positive relationship between a financial 
restructuring strategy and post-bankruptcy performance.  
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Figure 3.2: Research model of the study 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key 
governance 
mechanisms in 
the bankruptcy 
reorganization 
proceedings 
Monitoring mechanisms 
- Outside directors in the planner (H1+) 
- Outside directors in the plan administrator (H2+) 
- Ownership concentration by the largest shareholder (H3+) 
Control variables 
- Firm size 
- Industry type 
- Company type 
Incentive mechanisms 
- Cash compensation for the plan administrator (H4a+) 
- Managerial shareholding of the plan administrator (H4b+) 
 
A firm’s  
post-bankruptcy 
performance 
Market mechanisms 
- Operational restructuring methods (H5a+) 
- Asset restructuring methods (H5b+) 
- Financial restructuring methods (H5c+) 
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3.4 Summary 
 
The research design for this study is based on the positivist paradigm and agency 
theory underpins the theoretical framework.  The main objective of the chapter is to 
explain the hypothesis development of the study.   
 
According to the theoretical framework, agency theory indicates that the separation 
of ownership and control can cause several types of agency costs. The theory views 
shareholders and other stakeholders as principals and managers as agents. However, 
types of governance mechanisms in the theory namely monitoring, incentives and 
markets for corporate control are constructed to mitigate agency costs and enable 
improved firm performance. This study presents a model of agency theory which 
shows the theory’s potentiality to align the agent’s interest with stakeholders’ in 
Figure 3.1.  Empirical studies have attempted to investigate the efficiency of these 
mechanisms on firm performance. The research reveals that mechanisms which have 
been examined are outside directors, ownership concentration, executive 
remuneration and restructurings. Importantly, it was found that key governance 
mechanisms of the Thai bankruptcy reorganization proceedings were similar to these 
mechanisms. Thus, based on agency theory, key governance mechanisms of the Thai 
reorganization proceedings are likely to affect a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance. 
This conceptual framework provides the foundation for the research model of the 
study which is shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
With respect to monitoring mechanisms, many previous studies confirm that the 
expertise of outside directors can provide better monitoring which leads to better 
performance effectively (e.g., Morck et al. 1989; Coles & Hesterly 2000). A great 
deal of research that has investigated the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance show mixed results. However, much research 
has indicated that ownership concentration by major shareholders is a significant 
mechanism that can create firm value (e.g., Cubbin & Leech 1983; Cho 1998; 
Suehiro 2001). Concerning incentive mechanisms, executive remuneration such as 
salary and stock options is suggested as one of key mechanisms that can motivate 
managers to create more shareholder value and reduce agency problems (e.g., 
Mehran 1995; Fosberg & Rosenberg 2003). Numerous studies assert that the 
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effectiveness of this mechanism can motivate managers to perform better in 
managing and achieving company goals. According to market mechanisms, 
corporate restructurings are also viewed as value-creating activities and can reduce 
managerial opportunism in agency problems (Singh 1990; Zahra 1995). Empirical 
studies which investigate the relationship between restructuring methods and firm 
financial performance show positive results (e.g., Hite et al. 1987; Bethel & 
Liebeskind 1993: Bruton et al. 2002).  
 
The literature above and that reviewed in Chapter 2 together with information from 
the bankruptcy reorganization process of the Thai Bankruptcy Act leads to the 
research hypotheses of the study contained in Table 3.1.   
 
The next chapter presents research methodology for the study. It contains 
measurements of all variables, the criteria for sample selection and data collection, 
data sources, data analysis and a formal model specification.   
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the research methodology used to test 
hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3. First, the definitions of technical terms used in 
the Thai bankruptcy reorganization proceedings in Section 4.2 are discussed. The 
variable measurement of all variables is defined and data sources of each variable are 
described in Section 4.3, sample selection and data collection are explained in 
Section 4.4, and model specification in Section 4.5.  
 
 
4.2 Definitions of terms 
 
This thesis investigates insolvent firms under the Thai Bankruptcy Act, and it is 
necessary to define the technical terms regarding the Thai bankruptcy reorganization 
proceedings used in the study.  All definitions are derived from Thai laws namely the 
Bankruptcy Act, the Public Company Act and the Civil and Commercial Code 
including regulations of the Thai Central Bankruptcy court. They are as follows:  
 
1. A formal reorganization plan is defined as the plan of a filing firm for 
reorganizing its business operations. According to law, it must be proposed 
by the appointed planner and submitted for approval to the bankruptcy court 
after being accepted at a creditor’s meeting. 
 
2. Post-bankruptcy performance is defined as the financial performance of an 
insolvent company under a formal reorganization plan. 
 
3. A planner or plan preparer is defined as an appointed planner or plan preparer 
pursuant to Chapter 3/1 reorganization proceedings of the Thai Bankruptcy 
Act. The number of directors in the planner in each company is not limited by 
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the Thai Bankruptcy Act. Each company can have either one director or more 
depending on its need. In addition, as the law does not specify the kind of 
directors, they may be inside and/or outside directors. 
 
4. A plan administrator is defined as an appointed plan administrator pursuant to 
Chapter 3/1 reorganization proceedings of the Thai Bankruptcy Act who has 
the duty to manage a reorganized firm in accordance with a formal 
reorganization plan until the reorganization of the debtor’s business 
operations is achieved. According to this law, the number of directors in the 
plan administrator in each company is not limited and the kind of individuals 
is not specified by the law. The plan administrator may be either one director 
or more and inside and/or outside directors. 
    
 5. A public company is defined as one type of a limited liability company 
registered in Thailand and governed by the Public Company Act. The main 
characteristics are that: 1) a public limited company must have a minimum of 
15 promoters for its formation, 2) the liability of any shareholder is equal to 
the amount that is paid on shares held by them, 3) ownership is open to any 
member of the public who has the inclination to buy shares in the company, 4) 
the shares are offered for trade on the open market, some companies may be 
listed firms in the Stock Exchange in Thailand (SET) and the shares are 
traded through SET to the public.     
 
      6. A private company is defined as one type of a limited liability company 
registered in Thailand and governed by the Civil and Commercial Code. The 
main characteristics are that: 1) a private limited company must have at least 
seven promoters, 2) the liability of any shareholder is equal to the amount 
that is paid on shares held by them, 3) ownership is not open to anyone in the 
public, the shares are normally held by a small group of individuals or 
members of families, 4) and the shares are not offered for trade on the open 
market. 
 
 72
4.3 Variable measurement 
 
Based on the hypotheses in Chapter 3, there are 12 variables in the study, one 
dependent variable, 8 independent variables and 3 control variables. The 
measurement of variables is obtained and adapted from related prior studies and the 
data sources for each variable are presented as follows.  
 
 
4.3.1 The dependent variable 
 
A number of previous studies in the area of bankruptcy reorganization have 
evaluated a company’s performance as a dependent variable by using a measure of 
accounting profits for at least two years to identify any improvement (e.g., Hotchkiss 
1994, 1995; Alderson & Betker 1999). Hotchkiss (1994, 1995) and Dawley (1999) 
assessed recovery status in two through five years whereas Michel et al. (1998) and 
Alderson & Betker (1999) considered the sample firms’ performance for the first 
three years following emergence from bankruptcy.  
 
Consistent with previous studies, a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance (PFOM) in 
this study is defined as the dependent variable. The study also evaluates a firm’s 
performance in the first three years during reorganization (Michel et al. 1998; 
Alderson & Betker 1999). The Thai Bankruptcy Act specifies the normal period for 
implementing the reorganization plan as not exceeding five years. Thus, the three-
year post-bankruptcy performance under the process is sufficient to show the ability 
and trend of the firm to survive from bankruptcy and continue its business operation.  
 
Adapted from Hotchkiss’s (1995) and Platt & Platt’s (2002) study, PFOM of the 
study is also measured in terms of the difference of actual from projected 
performance. The measure is the three-year average value of the difference between 
actual profits before tax (APBT) and predicted profits before tax (PPBT) as a 
percentage of the absolute value of predicted profits before tax (PPBT) in years 1-3. 
The formula is: 
3
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Where: 
n = Years 1-3 during the reorganization time 
                                Xi = {(APBTi - PPBTi)/ |PPBTi|} x 100 
                          APBT = Actual profits before tax 
                           PPBT = Predicted profits before tax 
 
 
All data for the first three-year actual and predicted performances of each company 
are collected when its reorganization plan has been accepted by the court. The study 
gathers the data from three public sources including the databases of the Thai Central 
Bankruptcy Court, Bangkok, Thailand, the Department of Business Development at 
the Ministry of Commerce, Bangkok, Thailand, and the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
The data regarding three-year predicted profits before tax are disclosed in the 
reorganization plans of insolvent firms which were collected in bankruptcy 
reorganization filings within the database of the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court, 
Bangkok, Thailand whereas the data involving the first three-year actual profits 
before tax during the reorganization time are disclosed in several sources. The main 
data source is the reorganized firms’ progress reports detailing actual reorganization 
following the plan which were collected in bankruptcy reorganization filings within 
the database of the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court. In some cases, the progress 
reports did not contain all the data necessary for the study. In such cases, the 
additional data was sourced from financial statements of firms from the database of 
the Department of Business Development, the Ministry of Commerce, Bangkok, 
Thailand, and financial information of listed firms from the database of the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand. 
 
 
4.3.2 Independent variables  
 
Independent variables include three types of key governance mechanisms within the 
bankruptcy reorganization process namely monitoring, incentive and market 
mechanisms. Each has variable measurement and sources of data are as follows. 
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4.3.2.1 Monitoring mechanisms 
  
4.3.2.1.1 Outside directors in the planner 
 
As detailed in Chapter 3, the balance of evidence from empirical studies confirms 
that the expertise of outside directors can provide better monitoring which leads to 
improvement in post-bankruptcy performance (e.g., Daily 1995; Daily & Dalton 
1994a, 1994b; Gales & Kesner 1994; Hermalin & Weisbach 1988; Westphal 1999). 
Daily (1995) employed the proportion of outside directors to investigate successful 
bankruptcy reorganization whereas the study of Gales and Kesner (1994) indicated 
that the proportion of outsiders in the board was important to firm value. Daily & 
Dalton (1994b) also used the proportion of independent directors as a measure of 
outside directors to examine board composition of bankrupt firms.   Thus, following 
prior research, the proportion of outside directors in the planner was employed to 
measure outside directors in the planner (OUTPLA).The details on directors in the 
planner are shown in the reorganization plans of insolvent firms. All data were 
obtained from bankruptcy reorganization filings within the database of the Thai 
Central Bankruptcy Court collected at the time bankruptcy reorganization of 
insolvent firms had been approved by the court. The measure is calculated by 
dividing the number of outside directors in the planner by the total number of 
directors in the planner. The formula is as follows: 
 
OUTPLA = No. of outside directors in the planner   
                   Total no. of directors in the planner 
  
 
  
4.3.2.1.2 Outside directors in the plan administrator 
 
In a similar way to OUTPLA, to measure outside directors in the plan administrator 
(OULPLAD), the proportion of outside directors in the plan administrator is 
calculated. The details about directors in the plan administrator are disclosed in the 
reorganization plans of insolvent firms as well. The data are derived from bankruptcy 
reorganization filings within the database of the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court. 
OUTPLAD is calculated by dividing the number of outside directors in the plan 
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administrator by the total number of directors in the plan administrator. The measure 
is: 
 
OUTPLAD = No. of outside directors in the plan administrator   
                     Total no. of directors in the plan administrator 
 
4.3.2.1.3 Ownership concentration by the largest shareholder 
 
The literature in Chapter 3 shows that the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance has been investigated extensively even though 
the results are mixed. Many previous studies used the percentage of outstanding 
common shares owned by large shareholders to be a measure of ownership 
concentration, for example, Prowse (1992) and Limpaphayom (2000) used the 
percentage of common shares held by the largest five shareholders of the firm to 
measure concentrated ownership. Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) used 
various types of shareholding of owners as ownership concentration measures and 
the percentage of common shares held by the largest shareholders was one of those 
in their study. Consistent with these studies, the study employs the proportion of 
common shares held by the largest shareholding of the firm to proxy for ownership 
concentration (OWNER). All data were collected at the end of the first three-year 
performance during reorganization from two public sources. First is the register of 
common shareholders of each firm from the database of the Department of Business 
Development, the Ministry of Commerce, Bangkok, Thailand and second is the list 
of major shareholders of each listed company from the database of Stock Exchange 
of Thailand. It is calculated by dividing the number of common shares held by the 
largest shareholder by the total number of common shares. The measure is: 
 
                    OWNER = No. of common shares held by the largest shareholder  
                                                Total number of common shares  
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4.3.2.2 Incentive mechanisms 
 
4.3.2.2.1 Cash compensation for the plan administrator 
 
According to prior research, cash compensation is an effective mechanism that can 
motivate managers to increase firm value (Fama 1980; Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
The amounts of executive pay in terms of  salary, bonus and fees have been used as a 
measure in articles in the literature review (e.g., Goldberg & Idson 1995; Jensen & 
Meckling 1976; Jensen & Murphy 1990; Patton 1951) and found that they had a 
positive relationship with profitability of the firm (Dyl 1988; Fama 1980). In the 
reorganization plan, cash compensation (LNCAPLAD) is a managerial remuneration 
for the plan administrator. Thus, consistent with prior research, this variable is 
intended to measure the amounts of cash compensation for the plan administrator and 
to examine its relationship with post-bankruptcy performance. The data are disclosed 
in the reorganization plans of insolvent firms and their progress reports that were 
submitted to the official receiver. The data were obtained from bankruptcy 
reorganization filings within the database of the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court. The 
measure expresses how many Baht an executive is paid each month in terms of the 
natural log as suggested by prior research (e.g., Evans 2000; Evans, Evans & Loh  
2002). The formula is: 
 
LNCAPLAD = Log (cash compensation for the plan administrator in Baht per month) 
 
 
4.3.2.2.2 Managerial shareholding of the plan administrator 
 
As suggested in the literature, equity-based management compensation may lead to 
improved firm performance (Fosberg & Rosenberg 2003; Kaplan & Atkinson 1998; 
Mehran 1995). Following the reorganization plan, managerial shareholding 
(SHPLAD) is another form of possible managerial remuneration for the plan 
administrator. Fosberg & Rosenberg (2003) and Mehran (1995) used this form to 
measure executive compensation of chief executive officers and found that  it was an 
effective mechanism that can enhance firm value. Thus, similar to these studies, the 
study employs the percentage of common shares held by the plan administrator as a 
measure of managerial shareholding which is considered to be associated with post-
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bankruptcy performance. The data are located in a number of public sources – 1) the 
reorganization plans of insolvent firms in bankruptcy reorganization filings within 
the database of the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court, Bangkok, Thailand, 2) the 
register of common shareholders of each firm in the database of the Department of 
Business Development, the Ministry of Commerce, Bangkok, Thailand, and 3) the 
list of major shareholders of each listed company in the database of Stock Exchange 
of Thailand. The study collected the data from the database of the Department of 
Business Development, the Ministry of Commerce, Bangkok, Thailand and the 
database of Stock Exchange of Thailand at the end of the first three-year firm 
performance under the reorganization plan. The formula is:  
 
SHPLAD = No. of common shares held by the plan administrator  x 100 
             Total number of common shares 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Market mechanisms 
 
4.3.2.3.1 Restructuring methods of insolvent firms 
 
Based on agency theory and past research, a firm’s restructuring strategy is a 
significant mechanism that can reduce managerial opportunism and improve firm 
performance (e.g., Jensen & Meckling 1976; Bethel & Liebeskind 1993; Bruton et al. 
2002). Following discussion in Section 3.3.5.1 of Chapter 3, restructuring strategies 
in this thesis are divided into three types; operational restructuring (ORSTR), asset 
restructuring (ARSTR), and financial restructuring (FRSTR). All data are found in 
the reorganization plans of insolvent firms and their progress reports that were 
submitted to the official receiver. The data were obtained from bankruptcy 
reorganization filings within the database of the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court and 
collected during the first three-year performance post reorganization.  
 
In accordance with past research, for example, Duhaime & Grant 1984; Montgomery 
et al. 1984; Bruton et al. 2002, this study uses a categorized variable (1, 0) to 
measure each type of restructuring.  The dummy variable of ORSTR is one for 
operational restructuring and zero otherwise. The dummy variable of ARSTR is one 
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for asset restructuring and zero otherwise. And the dummy variable of FRSTR is one 
for financial restructuring and zero otherwise. These measures capture the frequency 
of each strategy used for reorganization by each company in the sample. 
 
 
4.3.3 Control variables 
 
This study will include firm size, industry and company type as control variables in 
the model as they may be related to the ability of insolvent firms to achieve 
successful reorganization and improved post-bankruptcy performance (Gales & 
Kesner 1994). All control data are available in the database of the Thai Central 
Bankruptcy Court, Bangkok, Thailand. They were collected at the time that insolvent 
firms in the sample had been ordered for bankruptcy reorganization and the plans had 
been approved by the court. The definition and measurement of each control variable 
is described as follows: 
 
Firm size is commonly used by prior researchers in this field. In accordance with the 
studies of Hotchkiss (1995), Agrawal & Knoeber (1996), Hotchkiss & Mooradian 
(1997), Fayez & Meyer (2001) and Dahiya et al. (2003), the firm size (LNSIZE) of 
this study is measured by the natural log of the total assets in the firm in million Baht. 
Total assets are defined as the book value of total assets as of the date the court 
issued the order for reorganization of the firm. The measure is: 
 
LNSIZE = Log (Book value of total assets in the firm in million Baht) 
Industry type was also suggested as a control variable in previous studies (e.g., Lee, 
Lucius & McNeil 1999; Peng 2004). According to the research by the Economic 
Indicator Section, Economic Research Department, Bank of Thailand (Siksamat 
1999), 400 medium and large firms in their sample were classified in two types – 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors to explore the economic condition of 
business firms in Thailand after financial and economic crises in 1997. In their 
results, the Business Sentiment Index (BSI) - the company’s profits and investment 
indicated that firms in the manufacturing sector performed better relative to the non-
manufacturing sector. These results imply that industry types may influence Thai 
firms’ economic performance. Thus, following a classification of industry types by 
Siksamat (1999), industry type (INDSTR) of Thai insolvent firms in the sample will 
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be defined as manufacturing and non-manufacturing. It will be measured by a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in the manufacturing industry, and zero 
for other industries.  
  
Thai insolvent firms that filed a petition for reorganization under the Thai 
Bankruptcy Act are both public and private companies. Based on the definitions of 
terms in Section 4.2, they are different in ownership structure. Empirical research 
indicates that such a difference has an impact on firm value (Krause 1988; Kroll, 
Wright, Toombs & Leaveil 1997; Poensgen & Thonet 1979). Thus, following the 
results of past research, company type of reorganized firms may influence 
mechanisms of the process through their abilities to deal with financial distress and 
consequently may affect a firm’s performance. Therefore, company type (TYPE) in 
this study will be controlled. To measure it, the study uses a dummy variable for a 
proxy of types of company. The dummy variable (1,0) is one if the firm is a public 
company, and zero if the firm is a private company.     
 
All variable measures are summarized in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1: A list of measures of variables 
Panel A. A dependent variable 
Variable Measurement 
 
A firm’s post-bankruptcy performance 
 (PFOM)        
 
The three-year average value of the difference 
between actual profits before tax and predicted 
profits before tax as a percentage of the absolute 
value of predicted profits before tax in years 1-3 
 
 
Panel B. Independent variables 
Variables Expected 
sign 
Measurement 
 
Monitoring mechanisms: 
 
Outside directors in the 
planner (OUTPLA) 
 
Outside directors in the plan 
administrator (OUTPLAD) 
 
Ownership concentration by 
the largest shareholder 
(OWNER) 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
The proportion of outside directors in the 
planner 
 
The proportion of outside directors in the plan 
administrator 
 
The proportion of common shares held by the 
largest shareholder of the firm  
 
 
Incentive mechanisms: 
 
Cash compensation for the 
plan administrator 
(LNCAPLAD) 
 
Managerial shareholding of 
the plan administrator 
(SHPLAD) 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The natural log of amounts of cash 
compensation for the plan administrator in 
Baht per month 
 
The percentage of common shares held by the 
plan administrator 
 
Market mechanisms: 
 
Operational restructuring 
methods (ORSTR) 
 
Asset restructuring methods 
(ARSTR) 
 
Financial restructuring 
(FRSTR) 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
Dummy variable (1,0) 
1 for operational restructuring or 0 otherwise 
 
Dummy variable (1,0) 
1 for asset restructuring or 0 otherwise 
 
Dummy variable (1,0) 
1 for financial restructuring or 0 otherwise 
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
 
Panel C. Control variables 
Variables Measurement 
 
Firm size (LNSIZE)  
 
The natural log of the book value of total 
assets in the firm in million Baht 
 
 
Industry type (INDSTR) 
 
 
 
 
Types of industry 
1 = Manufacturing 
0 = Others 
 
 
Company type (TYPE)  Types of company 
1 = Public company 
0 = Private company  
 
 
 
 
4.4 Sample selection and data collection 
 
Insolvent companies which filed petitions for Chapter 3/1 bankruptcy reorganization 
are screened as samples. The selection criteria is that they must be a company filing 
for reorganization under the Thai Bankruptcy Act and the court has already accepted 
the reorganization plan and appointed their plan administrator. The periods for 
gathering filing companies whose plans have been confirmed by the court are 
between January 1999 and December 2002. They come from the database of the Thai 
Central Bankruptcy Court, Bangkok, Thailand. The primary investigation found that 
111 companies had met the selection criteria. They included both large private (76) 
and public (35) companies in various industries which owed creditor(s) at least 10 
million Baht. The list of all sample firms is shown in Appendix 2. 
            
 82
             Table 4.2: The number of sample firms each year 1999 - 2002              
Year 
(that plans were 
accepted by the court) 
Total No. of firms 
each year 
No. of 
private firms 
No. of 
public firms 
19991 1 (0.9%) 0 1 
2000 16 (14.4%) 5 11 
2001 48 (43.2%) 36 12 
2002 46 (41.4%) 35 11 
Total 111 (100.0%) 76 (68.5%) 35 (31.5%) 
               
1
 The court opened on June 18, 1999. 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows the number of sample firms each year that received court approval 
for reorganization and whose plans had been confirmed by the court 1999 – 2002.  
This table indicates that in the first two years of opening the court, there were only 
17 companies in the bankruptcy reorganization process. The number of firms filed 
for reorganization increased in 2001 and 2002. In total, approximately two-thirds of 
the reorganized firms (68.5%) were private while the remaining 35 firms (31.5%) 
were public.  
 
The schematic below illustrates the dating convention used to describe performance.  
 
                   P                   C                       +1                    +2                   +3 
                   |___________|____________|____________|___________|__________ 
 
 
P represents the year a firm filed a petition for reorganization. C represents the year 
the firm’s plan of reorganization was accepted by a creditor’s meeting and confirmed 
by the bankruptcy court. Performances for the time between P and C during that 
process are not considered. Year +1, +2, +3 represent the first, second, and third full 
years respectively of post-bankruptcy results. 
 
Following the schematic diagram, data for analysis were collected during the period 
1999 - 2005. The data of each company contain information about governance 
mechanisms under the plan including the first three-year predicted and actual 
performance in terms of profits before tax. All data were extracted from three public 
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sources. The data involving the confirmed reorganization plan, progress reports of 
the first three-years operation under the plan and other related information were 
obtained from the database of the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court which is the core 
database used in this study. Ownership and managerial shareholding data were 
collected from the database of the Department of Business Development, the 
Ministry of Commerce and the database of the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
Financial data of companies were also obtained from these sources. 
 
 
4.5 Model specification 
 
The study employs the ordinary least squares regression analysis to investigate the 
effect of governance mechanisms of the bankruptcy reorganization proceedings on 
post-bankruptcy performance. Following from the variable measurement described in 
Section 4.3, the proposed research model can be expressed as follows. 
 
   PFOM= α+β1(OUTPLA)+β2(OUTPLAD)+β3(OWNER)+β4(LNCAPLAD) 
                 +β5(SHPLAD)+β6(ORSTR)+β7(ARSTR)+β8(FRSTR)+ β9(LNSIZE) 
                 +β10(INDSTR)+β11(TYPE) +ε 
      
Where: 
α = A constant term 
β1…β11 = Coefficient of each variable 
PFOM = The three-year average value of the difference between actual profits before 
tax and predicted profits before tax as a percentage of the absolute value of  
predicted profits before tax in Years 1-3  
OUTPLA = The proportion of outside directors in the planner  
OUTPLAD = The proportion of outside directors in the plan administrator 
OWNER = The proportion of common shares held by the largest shareholder of the 
firm 
LNCAPLAD = The natural log of amounts of cash compensation for the plan 
administrator  
SHPLAD = The percentage of common shares held by the plan administrator 
ORSTR = Dummy variable (1,0) 1 for operational restructuring or 0 otherwise 
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ARSTR = Dummy variable (1,0) 1 for asset restructuring or 0 otherwise 
FRSTR = Dummy variable (1,0) 1 for financial restructuring or 0 otherwise 
LNSIZE = The natural log of the total assets in the firm   
INDSTR = Types of industry; 1 for manufacturing, 0 for others  
TYPE = Types of company; 1 for public company, 0 for private company 
ε = An error term 
 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
This chapter introduced the research methodology for the study. It is designed to 
examine the relationship between monitoring, incentive and market mechanisms 
within the bankruptcy reorganization process and a firm’s post-bankruptcy 
performance.  
 
The definitions of all variables, their measurements, data sources and timing of data 
collection are described. A summary of measures of variables is outlined in Table 4.1. 
The chapter also outlines the criteria for selecting the sample and data collection. The 
list of all sample firms includes those whose plans were accepted by the Thai Central 
Bankruptcy Court 1999-2002 and is attached in Appendix 2. The data gathered for 
analysis took place between January 1999 and December 2005 following the 
schematic diagram in Section 4.4. The information on governance mechanisms of the 
bankruptcy reorganization process and the first three-year predicted and actual 
performance in terms of profits before tax were extracted from three public sources. 
They are the database of the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court, the database of the 
Department of Business Development, the Ministry of Commerce and the database 
of the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Finally, the chapter specifies the OLS regression 
model based on hypotheses in Chapter 3.  
 
The next chapter will present the results of the descriptive analysis. It will show the 
characteristics of all variables and the relationships between key governance 
mechanisms of the process and a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance. These results 
will be helpful for developing an understanding of the main features of variables in 
the sample and suggest the critical factors for successful reorganization. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Descriptive analysis of sample data 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the variables used in the study. The analysis is 
undertaken primarily through the use of descriptive statistics. The findings and 
discussions are shown in the following sections. Section 5.2 reports the results of a 
firm’s post-bankruptcy performance, the number of firms reporting positive and 
negative percentage differences of post-bankruptcy performance and the 
relationships with other variables. Section 5.3 discusses the findings in relation to the 
independent variables and Section 5.4 addresses the analysis of control variables.  
 
 
5.2 The dependent variable 
 
In Chapter 4, a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance (PFOM) is designed as the 
dependent variable in terms of the first three-year actual profits before tax during the 
reorganization time. Table 5.1 shows a summary of descriptive statistics of actual 
profits before tax (APBT) and predicted profits before tax (PPBT). As can be seen, 
mean scores of APBT in years 1, 2, 3 were 496.96, 11.50 and 104.33 million Baht, 
respectively, whereas mean scores of PPBT were -22.08, 10.56 and 43.83 million 
Baht, respectively. Median values of APBT in each year were -12.83, -5.33 and 0.00, 
respectively showing negative and zero results and lower scores than those of PPBT 
(-6.88, 0.00, and 2.28, respectively). Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display the performance of 
reorganized firms in the sample and show an improvement over the three-year period.  
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               Table 5.1: Mean, median and standard deviation of actual and  
                                predicted post-bankruptcy performances in each year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       Notes:  1. APBT = Actual profits before tax in million Baht 
                                        2. PPBT = Predicted profits before tax in million Baht 
                                  3. Total sample companies = 111 insolvent companies 
 
 
Figure 5.1 presents graphs of median values of the first three-year actual and 
predicted profits before tax of 111 firms. It can be seen that the median line of actual 
profits before tax (APBT) gradually nears the median line of predicted profits before 
tax (PPBT). These results indicate that overall, insolvent firms’ performances 
improved while reorganization plans were being implemented.  
 
 
                Figure 5.1: A comparison of three-year performance between 
                                   median predicted and actual profits before tax 
 
 
                       Notes:  APBT = Actual profits before tax in million Baht 
                                         PPBT = Predicted profits before tax in million Baht 
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Figure 5.2 reports the percentage difference of post-bankruptcy performance (PFOM) 
for each firm. According to Section 4.3.1 in Chapter 4, PFOM is measured in a form 
of the three-year average value of the difference between actual profits before tax 
and predicted profits before tax as a percentage of the absolute value of predicted 
profits before tax in years 1-3. As shown in this figure, the line of PFOM indicates 
that most have percentage differences of performance near zero suggesting some 
accuracy in the three-year period.   
 
    Figure 5.2: Post-bankruptcy performance (PFOM) of  
                      each reorganized firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
 
 
    
 
 
Table 5.2 illustrates the number of firms reporting positive and negative percentage 
differences of post-bankruptcy performance (PFOM). The findings show that of the 
samples, 67 firms (60%) have positive percentage differences and 44 firms (40%) 
have negative percentage differences. The results in each company type are also 
similar to the results in total. Forty-four private firms (58%) and 23 public firms 
(66%) have positive results while 32 private (42%) and 12 public (34%) have 
negative results. This evidence suggests that main governance mechanisms in the 
reorganization proceedings can enable the majority of insolvent companies to 
continue their business to meet or exceed financial expectation. It can be said that the 
recovery rate of Thai insolvent firms in this study is around sixty percent.  
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Table 5.2: Positive and negative percentage differences of post-bankruptcy 
performance     
 
 
Characteristic difference            Total sample firms      Private firms        Public firms 
 
1) Positive percentage difference             67 firms, 60%     44 firms, 58%        23 firms, 66% 
 
2) Negative percentage difference             44 firms, 40%            32 firms, 42%        12 firms, 34% 
             
    Number of firms            111 firms, 100%    76 firms, 100%       35 firms, 100%        
 
 
 
Table 5.3 examines how positive and negative percentage differences of performance 
(PFOM) relate to the features of key governance mechanisms of the process and 
control variables. The key governance mechanisms include three types of 
mechanisms; monitoring, incentive and market mechanisms and control variables 
consist of firm size, industry and company type. 
 
According to monitoring mechanisms - the planner, the plan administrator and the 
ownership concentration by the largest shareholder, the results show that more than 
60% of both groups use inside directors as their planner and plan administrator. 
However, the percentages of the use of these mechanisms between inside and outside 
directors of each group are different. The percentage of companies using inside 
directors in the planner in the positive group, 43 (64%) was higher than in the 
negative group, 27 (61%) but the percentage of companies in the positive group 
which used at least one outside director in the planner, 24 (36%) was lower than in 
the negative group, 17 (39%). Contrary to the planner, the negative group shows the 
percentage of the use of inside directors in the plan administrator, 31 (71%) higher 
than in the positive group, 46 (69%) whereas the percentage of the use of at least one 
outside director as the plan administrator in the negative group, 13 (29%) was lower 
than in the positive group, 21 (31%). Also, there are a number of differences in the 
percentage of the use of ownership concentration by the largest shareholder between 
the positive and negative groups. Although most (around 55% - 60%) in both groups 
had ownership concentration in the range of equity which is equal or less than 50%, 
the percentage in the positive group appears to be higher (60%). In the range of 
equity shareholding more than 50%, the figures show that the percentage of 
 89
companies in the negative group had a higher figure, 20 (45%) than in the positive 
group, 27 (40%).  
 
For Incentive mechanisms (managerial remuneration for the plan administrator), the 
results show that most companies in both groups paid cash compensation (around 
75% -76%) and allocated common shares (66% - 68%) to the administrator.  It can 
be noticed that both groups used cash compensation to motivate the administrator 
more than managerial shareholding and the positive group, 51 (76%) was a higher 
percentage than the negative group, 33 (75%). However, the figures argued that the 
percentage of the use of managerial shareholding in the positive group, 44 (66%) was 
lower than that in the negative group, 30 (68%).  
 
Market mechanisms are divided into three restructuring types including operational, 
asset and financial restructurings. From the table, all companies used restructuring 
methods for reorganization in terms of financial restructuring (100%), operational 
restructuring (58% - 64%), and asset restructuring (32% - 43%). As can be seen, 
there was no difference of the percentage of the use of financial restructuring in both 
groups. Both, positive and negative groups used operational restructuring more than 
asset restructuring. Apparently, the percentage of the use of operational restructuring 
in the positive group, 39 (58%) was lower than that in the negative group, 28 (64%) 
whereas the percentage of the use of asset restructuring in the positive group, 29 
(43%) was higher than that in the negative group, 14 (32%).  
 
As regards control variables, the figures show that firm size in both groups was 
different. Thirty companies (45%) in the positive group had a size below median of 
total assets (855 million Baht) whereas 37 companies (55%) in this group had a size 
above median. Contrary to these results, 25 companies (57%) in the negative group 
had a size below median and 19 companies (43%) had a size above median. 
Noticeably, the majority of the positive group had a size above median whereas the 
majority of the negative group had a size equal and less than median. For industry 
type, 37 (55%) and 30 (45%) in the positive group were non-manufacturing and 
manufacturing companies, respectively whereas 21 (48%) and 23 (52%) in the 
negative group were non-manufacturing and manufacturing companies, respectively. 
Like firm size, the majority of companies in each group were different in industry 
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type. Fifty-five percent of companies that had positive performances were non-
manufacturing companies, while the majority (52%) of the negative group was in the 
manufacturing industry.  Finally, as for company type - the majority (around 66% - 
73%) of both groups were private companies. Although the positive group had 
private companies, 44 (66%) more than public companies, 23 (34%), the figures 
show that the negative group had a higher percentage (73%) for private but a lower 
percentage (27%) for public.   
 
These results indicate that there are a number of differences of the features of key 
governance mechanisms of the process and control variables in companies that had 
positive and negative PFOM. The details of descriptive statistics of these variables 
are shown in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
 91
Table 5.3: A comparison of companies with positive and negative post-bankruptcy 
                 performance (PFOM4) 
 
                                                            Positive  PFOM                      Negative PFOM 
      Variables                                                                 (67 companies)                        (44 companies) 
Key governance mechanisms in the process: 
Monitoring mechanisms: 
 
1. Planner - Inside directors only        43 (64%)            27 (61%) 
                 - At least one outside director       24 (36%)            17 (39%) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
2. Plan administrator - Inside directors only       46 (69%)            31 (71%) 
                                  - At least one outside director          21 (31%)            13 (29%) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
3. Ownership concentration by the largest shareholder  
            
                                             - equal or less than 50%       40 (60%)            24 (55%) 
                                             - more than 50%                   27 (40%)                         20 (45%) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Incentive mechanisms: 
 
4. Managerial remuneration 
 
    4.1 Cash compensation -Yes        51 (76%)            33 (75%) 
                                          - No (Nil compensation)     16 (24%)            11 (25%) 
    4.2 Managerial shareholding -Yes       44 (66%)            30 (68%) 
                                                   -No (Nil shareholding)   23 (34%)            14 (32%) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Market mechanisms: 
 
5. Restructuring methods 
 
5.1 Operational restructuring -Yes      39 (58%)            28  (64%) 
                                                -No      28 (42%)            16  (36%) 
5.2 Asset restructuring -Yes       29 (43%)            14 (32%) 
                                      -No       38 (57%)            30 (68%) 
5.3 Financial restructuring -Yes        67 (100%)            44 (100%) 
                                            -No         -                -   
Control variables: 
 
1. Size - Below median of total assets                               30 (45%)             25 (57%)     
            - Above median of total assets                               37 (55%)                                 19 (43%) 
 
2. Industry - Non-manufacturing                                       37 (55%)                                 21 (48%) 
                  - Manufacturing                                               30 (45%)                                 23 (52%) 
3. Type - Private Company                                                44 (66%)                                 32 (73%)  
             - Public Company                                                 23 (34%)                                 12 (27%) 
4 PFOM = The three-year average value of the difference between actual profits before tax and 
predicted profits before tax as a percentage of the absolute value of predicted profits 
before tax in years 1-3 
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5.3 Independent variables 
                                                                                                                         
The independent variables of the study are the main governance mechanisms within 
the Thai reorganization proceedings. They are described as follows. 
 
 
5.3.1 Monitoring mechanisms 
 
The monitoring mechanisms in the Thai bankruptcy reorganization process are the 
planner, the plan administrator and ownership concentration by the largest 
shareholder. The literature in Chapter 2 reveals that the planner and the plan 
administrator have an important role in successful reorganization and the definitions 
of terms in Chapter 4 also specify that the number and kind of directors in the 
planner and plan administrator in each company is not limited by the Thai 
Bankruptcy Act. Bankrupt firms may establish a team of them to monitor their 
businesses. In addition, they may be inside or outside directors.  
 
Ownership concentration has played an important role in the business community of 
the Thai economy since the late 1950s (Dhnadirek & Tang, 2003). The family 
business was embedded in the Thai companies even if they became public. Family 
members as major shareholders are often insiders and dominate a company’s 
business management. As mentioned in Chapter 2, a major shareholder still plays the 
important role in the bankruptcy reorganization process as well. He or she can file a 
petition for reorganization and nominate the planner. For this study, concentrated 
ownership is measured by the proportion of common shares held by the largest 
shareholding of the firm. Thus, the role of the largest shareholder of the insolvent 
firm will be examined to determine whether ownership concentration has a 
discernible impact on post-bankruptcy performance.  
 
 
5.3.1.1 The planner 
 
Figure 5.3 presents outside and inside directors in the planner of bankrupt sample 
companies. Figure 5.3(A) reveals that the majority of bankrupt firms, both private 
and public, set inside directors as their planner rather than outside directors. Only 41 
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companies (37%) hired at least one outside director, whereas 70 companies (63%) 
used inside directors to propose the reorganization plan.  
 
Figure 5.3(B) discloses that the numbers of companies using at least one outside 
director increase when bankrupt firms are classified by firm size. The evidence 
indicates that although large numbers use inside directors in the planner in firms with 
a size less than 500 million Baht, firms with more than 500 million Baht tend to 
increase the use of outside directors. This result suggests that outside directors in the 
planner play an important role in larger firms. 
 
               Figure 5.3: Outside and inside directors in the planner of bankrupt                                         
sample companies   
       
     
    A: Outside and inside directors classified by company type   
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5.3.1.2 The plan administrator 
 
Figure 5.4 shows outside and inside directors as the plan administrator of bankrupt 
sample companies. As was the case with the planner, 56 private companies and 21 
public companies chose inside directors as plan administrators. Only 20 private 
companies and 14 public companies chose outside directors.  
 
A comparison of Figure 5.4(A) with Figure 5.3(A) indicates that public companies 
employed the same number of outside directors as did the planners. Planners were 
still hired after the plan had been prepared and approved by the court, but did not 
undertake the same duties, as the plan administrator to implement the plan. 
Meanwhile, private companies that employed outside directors in the planner 
decreased their numbers and employed inside directors instead to manage their 
business following the approved plan. It is noted that when comparing directors in 
the planner of private companies with directors in the plan administrator of the same 
company type, the number of outside directors slightly decreased from 27 in the 
planner to 20 in the plan administrator or about 9%. The number of inside directors 
dramatically increased from 49 in the planner to 56 in the plan administrator or about 
9% as well. This evidence is consistent with the information which was apparent in 
their reorganization plans. 
 
As with Figure 5.3(B), Figure 5.4(B) also indicates that when firms with inside and 
outside directors as the plan administrators are classified by firm size,   firms which 
are larger than 500 million Baht increase the use of outside directors in the plan 
administrators. The evidence shows that 30 (88%) of total outside directors are in 
these firms.  
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               Figure 5.4: Outside and inside directors as the plan administrator  
                      of bankrupt sample companies  
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5.3.1.3 Ownership concentration by the largest shareholder 
 
The results from the descriptive statistics in Table 5.4 reveal that overall, in both 
company types, the minimum value for the largest owner’s holding is 6.26% and the 
maximum value is 99.99%. It can be seen that the range of its concentration is very 
wide. Nevertheless, the largest shareholder owns 49.41% of equity at the mean and 
40.38% of equity at the median. It is possible to say that the ownership of an 
insolvent firm’s large shareholder is highly concentrated relative to Limpaphayom’s 
(2000) study. When considering each company type, the mean and median scores of 
public companies are 30.47% and 24% respectively, while the mean and median 
scores of private companies are higher, 58.13% and 53.42% respectively.  
 
                  Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics of ownership concentration by the 
                                   largest shareholder of reorganized firms in this study 
 
OWNER Type of company 
 Items 
Private 
company 
Public 
company 
Total of  
both types 
N 76 35 111 
Mean (%) 58.12 30.47 49.40 
Median (%) 53.42 24.00 40.38 
Std. deviation (%) 28.90 22.28 29.82 
Minimum (%) 10.00 6.26 6.26 
Maximum (%) 99.99 99.65 99.99 
 
 
 
When dividing the percentage of share holding by the largest shareholder into four 
categories of ownership concentration; 1) < = 25%, 2) 25% < x < = 50%, 3) 50% < x 
< = 75%, and 4) > 75%, it was found that the maximum number of both public and 
private firms was in the range of the second category. Figure 5.5(A) shows that the 
largest shareholder of 37 companies (33%) holds equities of more than 25% but less 
than 50%. However, Figure 5.5(B) and (C) present a difference of ownership 
concentration in each company type. As can be seen, the maximum numbers (35% 
and 36%) of private firms were in the range of the second and fourth category while 
the maximum number (53%) of public firms is in the first category. These results 
confirm the findings of Table 5.4 that the largest shareholder in both company types 
is concentrated, but the largest shareholder in private companies is more 
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concentrated than in public companies. It is noted that the role of the largest 
shareholder is still strong even though firms stay in the reorganization process. Thus, 
this may be a critical influence on post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
             Figure 5.5: Percentage of share holding by the largest shareholder 
 
                     A: Percentage of share holding by the largest shareholder of  
                                     total sample firms 
  
Percentage of share holding by the largest 
shareholder
No. of firms, 
29, 26%
No. of firms, 
37, 33%
No. of firms, 
15, 14%
No. of firms, 
30, 27%
< = 25% 25% < and < = 50% 50% < and < = 75% > 75% 
 
 
                               B: Percentage of share holding by the largest shareholder of 
                                        private firms   
        
Percentage of share holding by the largest 
sharehoder of private firms in this study
No. of firms, 
10, 13%
No. of firms, 
27, 35%No. of firms, 
12, 16%
No. of firms, 
27, 36%
< = 25% 25% < and < = 50% 50% < and < = 75% > 75% 
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                    Figure 5.5 (continued) 
 
                             C: Percentage of share holding by the largest shareholder of  
                                 public firms 
                               
Percentage of share holding by the largest 
shareholder of public firms in this study
No. of firms, 
19, 53%No. of firms, 
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No. of firms, 3, 
9%
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5.3.2 Incentive mechanisms 
 
In the reorganization proceedings, the information from the reorganization plan 
confirms that the plan administrators receive management fees in terms of cash 
and/or company’s common stock. The following investigates the size of cash and 
equity payments made to administrators. 
 
 
5.3.2.1 Cash compensation for the plan administrator 
 
Table 5.5 shows the plan administrator of both company types receives cash 
compensation (CAPLAD) 525,870 Baht per month, on average, and 300,000 Baht 
per month at median, although the maximum value of compensation rises to 
4,000,000 Baht per month. It is noted that the plan administrator of a public company 
receives higher cash compensation than a private company. The mean and median 
compensations in a public company are 763,301.17 and 500,000 Baht per month 
respectively, whereas those in a private company are 416,527.33 and 200,000 Baht 
per month respectively. 
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                Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics of the amounts of cash compensation 
                                 for the plan administrator (CAPLAD) 
                                           
CAPLAD Type of company 
Items 
Private 
company 
Public 
company 
Total of both 
types 
N 76 35 111 
Mean 416527.33 763301.17 525870.43 
Median 200000.00 500000.00 300000.00 
Std. Deviation 614405.59 853971.69 713435.25 
Minimum 0 0 0 
Maximum 3250000.00 4000000.00 4000000.00 
             Note: CAPLAD = the amounts of cash compensation for the plan  
                                           administrator in Baht per month 
 
 
                        
Figure 5.6 gives more information about the frequency of range of cash 
compensation for the plan administrator. Twenty-four percent are willing to accept 
no compensation. A possible explanation for this is they may be insiders and paid as 
top executive management and/or the largest shareholder. Almost 50% of firms pay 
in the range 0< and <=500,000. The highest frequency (36%) is in the range greater 
than 100,000 Baht, but not less than 500,000 Baht. 
 
 
              Figure 5.6: Range of cash compensation for the plan administrator 
 
Range of cash compensation
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0 0< and < =100,000
100,000< and < =500,000 500,000< and < =1,000,000
> 1,000,000 
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5.3.2.2 Managerial shareholding of the plan administrator 
 
Common shares held by the plan administrator (SHPLAD) are disclosed in Table 5.6 
with shareholding of 13.26% on average and less than 1% at median. The minimum 
value reveals that some plan administrators do not receive common shares as 
compensation. The results indicate that the plan administrators of a private company 
have significantly higher shareholding than those of a public company. The mean in 
a private company is 16.19%, while the mean score in a public company is only 
6.9%.  
 
     Table 5.6: Descriptive statistics of the percentage of common shares 
                                  held by the plan administrator (SHPLAD) 
 
SHPLAD Type of company 
Items 
Private 
company 
Public 
company 
Total of both 
types 
N 76 35 111 
Mean 16.190 6.908 13.263 
Median 0.493 0.041 0.230 
Std. Deviation 26.424 16.998 24.169 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 100.000 78.330 100.000 
                   
 
 
Figure 5.7 illustrates that although about one-third of firms, 37 (33%) did not allocate 
common shares to the plan administrator, more than half of them, 74 (67%) were 
shareholders. Most (46%) were in the range of not less than 20% of total 
shareholding, with only 23 firms with plan administrators holding common shares of 
more than 20%. These results suggest that the majority of insolvent companies use 
share ownership to motivate the plan administrators. 
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                   Figure 5.7: Range of shareholding of the plan administrator 
 
Range of shareholding
33%
45%
10%
4% 3% 5%
0% 0% - 20% 20% - 40% 40% - 60% 60% - 80% 80% - 100%
 
Range of shareholding No. of firms Percent 
0% 37 33.3 
0% - 20% 51 45.9 
20% - 40% 11 9.9 
40% - 60% 4 3.6 
60% - 80% 3 2.7 
80% - 100% 5 4.5 
Total 111 100 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Market mechanisms 
 
As specified in the reorganization plan and progress reports, the critical market 
mechanism used by insolvent firms for bankruptcy reorganization are restructuring 
strategies. The study classifies restructuring methods into three categories; 
operational, asset, and financial restructuring and found that reorganized firms 
reported multiple methods to the bankruptcy court. The study explores how many 
firms used each category and then considers the relationship between using 
restructuring strategy and actual financial performance. The findings from 
descriptive analysis are as follows. 
  
 
5.3.3.1 Restructuring methods of insolvent firms 
 
Table 5.7 illustrates three categories of restructuring methods and indicates that of all 
firms, 111 (100%) used benefits from the reorganization proceedings to restructure 
their financial structures. Sixty-seven firms (60.4%) restructured their management 
and organization and only 43 (38.7%) restructured their asset management.  
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Table 5.7: Three categories of restructuring methods     
                                                                    
 
Restructuring methods                                  No. of firms                        Percent of total firms 
 
Total firms                                                                  111   
Operational restructuring                                           67                                                 60.4% 
Asset restructuring                                                      43                                                 38.7% 
Financial restructuring                                              111           100.0% 
 
 
Table 5.8 shows the relationship of restructuring methods to company and industry 
type as follows. Of the 67 firms using operational restructuring, 51 (76%) are private 
and 16 (24%) public. Of the 43 firms using asset restructuring, 27 (63%) are private 
and 16 (37%) public.  Of the 111 firms using financial restructuring, 76 (68%) are 
private and 35 (32%) public. As regards industry type, of the 67 firms using 
operational restructuring, 36 (54%) are manufacturing and 31 (46%) non-
manufacturing. Of the 43 firms using asset restructuring, 25 (58%) are manufacturing 
and 18 (42%) non-manufacturing and of the 111 firms using financial restructuring, 
53 (48%) are manufacturing and 58 (52%) non-manufacturing.  
 
   Table 5.8: Three categories of restructuring methods and company and industry  
type 
                     
 
Three categories 
of 
Restructuring methods 
 
Company type Industry type Total 
firms  
in each 
category 
 
Private 
 
Public 
 
I       
 
II 
Operational restructuring 
 
Asset restructuring 
 
Financial restructuring 
51(76%) 
 
27(63%) 
 
76(68%) 
16(24%) 
 
16(37%) 
 
35(32%) 
31 (46%) 
 
18 (42%) 
 
58 (52%) 
36 (54%) 
 
25 (58%) 
 
53 (48%) 
67(100%) 
 
43(100%) 
 
111(100%) 
      Note: Industry type I = non-manufacturing industry 
                Industry type II = manufacturing industry 
 
 
The firms reported to the Central Bankruptcy Court the details of operational, asset, 
and financial restructuring methods. Panel A of Table 5.9 shows the methods of 
operational restructuring. Nearly 50% of total firms attempted to reduce costs and 
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expenses, while about 30% attempted to change management, production systems, 
and sales and service systems. Around 15 – 20% were involved in company size 
reduction, change in organization structure, improvement in financial and accounting 
systems, and change in internal control systems, including discontinuation of loss 
making operations. Less than 14% improved information systems, profitable 
activities, and compensation and wage systems. Interestingly, although private and 
public firms applied each method, public companies were noticeably higher in the 
use of change in management as strategy.   
 
Panel B of Table 5.9 documents that the most common methods of asset 
restructuring were the disposal of non-core assets (86%), followed by the disposal of 
investments (21%). Some firms (12%) invested in capital assets. Four firms (9%) 
accepted mergers and acquisitions and only two (5%) were involved in intangible 
asset write-offs. It is apparent that there was little difference among the methods 
which private and public firms used.     
 
Panel C of Table 5.9 discloses that 107 firms (96%) accepted debt write-off of 
principal and/or accrued interest. Approximately 60 -70 firms (more than 50%) 
attempted to use debt to equity swaps (common share), deferment of principal and/or 
accrued interest, capital reduction from existing shareholders, and capital injection 
from new investors. Around 30 – 40% reported debt repayment / reschedule / 
refinance, change in interest rate, and settlement of debts with non-equity assets. 
Sixteen firms (14%) were granted a grace period and 8 firms (7%) used debt 
injection from new investors, while 7 firms (6%) injected capital from existing 
shareholders. The remainder chose to use debt to equity swaps into convertible 
debentures/bonds (4%) and debt to equity swaps into preference shares (2%).  
 
In summary, the results in Table 5.9 show that insolvent firms used formal 
reorganization through the court to relieve their debt burdens lawfully and increase 
new capital injections for continuing their businesses. Cost reduction, disposal of 
non-core assets and change in management were as crucial methods for restructuring. 
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Table 5.9: Details of restructuring methods used by reorganized firms 
 
 
Panel A 
Methods of operational restructuring                           Total firms         Private firms        Public firms  
   
No. of firms using operational restructuring        67                        50                     17           
Methods: 
Cost and expense reduction   32 (48%)              26 (52%)              6 (35%) 
Change in management    21 (31%)              13 (26%)              8 (47%) 
Change in production system   19 (28%)              14 (28%)              5 (29%) 
Change in sale and service system   19 (28%)              14 (28%)              5 (29%) 
Company size reduction    13 (19%)                8 (16%)              5 (29%) 
Change in organization structure   13 (19%)                9 (18%)              4 (24%) 
Improvement in financial and accounting system 12 (18%)                9 (18%)              3 (18%) 
Change in internal control system   11 (16%)                9 (18%)              2 (12%) 
Discontinuation of loss making operation  10 (15%)                9 (18%)              1 (6%)  
Improvement in information system    9 (13%)                8 (16%)              1 (6%) 
Improvement in profitable activities    7 (11%)                6 (12%)              1 (6%) 
Improvement in compensation and wage system    3 (5%)                  3 (6%)                     -       
                                                                                                                                 
 
Panel B 
Methods of asset restructuring                                     Total firms           Private firms       Public firms 
     
No. of firms using asset restructuring      43                           27                    16   
Methods: 
Disposal of non-core assets   37 (86%)              24 (89%)             13 (81%) 
Disposal of investments      9 (21%)                3 (11%)               6 (38%) 
Investment in capital assets     5 (12%)                3 (11%)               2 (13%) 
Mergers and acquisitions      4 (9%)                  1 (4%)                 3 (19%) 
Intangible asset write-off      2 (5%)                  2 (7%)                     - 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel C 
Methods of financial restructuring                              Total firms            Private firms       Public firms 
     
No. of firms using financial restructuring       111                         76                     35 
Methods: 
Debt write-off (principal and/or accrued interest)  107 (96%)            72 (95%)            35 (100%)  
Debt to equity swaps (common share)     69 (62%)            49 (65%)            20 (57%) 
Deferment of principal and/or accrued interest    63 (57%)            48 (63%)            15 (43%) 
Capital reduction from existing shareholders     62 (56%)            32 (42%)            30 (86%) 
Capital injection from new investors     61 (55%)            43 (57%)            18 (51%) 
Debt repayment / reschedule / refinance     43 (39%)            23 (30%)            20 (57%) 
Change in interest rate       40 (36%)            26 (34%)            14 (40%) 
Settlement of debts with non-equity assets     33 (30%)            23 (30%)            10 (29%) 
Granting of grace period       16 (14%)            11 (15%)              5 (14%) 
Debt injection from new investors        8 (7%)                5 (7%)                3 (9%) 
Capital injection from existing shareholders       7 (6%)                5 (7%)                2 (6%)  
Debt to equity swaps (convertible debenture/bond)      4 (4%)                2 (3%)                2 (6%) 
Debt to equity swaps (Preference share)       2 (2%)                1 (1%)                1 (3%) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: The number in brackets is the percentage of the number of companies using the method divided 
by the total number of firms in each column.  
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Rankings of prevalence of use of three restructuring types of both positive and 
negative percentage difference of post-bankruptcy performance (PFOM) firms are 
displayed in Tables 5.10 – 5.12. As can be seen in Table 5.10, firms in the positive 
group used change in management as the first rank but the negative group considered 
cost and expense reduction to be the first choice. At the second rank, the positive 
group used cost and expense reduction and change in sale and service system while 
the negative group gave priority to the use of change in production system. Change 
in production system, company size reduction and change in organization structure 
were employed by the positive group at the third, fourth and fifth rank, respectively. 
Meanwhile the negative group used change in management and improvement in 
financial and accounting systems in the third rank, change in sale and service system, 
organization structure, and internal control systems in the fourth rank, and 
discontinuation of loss making operations in the fifth priority. It appears that the use 
of operational restructuring methods of the successful group differs significantly 
from the negative group. 
   
Table 5.10: The ranks of prevalence of use of operational restructuring methods of   
two groups of reorganized firms reporting positive and negative 
percentage differences of post-bankruptcy performance (PFOM)  
  
                                                                                         Positive group                       Negative group                                  
Methods:                                                                      Rank     no. of firms              Rank     no. of firms 
 
Cost and expense reduction                                           2          13 (19%)                   1            19 (43%)  
        
Change in management                                                 1          14 (21%)                    3              7 (16%) 
 
Change in production system                                        3          11 (16%)                    2              8 (18%)   
        
Change in sale and service system                                2          13 (19%)                    4              6 (14%) 
    
Company size reduction                                                4          10 (15%)                    6               3 (7%) 
     
Change in organization structure                                  5             7 (10%)                    4               6 (14%)  
    
Improvement in financial and accounting systems       7             5 (7%)                     3               7 (16%) 
  
Change in internal control systems                               7             5 (7%)                     4               6 (14%) 
    
Discontinuation of loss making operations                   6             6 (9%)                     5               4 (9%) 
   
Improvement in information system                             6              6 (9%)                    6               3 (7%) 
   
Improvement in profitable activities                             7              5 (7%)                    7               2 (5%) 
    
Improvement in compensation and wage system          8              1 (1%)                    7              2 (5%) 
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Table 5.11 displays the ranks of asset restructuring methods in both groups. As can 
be seen, companies of the positive group chose disposal of non-core assets, disposal 
of investments, and mergers and acquisitions as the top three methods for 
restructuring. They also used other methods; investment in capital assets and 
intangible asset write-offs. The negative group chose the same primary methods that 
the positive group used.  
 
Table 5.11: The ranks of prevalence of use of asset restructuring methods of two 
groups of reorganized firms reporting positive and negative percentage 
differences of post-bankruptcy performance (PFOM) 
 
                                                                                      Positive group                          Negative group                                  
Methods:                                                                   Rank     no. of firms                 Rank     no. of firms 
 
Disposal of non-core assets               1          25 (37%)      1    12 (27%) 
    
Disposal of investments                2            7 (10%)      2      2 (5%) 
     
Investment in capital assets               4            3 (4%)      2      2 (5%) 
     
Mergers and acquisitions                3            4 (6%)                - 
      
Intangible asset write-offs                5            1, 2%      3      1, 2% 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.12 illustrates the ranks of financial restructuring methods of reorganized 
firms in both groups. It can be seen that debt write-off (principal and/or accrued 
interest) and debt to equity swaps (common share) are the first and second rank, 
respectively that both groups used for resolving their financial position. Deferment of 
principal and/or accrued interest was used by the negative group in the third rank, 
whereas the positive group considered this method as the fifth rank. The method of 
capital reduction from existing shareholders was used at the third rank by the positive 
group, whereas it became the fifth priority of the negative group. The method of 
capital injection from new investors is ranked at the fourth level in both groups. The 
methods of debt repayment/reschedule/refinance and change in interest rate are 
ranked sixth in the positive group while they are at the sixth and seventh rank in the 
negative group. Other methods such as settlement of debts with non-equity assets, 
debt to equity swaps (convertible debenture/bond) and debt injection from new 
investors were also used in both groups but they are the last rank. The results indicate 
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that there is a little difference in selection of these methods between the positive and 
negative groups.  
 
Table 5.12: The ranks of prevalence of use of financial restructuring methods of two 
groups of reorganized firms reporting positive and negative percentage  
                    differences of post-bankruptcy performance (PFOM) 
 
                                                                                         Positive group                        Negative group                                 
Methods:                                                                      Rank     no. of firms              Rank     no. of firms 
 
Debt write-off (principal and/or accrued interest)  1           66 (99%)     1    41 (93%)
       
Debt to equity swaps (common share)   2           42 (63%)     2    27 (61%) 
   
Deferment of principal and/or accrued interest  5           38 (57%)     3    25 (57%) 
   
Capital reduction from existing shareholders   3           41 (61%)     5    21 (48%)
    
Capital injection from new investors   4           39 (58%)     4    22 (50%) 
    
Debt repayment / reschedule / refinance   6           24 (36%)     6    19 (43%) 
    
Change in interest rate     6           24 (36%)     7    16 (36%) 
      
Settlement of debts with non-equity assets   7           19 (28%)     8     14 (32%) 
    
Granting of grace period     8           10 (15%)     9       6 (14%) 
      
Debt injection from new investors    9             7 (10%)    12       1 (2%)  
      
Capital injection from existing shareholders  10             4 (6%)     10       3 (7%)   
     
Debt to equity swaps (convertible debenture/bond) 11             2 (3%)     11       2 (5%) 
    
Debt to equity swaps (Preference share)  11             2 (3%)                  -    
 
 
 
 
The results of Tables 5.10 – 5.12 reveal there is different selection of restructuring 
methods in each category between positive and negative groups, particularly, around 
operational restructuring. It could be that the different uses of each method in each 
group are helpful for an understanding of a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance.  
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5.4 Control variables 
                                            
Control variables in the study include firm size, type of company, and industry type. 
The important features of each control variable are described below. 
 
5.4.1 Firm size 
 
The size of each firm is measured by the book value of a company’s total assets as of 
the date that the court had issued the order for the business reorganization of the firm. 
Details of each firm’s size are given in Appendix 2: List of sample companies. The 
results of descriptive statistics in Table 5.13 show that mean and median scores are 
1,914.08 and 855.36 million Baht, respectively. Mean and median sizes of private 
firms are 948.66 and 635.68 million Baht, respectively, while mean and median sizes 
of public firms are significantly larger at 4,010.44 and 2,042.70 million Baht, 
respectively.  
 
 
 
Table 5.13: Descriptive statistics of the size of reorganized  
                                          firms in this study 
 
Items Private firms Public firms total 
N 76 35 111 
Mean 948.66 4010.44 1914.08 
Median 635.68 2042.70 855.36 
Std. Deviation 1237.83 5285.17 3423.56 
Minimum 18.68 92.56 18.68 
Maximum 7601.00 27233.35 27233.35 
                      Note: Size is the book value of a company’s total assets in million Baht 
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5.4.2 Company type 
 
Sample firms in the study include both private and public companies.  Figure 5.8 
indicates that the number of private companies that filed for reorganization increased 
significantly in 2001, while the number of public companies jumped in 2000 and 
became more stable in the last two years of the study.  
 
  
  Figure 5.8: Types of bankrupt sample companies 
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The firm size of each company type in Table 5.14 shows private companies (76) 
have mean scores of firm size of only 948.66 million Baht relative to public 
companies (35) which are smaller in number but have mean scores of firm size 
nearly four times greater (4,010.44 million Baht).  
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                 Table 5.14: Descriptive statistics of firm size classified by company 
                                    and industry type 
 
Company 
type 
Industry 
type 
 
Mean 
 
N 
 
Std. Deviation 
Private 0 
1 
Total 
902.02 
1003.29 
948.66 
41 
35 
76 
1132.52 
1365.74 
1237.83 
 
Public 0 
1 
Total 
3372.30 
4613.12 
4010.44 
17 
18 
35 
3758.65 
6463.57 
5285.17 
 
Total 0 
1 
Total 
1626.07 
2229.27 
1914.08 
58 
53 
111 
2480.36 
4225.69 
3423.56 
 
                 Note: Industry type; 0 = non-manufacturing industry 
                                                      1 = manufacturing industry  
 
 
5.4.3 Industry type 
 
Figure 5.9 which presents industry types of bankrupt sample companies shows that 
of the 111 insolvent companies, 53 (48%) came from the manufacturing industry and 
58 (52%) from other industries. However, as shown in Table 5.14, mean scores of 
size (2,229.28 million Baht) of reorganized firms within the manufacturing industry 
are larger than those (1,626.07 million Baht) of firms within the non-manufacturing 
industry.  
 
Figure 5.9: Types of industry of bankrupt sample companies 
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48%Other industries, 
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Table 5.15 shows industry classification of the sample companies. The 
manufacturing companies in the study which suffered the biggest effect of the 1997 
Asian economic crisis were the steel industry and the stainless and plastic pipe 
industry including components of pipe products. Next came sport and fashion 
footwear, tuna fish canning, Para rubber, paper, and furniture factories. Twenty-six 
(49%) of the total manufacturing companies are in these industries. Among other 
industries, a large number of real estate development businesses, followed by 
construction, resort and hotel, car selling, leasing and distributors were extremely 
affected by this crisis.  Forty-two (72%) of total other industrial companies are in 
those industries.   When combined, they represent 68 (61%), more than half of the 
total sample companies.  
 
                  
Table 5.15: Industry classification of sample companies 
 
 
Industry classification                                    No. of private companies           No. of public companies                Total  
 
               
Manufacturing: 
 
Aluminum products    1   -      1      
 
Bicycles and parts    1   -      1 
 
Cassava products    -   1      1 
 
Components of air conditioning   -   1      1 
 
Crush stone factory    1   -      1 
 
Concrete wall    1   -      1 
 
Diesel engines    -   1      1 
 
Duck farm     -   1      1 
 
Fish sauce     1   -      1 
 
Frozen seafood    1   -       1 
 
Furniture factories    2   1      3 
 
High power electronic industry   1   -      1 
 
Iron-roll door    1   -      1 
 
Official decorating products   1   -      1 
 
Packaging products    -   2      2 
 
Paint     -   1      1 
 
Palm oil     1   -      1 
 
Paper, paper pulp and related products                            2   1      3 
 
Para rubber and related products   2   1      3 
 
Pipe and components of pipe   3   -      3 
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Table 5.15 (continued) 
 
 
Industry classification                                    No. of private companies           No. of public companies                Total  
 
 
Manufacturing: (continued) 
 
Plastic pipe    1   -      1 
 
Plastic     1   -      1 
Plastic and car components   -   1      1  
 
Stainless pipe and other stainless products  -   1      1  
 
Sport shoes and fashion shoes   1   2      3 
 
Steel and related products   4   2      6 
 
Textiles     4   -      1 
 
Thai silk products and handicrafts  1   -      1 
 
Tomato products    -   1      1 
 
Tuna fish canning    2   1      3 
 
Vehicle and machinery parts   2   -      2  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________      
  
                                         Subtotal 35                                 18                     53 (48%) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Others: 
 
Agricultural goods market    1   -                        1 
Building Construction and engineering   6   2                                       8 
Building material trading     -   1                         1 
Car selling and rental services   4   1                   5 
Construction of power station    1   -                  1 
Department store    -   1           1 
Educational institution    1   -         1 
Engineering & building basic public utilities                   1   -          1 
Environmental engineering   1   -          1 
Financial services    1   -          1 
General hospital    1   -                          1 
Leasing     3   -                         3 
Investment industry     -   1        1 
Mass media production   -   1       1 
Oil containers and harbour rental   1   -       1 
Printing services    -   1        1 
Real estate development                   11   7       18 
Resorts and hotels     5   -         5 
Selling, distributing representative & services 3   1         4 
Telecommunications    -   1          1 
Transportation    1   -         1 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________  
                                                            Subtotal 41   17                    58(52%) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________                                      
                          
                                                            Total  76                            35                                111(100%)   
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5.5 Summary 
 
This chapter reports on an investigation of variables using descriptive statistics. The 
dependent variable - a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance (PFOM) had positive 
percentage differences on average each year. Its median and standard deviations also 
showed improved results in the second and third year. In addition, firms with positive 
PFOM outnumbered those with negative PFOM. Moreover, it was found that the 
recovery rate from bankruptcy in this study was 60% of the total number of 
companies, 58% for private and 66% for public. This result suggests a majority of 
insolvent firms achieve successful reorganization and that the governance 
mechanisms of the bankruptcy reorganization produce some success.  
 
The study identified independent variables as key governance mechanisms of the 
Thai bankruptcy reorganization proceedings including the planner, the plan 
administrator, ownership concentration by the largest shareholder, cash 
compensation and common shares held by the plan administrator, operational, asset 
and financial restructuring methods. The descriptive results showed that the planners 
of bankrupt companies comprised both inside and outside directors. Only 37% of 
companies hired outsiders, whereas 63% used insiders to construct the reorganization 
plan. It was also found that firms with a size of more than 500 million Baht tend to 
use more outside directors. Similar to the planner, only 34 (30%) of 111 companies 
appointed outside directors as plan administrators and firms which are larger than 
500 million Baht also have higher use of outside directors as plan administrators. 
 
The analysis of ownership concentration revealed ownership of insolvent firm, 
remained highly concentrated throughout the reorganization process. Private 
companies had more concentrated ownership than public companies. Firms paid cash 
compensation around 500,000 Baht per month on average to the plan administrator, 
and 300,000 Baht per month at median. The results indicate that almost all sample 
firms, 84 (76%) pay cash compensation to the plan administrator. The plan 
administrators of both private and public companies also held common shares 
(13.26% on average and less than 1% at median). The mean number of shares held in 
a private company was 16.19%, while the mean score in a public company was only 
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6.9%. The results suggested these incentive mechanisms were used in the majority of 
insolvent firms to motivate the plan administrators.  
 
The results also disclosed important details of restructuring strategy implemented by 
insolvent firms. Among three categories of restructuring methods, all firms 
undertook benefits from financial restructure. Sixty-seven firms (60.4%) restructured 
their management and organization and 43 (38.7%) restructured their asset 
management. Cost reduction, disposal of non-core assets and change in management 
were identified as critical methods for restructuring.  
 
Control variables included firm size, company and industry type. Mean and median 
asset size of sample firms were 1,914.08 and 855.36 million Baht, respectively. The 
evidence showed that the sample firms were both public and private companies, with 
private (76) and public (35), however, mean asset size of public companies (4,010.44 
million Baht) were larger than those of private companies (948.66 million Baht). The 
results also revealed mean asset size of firms in each industry type. With 53 firms 
(48%) within the manufacturing industry and 58 firms (52%) within the non-
manufacturing type, mean asset size of manufacturing firms (2,229.28 million Baht) 
were larger than those (1,626.07 million Baht) of non-manufacturing firms. The 
study identified that insolvent firms in the sample covered important industries of the 
Thai economic system such as the steel industry, pipes and components of pipe 
products, footwear, paper, furniture factories, resorts and hotels, building 
construction and real estate development businesses. Sixty-eight companies (61%) of 
the total sample companies were in these industries.   
 
The next chapter presents the results of the statistical test of the hypotheses. It will 
begin with a report of the tests of the statistical assumptions. Then, it will present the 
empirical results of hypotheses testing from OLS regression analysis. A discussion of 
the hypotheses testing results will also be described in this chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Regression results and hypotheses testing 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to present the statistical analysis for the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3. It begins with a discussion of the main assumptions of the 
univariate statistical and multiple regression analyses in Section 6.2. This is followed 
by a report on the results of the ordinary least squares regression analysis in Section 
6.3 and the results of the hypotheses testing in Section 6.4. 
 
 
6.2 Assumptions of statistical tests  
 
The following section describes the sample size for testing and the main assumptions 
of multiple regression. 
 
 
6.2.1 Sample size for testing 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4), the study found bankruptcy files for 
reorganization at the Central Bankruptcy Court, Bangkok Thailand for 111 
companies. The reorganization plans for these companies had been confirmed in the 
period 1999-2002. All observations for analysis were collected for the period January 
1999 to December 2005. Missing data resulted from the second and third-year actual 
profits before tax during the reorganization period being unavailable. All missing 
data was rechecked with the database of the Department of Business Development, 
the Ministry of Commerce and the Stock Exchange of Thailand. It was necessary to 
remove those companies leaving 101 out of 111 (see details of the sample size of the 
study in Table 6.1) for the regression. Nevertheless, the remaining firms in the 
sample represent almost the entire population of insolvent companies for the period 
of the study.  
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Table 6.1 Details of the sample size of the study 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Insolvent firms whose reorganization plan had been confirmed 
by the court 1999 - 2002: 
                 - Public companies                                                                         35 
                 - Private companies                                                                        76 
Total sample firms                                                                                         111 
Less - firms missing both the second and third-year actual profits 
          before tax during the reorganization time 
                   - Private companies                                                                       (2) 
        - firms missing only the third-year actual profits before tax 
           during the reorganization time 
                   - Public companies                                                4 
                   - Private companies                                               4                      (8)                                   
Total sample firms for OLS regression analysis                                             101 
 
Total sample firms for OLS regression analysis in each company type 
 
                  - Public companies                                                                           31 
                  - Private companies                                                                          70  
                                                                                                                          101 
___________________________________________________________________  
Note: During the period of study, none of the 111 firms were terminated from the bankruptcy 
reorganization process.          
 
 
In addition, the study also checked the number of sample firms (N) to predictors 
before testing OLS regression in order to avoid problems of a small size effect and 
significant measurement error. Most research suggests that the cases-to-independent 
variables ratio which has sufficient power should be 10 - 15 cases for every 
independent variable in the model (Cohen 1988, 1992; Green 1991; Park & Dudycha 
1974; Pedhazur 1997; Schmidt 1971).  Thus, following this rule, the number of 
sample firms for nine independent variables in the model should be 90 - 135 firms, 
with the 101 sample firms of the study within this range. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the number of sample firms to predictors in the study was sufficient 
for testing the proposed research model. 
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6.2.2 Normal distribution 
 
In this study, normal quantile-quantile plots (Q-Q plots) were employed to test the 
distribution of continuous variables (Coakes 2005). The diagnostic tests on the 
variables indicated that there were deviations from normality (see Figure 6.1).  
 
 
          Figure 6.1: Normal quantile-quantile plots (Q-Q plots)  of continuous  
                             variables before transformation 
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Mean, median, standard deviations and skewness were computed to check the 
distribution of each variable. As can be seen in Table 6.2, large difference between 
the mean and median of these continuous variables suggest they were not normally 
distributed (except OWNER variable).  
 
 
                    Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics of continuously independent 
                                      variables before transformation  
 
                   
Continuous 
variables 
 
Mean Median 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
 
Skewness 
OUTPLA 0.32 0.00 0.45 0.74 
OUTPLAD 0.23 0.00 0.38 1.28 
OWNER 0.48 0.38 .29 0.61 
CAPLAD 526847.70 300000.00 735233.12 2.22 
SHPLAD 13.70 0.39 24.21 2.02 
SIZE 1901.62 855.36 3499.35 4.65 
                          Note: N = 101 companies 
 
Where: 
OUTPLA = The proportion of outside directors in the planner  
OUTPLAD = The proportion of outside directors in the plan administrator 
OWNER = The proportion of common shares held by the largest shareholding of the 
firm 
CAPLAD = The amounts of cash compensation for the plan administrator  
SHPLAD = The percentage of common shares held by the plan administrator 
SIZE = The book value of total assets in the firm 
 
To correct this problem, the independent variables were transformed. Each variable 
was treated as follows. 
 
1. Transform OUTPLA to be LNOUTPLA by adding 1 to each value to avoid 
zero values and then computing its natural log. 
2. Transform OUTPLAD to be LNOUTPLAD by adding 1 to each value to 
avoid zero values and then computing its natural log. 
3. Transform “CAPLAD” to be “LNCAPLAD” by adding 1 to each value to 
avoid zero values and then computing its natural log. 
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4. Transform “SHPLAD” to be “LNSHPLAD” by adding 1 to each value to 
avoid zero values and then computing its natural log. 
5. Transform “SIZE” to be “LNSIZE” by computing its natural log. 
 
As a result of the transformation, the mean and median of variables in Table 6.3 were 
closer and the values of standard deviation and skewness were reduced. While there 
were still some minor deviations from normality most researchers argue that if the 
data are not extremely non-normally distributed, the issue is not serious (Coakes 
2005; Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller & Nizam 1998; Norusis 2000).  
      
 
                     Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics of continuously independent  
                                      variables after transformation 
 
   
Continuous 
variables 
 
Mean Median 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
 
Skewness 
LNOUTPLA 0.23 0.00 0.31 0.68 
LNOUTPLAD 0.17 0.00 0.27 1.16 
OWNER 0.48 0.38 .29 0.61 
LNCAPLAD 9.58 12.61 5.76 -1.02 
LNSHPLAD 1.36 0.33 1.62 0.72 
LNSIZE 6.66 6.39 1.37 -0.18 
                           Note: N = 101 companies 
 
 
For the dependent variable, the descriptive statistics in Table 6.4 show that the 
distribution of the dependent variable – PFOM is significantly not normal and needs 
transformation. The study used log transformation to change PFOM to be the natural 
log form – LPFOM.  After transformation, descriptive statistics of LPFOM in Table 
6.4 indicated that the distribution of LPFOM neared normal.  
 
              Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics of post-bankruptcy performance  
                               (PFOM) and the natural log of post-bankruptcy  
                               performance (LPFOM) 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
Skewness  
PFOM 698.29 22.79 4900.78 8.79 
LPFOM 7.88 7.70 0.92 -5.97 
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6.2.3 Check for heteroscedasticity             
 
It was necessary to test for the presence of significant heteroscedasticity in the 
dependent variables. The assumption of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
model requires the absence of heteroscedasticity.  Pindyck and Rubinfield (1991) 
explained that if heteroscedasticity is present, OLS estimation will place more weight 
on the observations with larger error variances than on those with small error 
variances. The error variance of the dependent variables, known as homoscedasticity, 
must be constant (Field 2005). Non-constant variance of the error term is called 
heteroscedasticity.  To test this, the study used an examination of residual 
scatterplots, a plot of the standardized residuals (*ZRESID) and the standardized 
predicted values of the dependent variable based on the model (*ZPRED) (Coakes 
2005; Field 2005).  Field (2005) explains that if the graph of *ZRESID and*ZPRED 
looks like a random array of dots evenly dispersed around zero and does not funnel 
out, there is no indication of the presence of significant heteroscedasticity. In 
comparison to the PFOM scatterplot, the shape of the scatterplot of LPFOM in 
Figure 6.2 shows no obvious departures from homoscedasticity.  
 
Figure 6.2: Plots of the standardized residuals (*ZRESID) 
                                       against the standardized predicted values of                                                    
the dependent variable based on the model  
                                       (*ZPRED) 
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                         Figure 6.2 (continued) 
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6.2.4 Check for multicollinearity 
 
Checking for the presence of multicollinearity between the independent variables is 
important because it leads to biased parameter estimates. Whenever two predictor 
variables are highly correlated, they both measure essentially the same information. 
To reduce the impact of multicollinearity and make the best linear unbiased estimates 
in multiple regression analysis, the redundancy of variables from the analysis needs 
to be removed (Field 2005; Pallant 2001). Based on statistical theory, there are 
several tests to identify multicollinearity; bivariate correlations, tolerance of 
variables, and the variance inflation factor (VIF). This study employed a bivariate 
Pearson product-moment correlation to check it within the Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS) program (Coakes 2005; Pallant 2001). 
 
Table 6.5, which includes the dependent variable - LPFOM and 10 independent 
variables (seven expected predictors - LNOUTPLA, LNOUTPLAD, OWNER, 
LNCAPLAD, LNSHPLAD, ORSTR, and ARSTR and three control variables - 
LNSIZE, INDSTR, and TYPE), provides Pearson correlation coefficients of 
variables for 101 companies in the sample. The findings indicated that there were 
significant correlations among the expected predictors and control variables.  
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As can be seen in Table 6.5, there are independent variables in this study having a 
high coefficient of correlation (i.e. 0.80 and above) suggesting the presence of 
multicollinearity (Field 2005, pp.175). The correlation between LNOUTPLAD and 
LNOUTPLA is .808 and are multicollinear. This was an understandable result as the 
planners are appointed initially to set the plan and manage business operations during 
planning, while the plan administrators are nominated by the former and may be the 
same group as the planner, appointed after the plan has been approved. Thus, it is 
necessary to remove one of these variables (LNOUTPLAD) from the OLS regression 
model. After removing LNOUTPLAD, the highest correlation in the table is .497 
between TYPE and LNSIZE reflect the fact that public companies are generally 
larger than private. It can therefore be concluded that there is no significant 
multicollinearity between the remaining independent variables of the study.  
  
                                                                                   
Table 6.5: Pearson correlation coefficients with the data of 101 companies   
            
    Variables       1          2            3           4          5           6           7           8          9         10        11 
1.   LPFOM             1.00 
2.   LNOUTPLA     .072      1.00 
3.   LNOUTPLAD  .068      .808**  1.00 
4.   OWNER           .010     -.105     -.020        1.00 
5.   LNCAPLAD    .071      .201*    .282**   -.094      1.00 
6.   LNSHPLAD   -.112     -.061     -.228*    -.198*   -.092      1.00        
7.   ORSTR            .128      .162       .065       .145     -.086      .207*    1.00 
8.   ARSTR            .154      .202*     .176*    -.143      .086      .169*    .179*  1 .00 
9.   LNSIZE           .063      .215*     .183*    -.315**  .066     -.011      .077    .149    1.00 
10. INDSTR         .061      .072       .101       .000     -.239** -.080      .225*  .184*  .142      1.00   
11. TYPE             .139      .071       .099      -.438**  .138     -.212*  -.178*   .095    .497**  .054   1.00    
Note: N = 101 companies 
          Variable # 1 is a dependent variable 
          Variables # 2 - # 8 are independent variables 
          Variables # 9 - # 11 are control variables 
          ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed) 
          *   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
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6.2.5 Outliers   
 
The criterion set for detecting multivariate outliers of the study is Mahalanobis 
distances at p < 0.01 level as recommended by Tabachnick & Fidell 2001, pp.157. It 
is evaluated as a critical value of the Chi - Square distributions with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of predictors. In this case, the study initially sets 9 
independent variables of post-bankruptcy performance (excluding one redundant 
variable - LNOUTPLAD and one ineffective predictor - FRSTR). Thus, if any cases 
with Mahalanobis distances are greater than 21.67 (see Tabachnick & Fidell 2001, 
pp.933 in Table C.4: Critical Values of Chi Square (χ2) at df = 9 independent 
variables and p < 0.01 level), they are multivariate outliers. In Table 6.6, the 
maximum value of Mahalanobis distances in the study (17.19) does not exceed the 
given criterion (21.67). Consequently, the results of Mahalanobis distances suggest 
that there are no significant outliers in this study. 
 
 
Table 6.6: The results of the Mahalanobis distance test 
 
 
Items                                        Mahalanobis distance    
 
 
Minimum      4.43 
 
Maximum    17.19  
 
Mean       8.91 
 
Standard Deviation     2.59 
 
No. of cases      101 
Note: The criterion for multivariate outliers of this study is 21.67 (at df = 9 and p < 0.01 level – see 
Tabachnick & Fidell 2001, pp.933).  
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6.3 The results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis 
 
 
6.3.1 Sample used for analysis 
 
As discussed in Section 6.2.1, the sample firms for regression analysis consisted of 
101 reorganized companies. Although this was not a large sample size, it was not 
unusual and many prior researchers who investigated post-bankruptcy performance 
have found a small sample (e.g., the studies of Michel, Shaked & McHugh (1998), 
Alderson & Betker (1999) and Platt & Platt (2002)). For this study, 101 companies 
comprise 91% of all of the 111 bankrupt companies whose reorganization plans were 
accepted by the court between 1999 and 2002 and therefore represent the maximum 
number of companies for this period. 
 
 
6.3.2 Regression model  
 
As a result of two independent variables showing high coefficients of correlation, 
one variable is omitted from the OLS regression model (Section 6.2.4). The variable 
is the natural log of the proportion of outside directors in the plan administrator - 
LNOUTPLAD. Additionally, it is seen that there is no difference in the financial 
restructuring mechanism among companies, this independent variable - FRSTR was 
used for reorganizing business in all companies (see Tables 5.7 in Chapter 5). Thus, 
it is necessary to remove the expected predictor - FRSTR from the model as well. 
Consequently, compared with the proposed research model from Chapter 4 (Section 
4.5), the revised model for testing the dependent variable is as follows. 
 
 
LPFOM = α+β1(LNOUTPLA)+β2(OWNER)+β3(LNCAPLAD)+β4(LNSHPLAD) 
                   +β5(ORSTR)+β6(ARSTR)+β7(LNSIZE)+β8(INDSTR)+ β9(TYPE)+ε 
 
 
Where;  
 
          α = A constant term  
 
β1…β11 = Coefficient of each variable  
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LPFOM = The natural log of the three-year average value of the difference between 
actual profits before tax and predicted profits before tax as the percentage 
of absolute value of predicted profits before tax in years 1-3    
LNOUTPLA = The natural log of the proportion of outside directors in the planner  
OWNER = The proportion of common shares held by the largest shareholder of the 
firm 
LNCAPLAD = The natural log of amounts of cash compensation for the plan 
administrator  
LNSHPLAD = The natural log of the percentage of common shares held by the plan 
administrator 
ORSTR = Dummy variable (1,0) 1 for operational restructuring or 0 otherwise 
ARSTR = Dummy variable (1,0) 1 for asset restructuring or 0 otherwise 
LNSIZE = The natural log of the book value of total assets in the firm 
INDSTR = Types of industry; 1 for manufacturing, 0 for others  
TYPE = Types of company; 1 for public company, 0 for others 
        ε = An error term 
       
 
 6.3.3 OLS regression test results 
 
The research model in Section 6.3.2 is tested using SPSS to examine which are the 
key governance mechanisms in the Thai reorganization proceedings contributing to 
post-bankruptcy performance. In the analysis, with standardized residuals within 
above + 2 standard deviations are omitted research suggests that these cases may 
unreasonably influence the accuracy of estimates (Field 2005). Five cases with 
standardized residuals greater than + 2 are removed reducing the sample firms of the 
OLS regression test from 101 to 96. The sample of 96 and 9 predictors remains a 
sufficient number of sample firms to test the regression model (see Section 6.2.1).            
 
The regression findings in Table 6.7 indicate that there are significant mechanisms 
that dominate post-bankruptcy performance. Three variables (ownership 
concentration by the largest shareholder - OWNER, the natural log of cash 
compensation for the plan administrator - LNCAPLAD, and the natural log of 
common shares held by the plan administrator - LNSHPLAD) are found as positive 
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and significant predictors at p < .10. The results suggest that these mechanisms have 
significant and positive effects on post-bankruptcy performance as measured by 
LPFOM. The coefficient of asset restructuring - ARSTR shows a positive 
relationship which is as expected although not significant.   
 
However, two variables (the natural log of the proportion of outside directors in the 
planner – LNOUTPLA and operational restructuring - ORSTR) were found to be 
insignificant. Varying from the expected hypotheses, the relationship between the 
natural log of the proportion of outside directors in the planner - LNOUTPLA and 
performance and the relationship between operational restructuring - ORSTR and 
performance show negative signs. The results indicate that outside directors in the 
planner and operational and asset restructuring methods do not significantly enhance 
the performance of firms under reorganization.   
 
The findings also show that firm size and industry type are significant. These results 
indicate that size and industry type influence reorganized firms’ post-bankruptcy 
performance in comparison to predicted performance. Firm size - LNSIZE shows a 
positive sign whereas industry type - INDSTR appears negative. This can be 
interpreted to suggest that large firms have a positive effect on post-bankruptcy 
performance and manufacturing industry has a negative effect on post-bankruptcy 
performance as measured by LPFOM.    
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Table 6.7: Empirical results of predictors of a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance 
                 as measured by the natural log of post-bankruptcy performance (LPFOM) 
 
Model: 
         LPFOM = α+β1(LNOUTPLA)+β2(OWNER)+β3(LNCAPLAD)+β4(LNSHPLAD) 
                          +β5(ORSTR)+β6(ARSTR)+β7(LNSIZE)+β8(INDSTR) + β9(TYPE)+ε                         
 
 
Dependent     Independent 
Variable          Variables          Hypothesis      Expected sign    Coefficient       t-value       Significance  
LPFOM           LNOUTPLA          H1                     +                   -0.068            -0.599             .275 
                        OWNER                 H3                     +                    0.280             2.085             .020*                        
                        LNCAPLAD          H4a                    +                    0.008            1.434             .077* 
                        LNSHPLAD          H4b                    +                    0.037            1.572             .060* 
                        ORSTR                  H5a                    +                   -0.018          -0.244              .404 
                        ARSTR                  H5b                    +                    0.013            0.191             .424 
                        LNSIZE                                                                  0.048            1.685             .048* 
                        INDSTR                                                                -0.171           -2.451            .008* 
                        TYPE                                                                      0.055            0.592            .277 
                        Intercept                                                                 7.439          35.984             .000                                         
   
F-value                      2.050*                        
R-square                    0.178                        
Adjusted R-square    0.091                   
Note: N = 96 sample companies 
          * is percent significance level < .10 (1-tailed) 
 
Where: 
LPFOM = The natural log of the three-year average value of the difference between 
actual profits before tax and predicted profits before tax as the percentage 
of absolute value of predicted profits before tax in years 1-3    
LNOUTPLA = The natural log of the proportion of outside directors in the planner  
OWNER = The proportion of common shares held by the largest shareholder of the 
firm 
LNCAPLAD = The natural log of amounts of cash compensation for the plan 
administrator  
LNSHPLAD = The natural log of the percentage of common shares held by the plan 
administrator 
ORSTR = Dummy variable (1,0) 1 for operational restructuring or 0 otherwise 
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ARSTR = Dummy variable (1,0) 1 for asset restructuring or 0 otherwise 
LNSIZE = The natural log of the book value of total assets in the firm 
INDSTR = Types of industry; 1 for manufacturing, 0 for others  
TYPE = Types of company; 1 for public company, 0 for others 
 
The model in Table 6.7 is significant at p < .10 level with an F-test value of 2.050. 
The adjusted R-square value of the model is 0.091, suggesting that the independent 
variables of the estimated equation explain approximately 9.1 percent of the variation 
in post-bankruptcy performance. The explanation power is consistent with previous 
studies that have employed the OLS regression model to investigate the effect of 
governance mechanisms on performance with the adjusted R - square approximating 
10% (for example, the studies of Mehran (1995), Johnson, Boone, Breach and 
Friedman (2000), Lemmon and Lins (2003) and Peng (2004)).  
 
Table 6.8: Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) based on  
                  96 sample companies 
 
 
Variables     Tolerance    VIF 
 
 
LNOUTPLA         .853   1.173 
OWNER         .676   1.478 
LNCAPLAD         .862   1.160 
LNSHPLAD         .731   1.368 
ORSTR          .794   1.259 
ARSTR          .883   1.132 
LNSIZE          .647   1.544 
INDSTR         .844   1.184 
TYPE          .568   1.760 
 
 
 
Table 6.8 that examines tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIF) based on 96 
sample companies shows that the tolerance of variables in the model is not close to 
zero and the variance inflation factors (VIF) of variables are less than 10. These 
results indicate that multicollinearity between the independent variables is not 
significant for this model (Field 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell 2001). 
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6.4 Hypotheses testing            
 
The results of the OLS regression are shown in Table 6.7. As noted in Section 6.3.2, 
the natural log of the proportion of outside directors in the plan administrator 
(LNOUTPLAD) and financial restructuring (FRSTR) were removed from the model. 
Consequently, hypotheses 2 and 5c which are related to LNOUTPLAD and FRSTR 
variables respectively, were not available for hypothesis testing in this study. The 
following explains the results for hypotheses 1, 3, 4a, 4b, 5a, and 5b. 
 
6.4.1 Monitoring mechanism hypotheses 
 
6.4.1.1 Outside directors in the planner (LNOUTPLA) 
 
Based on the literature regarding governance mechanisms of agency theory, outside 
directors in the planner are expected to be an important monitoring mechanism of the 
bankruptcy reorganization process that can enhance post-bankruptcy performance 
following reorganization. It was hypothesized that: 
 
H1:  There is a positive relationship between the proportion of outside directors in 
the planner of the firm and post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
The results of the model in Table 6.7 show that Hypothesis 1 is not supported by the 
LPFOM model. The regression coefficient on LNOUTPLA is negative (-0.068) 
contrary to expectation, although statistically insignificant. This finding suggests that 
outside directors in the planner are not positively related to a firm’s post-bankruptcy 
performance. 
 
The result is in line with the studies by Johnson, Daily and Ellistrand (1996), Dalton, 
Daily, Ellistrand and Johnson (1998), Klein (1998), and Bhagat and Black (2002) 
who also found no significant relationship between outside directors in the board and 
firm performance. This supports Bhagat and Black’s (2002) view that the abilities of 
outside directors in the board to improve firm performance may be limited by many 
factors. For example, in terms of the independence of monitoring, they may not have 
enough independence to monitor business management of the firm or they may have 
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personal relationships with inside directors that affect their independence. Thus, to be 
a clearer understanding whether they are truly independent and what are the critical 
factors that influence their abilities, it needs to be more investigation in future 
research.  
 
 
6.4.1.2 Ownership concentration by the largest shareholder (OWNER) 
 
Ownership concentration is also suggested by agency theory as another monitoring 
mechanism of the bankruptcy reorganization process. A number of previous studies 
reviewed in Chapter 3 support the view that this mechanism has a positive effect on 
firm performance through reduced agency costs. As a result of these studies, the 
hypothesis in this study is:  
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration by the largest 
shareholder of the firm  and post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
The results of the model in Table 6.7 show that Hypothesis 3 is supported by the 
LPFOM model. The regression coefficient on OWNER is positive (0.280) as 
hypothesized and statistically significant. This finding suggests a positive effect of 
ownership concentration on post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
The result supports prior research undertaken by Cubbin and Leech (1983), Wruck 
(1989), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Oswald and Jahera (1991). They 
similarly found a positive relationship between ownership concentration and 
profitability. It is also in line with the study of Wiwattanakantang (1999) who studied 
the effect of ownership concentration and corporate governance on performance by 
using a sample of Thai firms and found that major shareholders of the firm enhance 
profitability. This indicates that this mechanism is advantageous in improving firm 
performance and is consistent with the expectation of agency theory.  
 
This result is also consistent with Charitou et al.’s (2007) research on the effective 
role of institutional ownership on firm performance of a bankruptcy reorganization 
filing. The result confirms that reorganized firms through the court generate benefits 
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from concentrated ownership in a role of monitoring management. Thus, it can be 
concluded that ownership concentration of the large shareholder is a powerful 
monitoring mechanism of the bankruptcy reorganization process and this can 
produce better post-bankruptcy performance of the firm and lead to greater success 
in bankruptcy reorganization. 
 
 
6.4.2 Incentive mechanism hypotheses 
 
6.4.2.1 Cash compensation for the plan administrator (LNCAPLAD) 
 
Cash compensation is a type of managerial remuneration that Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) indicate can provide financial incentives for managers to maximize firm value 
and decrease their opportunistic behaviors. Based upon agency theory, there should 
be a positive relationship between managerial compensation and firm performance. 
Thus, the hypothesis is:   
 
H4a: There is a positive relationship between cash compensation for the plan 
administrator and post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
As can be seen from Table 6.7, the regression coefficient on LNCAPLAD is positive 
(0.008) in the direction as predicted and statistically significant at the p < .10 level. 
Hence, hypothesis 4a is supported by the model. This finding suggests that cash 
compensation for the plan administrator is a useful incentive mechanism of the 
bankruptcy reorganization process that has a positive relationship with post-
bankruptcy performance. 
 
This finding is similar to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976), Fama’s (1980) and Jensen 
and Murphy’s (1990) conclusion that executive compensation is a critical mechanism 
of agency theory that leads to an increase in firm performance. It corroborates 
research by Patton (1951), Roberts (1956), Dyl (1988) and Goldberg and Idson (1995) 
that the positive relationship between executive compensation and profits is 
statistically significant. It is also consistent with the studies by Grant (1998) and 
Kaplan and Atkinson (1998) who found that executive pay is an efficient incentive 
mechanism to improve the goal alignment of shareholders and managers.   
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Following the literature review in Chapter 2, no previous studies regarding 
governance patterns in bankrupt firms concentrated on exploring this factor. It can be 
said that this is the first time this mechanism was examined in Thai insolvent firms. 
LNCAPLAD in the study was measured by the natural log of amounts of cash 
compensation for the plan administrator, showing that the influence of cash 
compensation for the plan administrator on post-bankruptcy performance is 
conclusive. The evidence asserts that it is an effective incentive mechanism in 
controlling agency problems of reorganized firms. Thus, it is possible to say that the 
use of this mechanism can contribute to successful bankruptcy reorganization. 
 
 
6.4.2.2 Managerial shareholding of the plan administrator (LNSHPLAD) 
 
Previous research suggests managerial shareholding is another important form of 
executive remuneration that can motivate managers to increase firm value (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976; Mehran 1995). This hypothesis focuses on equity-based 
compensation as agency theory and previous studies suggest that it can align 
managers remuneration with the firm’s financial performance. The hypothesis is: 
 
H4b: There is a positive relationship between percentage shareholding of the plan 
administrator and post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
The regression coefficient on LNSHPLAD in Table 6.7 is positive (0.037) as the 
expected direction and statistically significant at the p < .10 level. This indicates that 
hypothesis 4b is supported by the model. The finding suggests that managerial 
shareholding of the plan administrator is an important incentive mechanism of the 
bankruptcy reorganization process that has a positive impact on post-bankruptcy 
performance. 
 
Managerial shareholding in this study is measured by common shares held by the 
plan administrator which is consistent with the research by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Mehran (1995). This study supports their findings that the percentage of 
shares held by the CEO is significant in company performance. Similarly, Fosberg 
and Rosenberg (2003) found share ownership by the firm’s executive to be an 
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efficient mechanism in controlling agency costs and can stimulate managers to 
produce higher returns for shareholders. The finding also extends Jensen and 
Murphy’s (1990), Kaplan and Atkinson’s (1998) and Kim’s (2006) work by 
indicating that this mechanism can encourage managers to achieve higher firm value 
in post-bankruptcy situation. 
 
As with H4a, no prior research concerning governance patterns in bankrupt firms has 
explored the impact of managerial shareholding on post-bankruptcy performance. 
This is also the first time that equity-based compensation has been investigated in the 
bankruptcy reorganization of Thai insolvent firms. Evidence shows that it can 
motivate the plan administrator to improve post-bankruptcy performance of 
reorganized firms, thus implying that the use of this mechanism can assist in 
successful bankruptcy reorganization.  
 
 
6.4.3 Market mechanism hypotheses 
 
6.4.3.1 Operation restructuring methods of insolvent firms (ORSTR) 
 
Operational restructuring is a restructuring strategy employing changes to internal 
operations to increase value for stakeholders. Much previous research investigated 
the relationship between restructuring activities and firm performance and confirms 
the efficiency of restructuring methods i.e., research by Singh (1990) and Bruton, 
Keels and Scifres (2002). This suggests hypothesis 5a:   
 
H5a: There is a positive relationship between an operational restructuring strategy 
and post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
The regression coefficient for this variable (ORSTR) in Table 6.7 is in the negative 
direction (-0.018) varying from expectation, although statistically insignificant. 
Hypothesis 5a is not supported by the model. Somewhat surprisingly, the finding 
suggests that operational restructuring methods are not an important mechanism of 
the bankruptcy reorganization process as it does not have a positive relationship with 
post-bankruptcy performance.  
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This result conflicts with the studies by Singh (1990) who examined a method of 
operational restructuring - management buyouts and found it can make an 
improvement in a firm’s financial performance. It is also contrary to Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens’s (1990), Opler’s (1992) and Bruton et al.’s (2002) findings that found 
that methods of restructuring strategy can create shareholder wealth.  
 
Although the result is inconsistent with the above studies, it is not alone as a number 
of prior studies also found that operational restructuring methods did not play a 
significant role during the time of reorganization (for example, the studies by Datta 
and Iskandar-Datta (1995) and Sudarsanam and Lai (2001)). Datta and Iskandar-
Datta (1995) examined various forms of restructuring and found this mechanism was 
not an important strategy after filing for reorganization in bankruptcy. Sudarsanam 
and Lai’s (2001) results also showed that operational restructuring methods in their 
model were negatively related to firm value. Their multiple regression results 
indicated that this mechanism was not associated with the probability of recovery.  
 
It could be speculated that the financial problems of Thai insolvent firms may be so 
complex that this mechanism cannot overcome their distress. Another possible 
reason is that the methods used by firms may be not consistent with the cause of their 
problems which are often financial and balance sheet related. The inconclusive result 
suggests that they need to be studied in future research. 
 
 
6.4.3.2 Asset restructuring methods of insolvent firms (ARSTR) 
 
Asset restructuring is another strategy that can assist managers in increasing firm 
performance (Bethel & Liebeskind 1993; Byrd, Parrino & Pritsch 1998; Fama 1980). 
This conclusion suggests hypothesis 5b: 
  
H5b: There is a positive relationship between an asset restructuring strategy and 
post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
Similar to H5a, the finding presented in Table 6.7 indicates that hypothesis 5b is not 
supported by the model. The regression coefficient for this variable (ARSTR) is 
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positive (0.013), in the expected direction but statistically insignificant at the p < .01 
level. The finding suggests that the asset restructuring method is not an important 
market mechanism of the bankruptcy reorganization process as it does not have a 
significant relationship with post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
This finding supports the research by Sicherman and Pettway (1987) who examined 
asset restructuring - mergers and acquisitions and found this strategy to be positively 
related to abnormal returns to stockholders but also insignificant. Similarly, Phan and 
Hill (1995) found that this restructuring strategy produces better performance as 
measured by profitability. This is also consistent with the study by Sudarsanam and 
Lai (2001) who found that higher proportions of recovery than non-recovery firms 
chose asset restructuring methods to restructure their financial distress.  
 
In bankruptcy reorganization, the result reinforces the findings of Hotchkiss (1994) 
that abnormal returns of companies that file for bankruptcy reorganization are 
positively related to asset sales. It is also in line with Datta and Iskandar-Datta’s 
(1995) conclusion that the methods of this mechanism particularly divestitures play 
an important role in reorganized firms. However, the insignificant result in this study 
implies that asset restructuring methods may be less useful for solving the financial 
distress of Thai insolvent firms. Thus, the efficacy of each method of asset 
restructuring should be more closely examined in future research.  
 
A summary of the results of hypothesis testing is exhibited in Table 6.9.  
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Table 6.9: Results of hypothesis testing 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Hypothesis                                                                                                Expected sign              Result 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Monitoring mechanisms: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of                          +             Not Supported 
        outside directors in the planner of the firm and  
        post-bankruptcy performance.                                                                
                                                                                                                                                          
H3: There is a positive relationship between ownership                                    +                  Supported 
        concentration by the largest shareholder of the firm  
        and post-bankruptcy performance.                                                                                                   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Incentive mechanisms: 
H4a: There is a positive relationship between cash compensation                     +                  Supported                                
          for the plan administrator and post-bankruptcy performance. 
                                                                                                            
H4b: There is a positive relationship between percentage shareholding            +                  Supported 
          of the plan administrator and post-bankruptcy performance. 
 _________________________________________________________________________________                               
 Market mechanisms:     
 H5a: There is a positive relationship between an operational                            +            Not Supported                               
           restructuring strategy and post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
 H5b: There is a positive relationship between an asset restructuring                +            Not Supported*                              
           strategy and post-bankruptcy performance.                                                                                                                  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
* Note: The sign H5b is positive in the expected direction.                                                                                                    
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6.5 Summary 
 
This chapter reports the empirical results of the OLS regression used to test the 
research hypotheses of the study. It also outlines changes to the variable studied to 
meet the requirements of the assumptions of the statistical tests used.  
 
The OLS regression test results based on 96 sample firms indicate that there are three 
expected predictors in the model which positively and significantly affect a firm’s 
post – bankruptcy performance. These predictors are ownership concentration of the 
largest shareholder (OWNER - H3), the natural log of amounts of cash compensation 
for the plan administrator (LNCAPLAD - H4a), and the natural log of common 
shares held by the plan administrator (LNSHPLAD - H4b). Asset restructuring 
(ARSTR - H5b) also shows a positive sign as expected, implying that it may increase 
a firm’s value although not significant. Expected predictors that show insignificant 
effects on post-bankruptcy performance are the natural log of outside directors in the 
planner (LNOUTPLA - H1) and operational restructuring (ORSTR - H5a). Overall, 
the results suggest that monitoring and incentive mechanisms within the bankruptcy 
reorganization proceedings are significantly related to a firm’s post-bankruptcy 
performance. 
 
The final chapter will present the conclusions of the study. This chapter contains a 
summary and the implications of the results, the limitations of the study and 
suggestions for future research.   
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The final chapter presents conclusions of the study. It contains a summary of the 
research findings in Section 7.2, implications of the study in Section 7.3, describes its 
limitations in Section 7.4 and outlines suggestions for further research in Section 7.5.  
  
 
7.2 Summary of research findings  
 
This thesis utilizes agency theory to examine the impact of governance mechanisms 
within the Thai bankruptcy reorganization proceedings on firm performance. Its aim 
is to investigate how these mechanisms affect a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance. 
The study uses the data of 111 Thai insolvent companies, both public and private, 
whose plans were approved by the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court between 1999 and 
2002 as the sample for analysis.  
 
Three key governance mechanisms are identified which agency theory suggests can 
limit agency problems and improve performance (Coles & Hesterly 2000; Jensen 
1986; Montgomery, Thomas & Kamath 1984; Peng 2004). The first is monitoring, 
which include outside directors in the planner and ownership concentration by the 
largest shareholder. The second is incentive alignment, namely, cash compensation 
for the plan administrator and common shares held by the plan administrator and the 
third is market mechanisms of which operational and asset restructuring is tested. 
Descriptive statistics and ordinary least squares regression were used to analyze the 
results of the study. The following is a summary of the results of each type of 
mechanism.  
 
First, monitoring mechanisms: The results indicate that ownership concentration by 
the largest shareholder is influential. Descriptive statistics confirm that the ownership 
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of the largest shareholder in sample firms, both private and public, remains highly 
concentrated for firms in the bankruptcy reorganization process. Statistically, 
ownership concentration by the largest shareholder shows a positive relationship 
with post-bankruptcy performance. This finding is consistent with previous studies 
and the expectation of agency theory (Oswald & Jahera 1991; Shleifer & Vishny 
1986; Wruck 1989). Contrary to expectation, another mechanism - outside directors 
in the planner is negatively related to post-bankruptcy performance. This finding is 
not statistically significant. However, it suggests that increasing outside directors in 
the planner will not necessarily improve performance. 
 
Second, two incentive mechanisms researched in this study, cash compensation for 
the plan administrator and common shares held by the plan administrator were found 
to be significant and have a positive relationship with post-bankruptcy performance. 
Descriptive statistics found that most sample firms provided incentives to motivate 
the plan administrators. Cash compensation is around 500,000 baht per month on 
average and 300,000 baht per month at median, whereas managerial shareholding is 
13.26% on average and less than 1% at median. The findings are in line with prior 
research that shows these mechanisms can reduce agency problems and stimulate 
managers to create firm value (Dyl 1988; Jensen & Murphy 1990; Mehran 1995). 
 
Third is the use of market mechanisms. The effectiveness of operational and asset 
restructurings was inconclusive. There is no evidence in this study that indicates that 
they play a significant role in improving post-bankruptcy performance. Descriptive 
statistics found that among 67 firms using operational restructuring, 39 (58%) 
succeeded in producing a positive performance which means that actual performance 
over a three-year period exceeded predicted performance and of 43 firms which used 
asset restructuring, 29 (67%) succeeded. Statistically, operational restructuring is 
negatively though not significantly related to firm performance consistent with 
Sudarsanam and Lai’s (2001) conclusion, whereas asset restructuring was found to 
be positively related to post-bankruptcy performance but insignificant which is 
similar to Sicherman and Pettway’s (1987) results.  
 
In summary, these results indicate that ownership concentration by the largest 
shareholder and incentive mechanisms both cash compensation and managerial 
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shareholding for the plan administrators play important roles in bankruptcy 
reorganization. It can be concluded that they can mitigate agency problems and 
increase a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance consistent with agency theory. 
 
In addition, interesting results from descriptive analysis included that the number of 
firms with positive post-bankruptcy performance (PFOM) were greater than those 
with negative post-bankruptcy performance. Also, the majority of Thai insolvent 
firms emerging from bankruptcy had better actual performance in comparison to 
predicted performance under the bankruptcy arrangement (see the results in Chapter 
5). This is contrary to the studies of Hotchkiss (1995) and Alderson and Betker (1999) 
who examined the effectiveness of the bankruptcy reorganization process by using a 
sample of U.S. firms and found the majority that reported operating profit margins 
exhibited poor performance. The findings of this study also show better firm 
recovery outcomes than Vongvipanond, Jumpa and Wichitaksorn’s (2002) study 
which examined a sample of Thai court-based reorganized firms. They found that the 
average recovery rate of Thai insolvent firms from January 1999 to June 2002 was 
49%, while the current study found the recovery rate of Thai insolvent firms from 
January 1999 to December 2005 to be 60% as indicated by positive PFOM that 60% 
of sample firms had actual performance exceeding predicted performance under the 
reorganization plan (see Table 5.2 in Chapter 5). The results from negative PFOM in 
this table also indicated that 40% of the sample failed to meet their predicted 
performance.  When considering each company type in the sample, the data reveals 
that private companies achieved successful bankruptcy reorganization at a recovery 
rate of 58%, whereas public companies performed marginally better with a higher 
recovery rate of 66%.  
 
 
7.3 Implications of the findings of the study 
 
The implications in this study are divided into two parts - theoretical and managerial 
implications. A discussion of these implications is as follows. 
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7.3.1 Theoretical implications 
 
From the point of theoretical implications, this study supplements prior research by 
providing a unique contribution to the literature regarding the critical governance 
factors that influence successful bankruptcy reorganization. First, this study has 
contributed to research on key governance mechanisms of agency theory by 
extending and adapting the study of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) who examined the 
effectiveness of several agency problem-control mechanisms on firm performance in 
a single OLS regression model. Among alternative mechanisms in their model, only 
one monitoring mechanism, that is outside directors on the board is significant but 
has a negative relationship with performance. Building on their work, the current 
study examines monitoring, incentive and market mechanisms within the Thai 
reorganization proceedings. Evidence in this study confirms that not only the 
monitoring mechanism (ownership concentration by the largest shareholder) but also 
incentive mechanisms (cash compensation and managerial shareholding for the plan 
administrative) are able to improve actual post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
Second, this is the first known study of key governance mechanisms within the Thai 
bankruptcy reorganization process that have been investigated by using a comparison 
of actual to predicted performance (LPFOM) as a measure of post-bankruptcy 
performance. Much previous research attempted to evaluate the total efficiency of 
mechanisms in the process by measuring post-bankruptcy performance in various 
ways, such as accounting performance, cash flow performance and stock 
performance (e.g., the studies of Hotchkiss (1995), Alderson and Betker (1999) and 
Platt and Platt (2002)).  
 
Third, a review of the literature found that previous research associated with 
governance patterns in a bankrupt firm has been minimal (see Section 2.2.3 of 
Chapter 2). Thus, with the guidance of agency theory, the current study attempts to 
extend research in this area by investigating governance mechanisms included in the 
bankruptcy reorganization process implemented in Thai bankrupt firms. The results 
of the study confirm that two types of mechanisms in the process, monitoring and 
incentive mechanisms, are significant determinants of a bankrupt firm’s post-
bankruptcy performance.  
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Fourth, most previous studies were undertaken in Western countries, particularly the 
U.S. and used public companies which had traded in a national stock exchange for 
analysis (e.g., Brockman, Hoffman, Dawley & Fornaciari 2004; Chatterjee, Dhillon 
& Ramirez 2004: Daily 1996; Hubbard & Stephenson 1997; Kim 2006). Few 
empirical studies exist on unlisted companies (see Table 2.1: A summary of the 
major empirical studies relating to the bankruptcy reorganization proceedings). Thus, 
this study contributes to the investigation of insolvent firms by examining listed and 
unlisted companies a different country (Thailand) setting. It found that company type 
is not significant in determining post-bankruptcy performance.  
 
Fifth, empirical evidence shows that little published research has been undertaken 
concerning the effectiveness of bankruptcy reorganization proceedings in Asian 
countries (see Sections 2.2 of Chapter 2), particularly, their impact on post - 
bankruptcy performance. Thus, the present study contributes to this research by 
investigating reorganized firms under the Bankruptcy Act of Thailand through an 
empirical study. Its results may be the starting point of research in this area in Asian 
countries and Thailand and also benefit the public by enabling them to obtain more 
knowledge of the subject of business reorganization through the bankruptcy court.   
 
 
7.3.2 Managerial implications 
 
From the point of decision-makers, namely debtor firms, creditors, shareholders, 
financial consultants, planners and plan administrators, and regulators, the study has 
several managerial implications. It reveals the firm performance outcomes of 
implementing the mechanisms in the Thai bankruptcy reorganization proceedings 
and provides an insight into the effectiveness of the total management of the 
bankruptcy reorganization through the court.  
 
First, the findings from the current study indicate that in bankruptcy reorganization, 
the role of the largest shareholder is vital to solving financial problems of insolvent 
companies. Apparently, ownership concentration is important in monitoring 
reorganized firms and can lead to improved post-bankruptcy performance. This is 
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more likely to convince the Government and the bankruptcy court that the concept of 
a voluntary bankruptcy of Chapter 3/1, the bankruptcy reorganization process is an 
effective concept even when applied to highly concentrated ownership. Creditors can 
also get benefits from this mechanism as the company performance improves, they 
will receive debt payments as specified in the reorganization plan. This supports 
Vongvipanond, Jumpa and Wichitaksorn’s (2002) view that most reorganized firms 
are of the cooperative type between creditors and the debtor. In addition, the 
efficiency of this mechanism is also advantageous to debtor firms in terms of 
enabling other shareholders and new investors to have confidence to inject more 
funds into debtor firms (Cho 1998).  
 
Second, the findings from the current study also show that managerial remuneration 
for the plan administrator in forms of cash and equity compensation positively 
influence post-bankruptcy performance. It suggests that appropriate compensation 
for the plan administrator can help debtor firms achieve successful bankruptcy 
reorganization. This discovery is consistent with Listokin’s (2006) view that 
managers in bankrupt firms deserve to receive appropriate compensation for their 
roles in managing the firm and are crucial to a firm’s survival in the future. Thus, 
debtor firms, the planner and the bankruptcy court as regulators need to take this into 
account when determining the form and the amount of these payments.  
 
Third, the efficiency of the approved reorganization plans in improving the 
performances of sample firms is tested. Descriptive statistics in Chapter 5 show that 
post-bankruptcy performances (PFOM) in comparison to predicted performances 
have more positive values than negative values. The majority (60%) of sample firms 
succeed in implementing their plans as indicated by positive PFOM. This informs all 
parties, including the official receiver and the bankruptcy court, that the financial 
feasibility of the plan is important to successful bankruptcy reorganization and the 
financial projections should not be overestimated (Michel, Shaked & McHugh 1998). 
Thus, regulations relating to the plan (i.e. section 90/42) that only specified broad 
requirements should be revised and clearly stated concerning financial planning for 
bankruptcy reorganization.    
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Fourth, the overall results from this study also indicate the total efficiency of the 
bankruptcy reorganization process and management in Thailand. Among three types 
of six governance mechanisms of the process - monitoring, incentive and market 
mechanisms, the significant results confirm that two types - monitoring and incentive 
mechanisms can enable insolvent firms to improve post-bankruptcy performance. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the total management of the process in Thailand is at a 
satisfactory level. Previous studies relating to the Chapter 3/1 process also agree that 
the satisfaction level of the process in terms of management and work 
accomplishment is quite good (Pipatsitee et al. 2003, 2004). This should help to 
convince debtor firms, creditors and shareholders that the bankruptcy reorganization 
process of the Thai Bankruptcy Act is useful for resolving their financial distress. 
The Government and the bankruptcy court should take this into account when 
undertaking a review of the regulations.   
 
 
7.4 Limitations  
 
Every study has a number of limitations and in this study these are 1) the sample size, 
2) the study period, 3) the economic conditions at the time of data collection, 4) the 
measurement of post-bankruptcy performance, 5) the adjusted R-square of the model, 
and 6) the application of the study. 
 
First, the sample size in the study is small although represents the entire population 
for the period studied. The Thai Bankruptcy Court commenced in June 1999, thus, 
some companies may have been uncertain as to the effectiveness of the bankruptcy 
reorganization proceedings and hesitated to solve their financial problems through 
the court. Consequently, the number of insolvent firms that filed for bankruptcy 
reorganization was small. In addition, the primary investigation found that the 
number of insolvent companies that filed for bankruptcy reorganization and whose 
plans had been approved by the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court during 1999 - 2002 
amounted to 111 companies. When collecting the data, however, it was found that 10 
companies had data missing, leaving 101 for analysis.  
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Second, the study period is also a limitation related to a small sample size. The 
criteria of sample selection needed to be limited to a four-year period (1999 - 2002) 
in order to collect details of the three-year data following bankruptcy reorganization 
(1999 - 2005). Nevertheless, much research concerning post-bankruptcy performance 
has also used a small sample size (e.g., research by Alderson and Betker (1999) and 
Platt and Platt (2002)). 
 
The third limitation of the sample in this study is the economic conditions at the time 
of data collection. According to the annual economic reports ranging from 1999 to 
2005, from the Bank of Thailand, it was found that the Thai economy had recovered 
from the 1997 Asian financial crisis in this period (Annual Economic Report 1999 - 
2005). Economic growth and stability had been satisfactory since 1999. It is not 
possible to assert that the findings would hold under significantly different economic 
conditions. 
 
The fourth limitation is the measurement of post-bankruptcy performance (PFOM). 
A measure of PFOM in this study was defined following the bankruptcy 
reorganization process of The Thai Bankruptcy Act. The law specifies that a 
reorganized firm must manage business operations in accordance with the approved 
plan until its reorganization is achieved. The regulations of the process clearly state 
that the reorganization plan is the most important aspect for bankruptcy 
reorganization. Thus, to capture successful bankruptcy reorganization, post-
bankruptcy performance in this study was determined to measure actual performance 
by comparing it with predicted performance. However, the literature in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.2.1) shows that measures of success in the bankruptcy reorganization 
process were of various types. Many used accounting performance such as return on 
assets (ROA) to examine post-bankruptcy performance of reorganized firms in terms 
of profitability (Hotchkiss 1994, 1995; and Maksimovic & Phillips 1998). Although 
the definition of post-bankruptcy performance in this study does not cover these 
measures of profitability, it does reflect the capability of the firms to achieve their 
reorganization plan and the effectiveness of the bankruptcy reorganization process, 
which is the major motivation of the current study.  
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The fifth limitation concerns the adjusted R-square of the model. The results of the 
OLS regression analysis in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3.3) show that the adjusted R-square 
of the model is 0.091. This value indicates that around 10% of the variation in post-
bankruptcy performance is explained by explanatory variables of the estimate 
equation. This is consistent with many previous researchers who examined some 
critical factors of firm performance and also obtained an adjusted R-square of around 
10% (Johnson, Boone, Breach & Friedman 2000; Lemmon & Lins 2003; Peng 2004). 
The small adjusted R-square (10%) means 90% of the variation in post-bankruptcy 
performance is due to factors not in the model. Following the literature in Chapter 2, 
it was found that there were many critical factors affecting a firm’s post-bankruptcy 
performance and influencing successful bankruptcy reorganization, namely internal, 
external, and governance factors. However, based on the research model and 
hypotheses in Chapter 3, this study concentrates only on an examination of 
governance factors within the bankruptcy reorganization process, and it was not the 
intention to investigate all factors of post-bankruptcy performance.  
 
The final limitation is the application of the studies findings to countries outside 
Thailand. This study focuses on insolvent companies that filed a petition for 
bankruptcy reorganization under the Thai Bankruptcy Act. Thus, the results of the 
study are applicable for Thai companies in the bankruptcy reorganization process and 
may not be applicable for all companies in financial distress. However, comparability 
can be made regarding insolvent companies in other countries that have similar 
regulations in the Bankruptcy Act. The literature in Chapter 2 reveals that the results 
of most studies regarding bankruptcy reorganization are dominated by data from 
Western countries. Thus, extending the empirical study into the less researched areas, 
particularly Asian countries such as Thailand is more likely to increase the utility and 
generalizability of the findings. 
 
 
7.5 Suggestions for further research 
 
According to the results of the OLS regression analysis in this study, governance 
mechanisms in the Thai bankruptcy reorganization process play a significant role in 
post-bankruptcy performance. However, in the literature review, the study found 
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limited prior research had examined governance mechanisms in an agency 
theoretical framework. There are several areas which could be reinvestigated in 
future. 
 
Studying determinants of a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance by considering 
environmental factors on economic growth - Economic growth may influence factors 
of successful bankruptcy reorganization and may bring about different results 
between periods of high growth and low growth. Thus, future research should try to 
reexamine the results of the current study by collecting data under different 
economic conditions and compare the results.  
 
The relationship between asset restructuring methods and actual post-bankruptcy 
performance requires further research. This study found the relationship between 
actual post-bankruptcy performance and asset restructuring methods to be 
insignificant but had a positive direction as hypothesized. Many previous studies 
confirmed that the methods of this strategy (i.e. asset sales and mergers) can improve 
firm performance (Bowman, Singh, Useem & Bhadury 1999; Hotchkiss 1994). This 
indicates that the efficacy of asset restructuring methods is inconclusive and should 
be replicated in further research to obtain a clearer understanding of the relationship.  
 
The role of outside directors in the planner may need further reexamination. In this 
study, it was hypothesized that it is positively related to post-bankruptcy 
performance. However, the result shows an insignificant and negative direction in 
OLS regression analysis whereas the majority of previous studies support that a 
higher proportion of outside directors in the board is beneficial for shareholders 
(Brickley, Coles & Terry 1994; Daily 1995). Thus, future research could separate 
outside directors in the planner into two variables – one as truly independent outside 
directors and another as a nominee of family owners. 
 
As with outside directors in the planner, it is interesting to investigate the types of the 
plan administrator and their association with post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
Another direction for future research is to investigate financial and internal controls 
(i.e. budget system and internal audit) of insolvent firms during the reorganization 
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time. Sandino (2004) studied types of management control systems and firm 
performance and found that many internal controls are associated with better firm 
performance.  Thus, these controls should be examined in a reorganization context to 
see whether they can assist a bankrupt firm increase its post-bankruptcy performance. 
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Appendix 1 
 Chart of business reorganization process 
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Chart of business reorganization process (continued) 
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Chart of business reorganization process (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  The Business Reorganization Office, Legal Execution Department,  
               Ministry of Justice, Thailand 
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Appendix 2 
 
 List of sample companies 
 
 
Notes: 1. Red case number is the number that the company had already considered by the court. 
           2. # 1 of industry column means manufacturing company, # 0 means non-manufacturing company.  
   3. Size is the book value of company’s total assets in million Baht when the court has issued the order for business 
reorganization. 
 
COMPANY NAME 
Red Case 
Number 
Date for 
accepting 
the plan 
by the 
court Industry 
Details for non-
manufacturing 
company 
Size 
(million 
Baht) 
 
1. THAI MODERN PLASTIC INDUSTRY PUBLIC 
COMPANY LIMITED  
lor.Phor. 
3/2541 
April 
20,1999 1  6720.92 
 
2. NAMPRASERT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
LIMITED  
Phor. 
9/2542 
March 
2,2000 0 Construction 299.05 
 
3. PANJAPOL PULP INDUSTRY PUBLIC 
COMPANY LIMITED 
Phor. 
12/2542 
March 
30,2000 1  10,000.39 
 
4. PANJAPOL PAPER INDUSTRY COMPANY 
LIMITED  
Phor. 
8/2542 
April 
3,2000 1  3,695.64 
 
5. SURANAKORN MUANGMAI COMPANY 
LIMITED  
Phor. 
5/2542 
April 
18,2000 0 
Central market of 
agricultural goods 128 
 
 
6. TONPING VALLEY COMPANY LIMITED  
Phor. 
10/2542 
May 
3,2000 0 
Gardening, Resort 
and Hotel 175.44 
 
 
7. SIAM STEEL INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
COMPANY LIMITED  
Phor. 
6/2542 
May 
11,2000 1  1,933.84 
 
8. THAI GERMAN PRODUCTS PUBLIC 
COMPANY LIMITED  
Phor. 
11/2542 
May 
18,2000 1  4,831.51 
 
9. THAI PRECISION MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY LIMITED  
Phor. 
16/2542 
June 
12,2000 1  899.99 
 
10. BANGKOK RANCH PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  
Phor. 
2/2543 
August 
17,2000 1  2,349.95 
 
 
11. NAWARAT PATANAKARN PUBLIC 
COMPANY LIMITED  
Phor. 
9/2543 
October 
10,2000 0 
construction and 
real estate 
development 3,636 
 
 
12. P.A.E. (Thailand) PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  
Phor. 
6/2543 
November 
9,2000 0 Construction 491.42 
 
13. THAI ENGINE MANUFACTURING PUBLIC 
COMPANY LIMITED  
Phor. 
13/2543 
December 
20,2000 1  564.85 
 
14. ROBINSON DEPARTMENT STORE PUBLIC 
COMPANY LIMITED  
Phor. 
21/2543 
December 
20,2000 0 Department store 13,160 
 
15. WONGPAITOON GROUP PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  30/2543 
December 
22,2000 1  2,133.75 
 
16. THAI TELEPHONE &  
TELECOMMUNICATION PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  
Phor. 
25/2543 
December 
27,2000 0 Telecommunication 10,046.39 
 
17. SRIVARA REAL ESTATE GROUP PUBLIC 
COMPANY LIMITED  445/2543 
December 
28,2000 0 Trade of real estate 2,125.28 
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List of sample companies (continued) 
 
COMPANY NAME 
Red Case 
Number 
Date for 
accepting 
the plan 
by the 
court Industry 
Details for non-
manufacturing 
company 
Size 
(million 
Baht) 
 
 
18. STA GROUP (1993) PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  
Phor. 
14/2543 
January 
16,2001 1  855.36 
 
 
19. STA MDF COMPANY LIMITED  
Phor. 
16/2543 
January 
16,2001 1  1,249.91 
 
20. STA PARTICLE PRODUCTS COMPANY 
LIMITED  
Phor. 
17/2543 
January 
16,2001 1  754.06 
 
21. HIGH PRESSURE STEEL PIPE INDUSTRY 
COMPANY LIMITED  
Phor. 
15/2542 
January 
24,2001 1  1,106.51 
 
22. BURAPA STEEL INDUSTRIES COMPANY 
LIMITED  386/2543 
January 
24,2001 1  828.20 
 
 
23. I.S.A COMPANY LIMITED  384/2543 
January 
25,2001 1  309.09 
 
 
24. THAIWAH PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  624/2543 
February 
14,2001 1  5,265.79 
 
 
25. ALPHA PROCESSING COMPANY LIMITED  473/2543 
February 
14,2001 1  801.00 
 
 
26. NARONG CANNING COMPANY LIMITED  385/2543 
February 
15,2001 1  669.58 
 
27. STAR BLOCK GROUP PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  574/2543 
February 
16,2001 0 
Building material 
trader 1,471.67 
 
28. ALPHATEX INDUSTRIES COMPANY 
LIMITED  468/2543 
February 
23,2001 1  988.56 
 
 
29. ALPHA SPINNING COMPANY LIMITED  467/2543 
February 
23,2001 1  1,378.10 
 
30. UBOL SAHATHAM TRANSPORT (1983) 
COMPANY LIMITED  541/2543 
February 
23,2001 0 
Construction and 
transportation 573.86 
 
31. THAI PACKAGING INDUSTRY PUBLIC 
COMPANY LIMITED  470/2543 
March 
6,2001 1  1,286.61 
 
32. PETCHPRAYA GENERAL HOSPITAL 
COMPANY LIMITED  493/2543 
March 
12,2001 0 General hospital 291.71 
 
 
33. TADA COMPANY LIMITED 517/2543 
March 
19,2001 0 
Construction of 
power station 979.89 
 
 
34. MATCON TRADING COMPANY LIMITED  522/2543 
March 
27,2001 0 Construction 23.56 
 
 
35. HYDROTECH COMPANY LIMITED  654/2543 
March 
30,2001 0 
Environmental 
engineering 59.86 
 
36. DULWICH INTERNATIONAL COMPANY 
LIMITED  626/2543 
April 
4,2001 0 
Educational 
institution 560.92 
 
 
37. PETCHBURI TERMINAL COMPANY LIMITED  584/2543 
April 
9,2001 0 
Oil containers and 
harbour rental 1,467.87 
 
 
 
38. SATHORNTHANI COMPANY LIMITED  637/2543 
April 
18,2001 0 
Developing the real 
estate for sales and 
rentals 699.42 
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List of sample companies (continued) 
 
COMPANY NAME 
Red Case 
Number 
Date for 
accepting 
the plan 
by the 
court Industry 
Details for non-
manufacturing 
company 
Size 
(million 
Baht) 
 
 
 
39. NARONG SEAFOOD COMPANY LIMITED  516/2543 
April 
24,2001 1  523.96 
                                                                                             
 
40. SIAMUNISOUL COMPANY LIMITED  675/2543 
April 
27,2001 1  463.93 
 
41. SAHAKARN WISAVAKORN COMPANY 
LIMITED  639/2543 
May 
2,2001 0 
Engineering and 
building the basic 
public utilities 129.23 
 
42. SUNTECH GROUP PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  636/2543 
May 
3,2001 1  1,132.20 
 
43. BIP ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY LIMITED  678/2543 
May 
9,2001 0 
General building 
engineering 66.85 
 
 
44. THAMMARIN COMPANY LIMITED  656/2543 
May 
11,2001 0 Hotel 685.64 
 
 
 
45. EMC PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  638/2543 
May 
15,2001 0 
Providing the 
service for long 
term contracts 375.65 
 
 
46. SARIN PROPERTY COMPANY LIMITED  729/2543 
May 
15,2001 0 
Real estate 
development 1,667.03 
 
 
47. UNI CORD PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED               
  576/2543 
May 
21,2001 1  1,685.89 
 
48. N.T.S. STEELGROUP PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  719/2543 
June 
6,2001 1  9,216 
 
49. EVERGREEN INDUSTRY COMPANY 
LIMITED  813/2543 
June 
21,2001 1  509.43 
 
 
50. TAI YO TECH COMPANY LIMITED  759/2543 
July 
2,2001 1  300.00 
 
 
 
51. SRIUTONG COMPANY LIMITED  828/2543 
July 
24,2001 0 
Building 
construction 
service 126.99 
 
 
52. SIAM PAPER COMPANY LIMITED  893/2543 
August 
16,2001 1  7,601 
 
53. TRAD PORNPIMON FISHSAUCE 1991 
COMPANY LIMITED  864/2543 
August 
23,2001 1  1,573.83 
 
54. HIGH PRESSURE PIPE FITTING COMPANY 
LIMITED  469/2543 
August 
28,2001 1  233.45 
 
55. MODERN HOME DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC 
COMPANY LIMITED  705/2543 
September 
27,2001 0 
Real estate 
development 4,209.57 
 
56. PROPERTY PERFECT PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  106/2544 
October 
2,2001 0 
Real estate 
development 5,927.28 
 
57. LANLUANG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
LIMITED  31/2544 
October 
9,2001 0 
Construction 
service 455.73 
 
 
58. THAMMATANI COMPANY LIMITED  32/2544 
October 
18,2001 0 
Real estate 
development 1,003 
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List of sample companies (continued) 
COMPANY NAME 
Red Case 
Number 
Date for 
accepting 
the plan 
by the 
court Industry 
Details for non-
manufacturing 
company 
Size 
(million 
Baht) 
 
 
59. RAIMON LAND PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  827/2543 
November 
8,2001 0 
Real estate 
development 1,011.13 
 
60. GUN KUL ENGINEERING COMPANY 
LIMITED  325/2544 
November 
15,2001 1  351.53 
  
 
61. YOONSILA CHAINGMAI COMPANY LIMITED  116/2544 
December 
7,2001 1  753.65 
 
62. THAI BICYCLE INDUSTRY COMPANY 
LIMITED  133/2544 
December 
11,2001 1  371.67 
 
 
63. CENTURY HOTEL COMPANY LIMITED  1049/2543 
December 
25,2001 0 Hotel 1,147.40 
 
 
64. ONE-HOLDING PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  406/2544 
December 
27,2001 0 Investment industry 894.81 
 
 
65. SG STAR PROPERTY COMPANY LIMITED  278/2544 
December 
28,2001 0 
Real estate 
development 300.19 
 
 
66. MEDIA OF MEDIAS PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  912/2543 
January 
15,2002 0 
Production of any 
mass media 607.50 
 
67. EASTERN PRINTING PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  519/2544 
January 
17,2002 0 Printing service 1,017.90 
 
68. ADVANCE DICASTING SERVICE COMPANY 
LIMITED  153/2544 
January 
29,2002 1  83.15 
 
 
69. SHINAWATRA THAI COMPANY LIMITED  568/2544 
January 
29,2002 1  962.00 
 
70. THAI HEAT EXCHANGE PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  34/2544 
January 
30,2002 1  529.39 
 
 
71. OLYMPIA THAI COMPANY LIMITED  389/2544 
January 
31,2002 0 Selling and service 975.47 
 
72. SINN BUALUANG CAPITAL COMPANY 
LIMITED  637/2544 
February 
27,2002 0 Financial service 34.13 
 
73. SINN BUALUANG LEASING COMPANY 
LIMITED  667/2544 
February 
28,2002 0 Property leasing 365.20 
 
74. C. M. I. C. DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
LIMITED  290/2544 
March 
8,2002 0 
Office space 
leasing 1,354.36 
 
75. THE CENTURY COUNTRY CLUB COMPANY 
LIMITED  638/2544 
March 
20,2002 0 
Real estate 
development 975.00 
 
 
76. THAI BAUER COMPANY LIMITED  27/2543 
March 
20,2002 0 Construction 1,778.97 
 
 
77. RAK PRODUCTION COMPANY LIMITED  207/2544 
March 
21,2002 1  527.43 
 
 
78. POWER - P COMPANY LIMITED  518/2544 
March 
29,2002 1  349.27 
 
79. ASIA IRON MANUFACTURING COMPANY 
LIMITED  700/2544 
April 
10,2002 1  164.62 
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List of sample companies (continued) 
 
COMPANY NAME 
Red Case 
Number 
Date for 
accepting 
the plan 
by the 
court Industry 
Details for non-
manufacturing 
company 
Size 
(million 
Baht) 
 
 
 
80. THAI VINITEC COMPANY LIMITED  636/2544 
April 
25,2002 1  738.81 
 
 
81. BANGKOK SHUTTERS COMPANY LIMITED  665/2544 
April 
26,2002 1  111.82 
 
 
82. H. C. CITY COMPANY LIMITED  837/2544 
May 
2,2002 0 
Real estate 
development 559.56 
 
 
 
83. INTER FAREAST ENGINEERING COMPANY 
LIMITED  346/2544 
May 
3,2002 0 
Distributing 
representative and 
rental of office 
facilities 857.58 
 
 
84. BIG DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED  658/2543 
May 
14,2002 0 
Real estate 
development 1,340.05 
85. TWY PROPERTY COMPANY LIMITED 629/2544 
 
May 
16,2002  Hotel                           2,081.80 
 
86. COUNTRY (THAILAND) PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  556/2544 
May 
20,2002 0 
Real estate 
development 2,089.64 
 
 
87. B. N. S. STEELGROUP COMPANY LIMITED  668/2544 
May 
21,2002 1  2,844.54 
 
 
88. BANGNA MACHINARY COMPANY LIMITED 745/2544 
May 
24,2002 1  172.67 
 
 
 
89. P.E.P. FERTILIZER COMPANY LIMITED  478/2544 
May 
29,2002 0 
Buying and selling 
fertilizer and 
chemical products 51.09 
 
 
90. CHONBURI - INTER COMPANY LIMITED  1023/2544 
May 
30,2002 0 Hotel 581.95 
 
91. NARONG INDUSTRIAL PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  870/2544 
June 
3,2002 1  169.95 
 
92. ADVANCE PAINT AND CHEMICAL 
(THAILAND) PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED 1025/2544 
July 
5,2002 1  92.56 
 
 
93. A.C.C. REAL ESTATE COMPANY LIMITED  1047/2544 
July 
15,2002 0 
Real estate 
development 490.65 
 
 
94. TREATTHABOON COMPANY LIMITED  445/2544 
July 
17,2002 1  1,316.17 
 
95. PREMIER ENTERPRISE PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  434/2543 
August 
2,2002 0 
Cars sales and 
rental service 2,042.70 
 
 
96. GREEN UNION COMPANY LIMITED  108/2544 
August 
9,2002 0 
Real estate 
development 205.29 
 
97. T.G. ADVANCE CONCRETE COMPANY 
LIMITED  1303/2544 
August 
16,2002 1  18.68 
 
 
98. MOOBAN SERI COMPANY LIMITED  1214/2544 
August 
19,2002 0 
Real estate 
development 1,134.46 
 
 
99. RAMA 3 LAND COMPANY LIMITED  1307/2544 
August 
23,2002 0 
Real estate 
development 6,153.92 
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List of sample companies (continued) 
 
COMPANY NAME 
Red Case 
Number 
Date for 
accepting 
the plan 
by the 
court Industry 
Details for non-
manufacturing 
company 
Size 
(million 
Baht) 
 
 
100. SAHAVIRIYA CITY PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED 992/2544 
August 
30,2002 0 
Real estate 
development 7,754.37 
   
 
101. THAIBENGUN COMPANY LIMITED  4/2545 
September 
10,2002 1  585.96 
 
 
102. MITSU CHAROENSRI COMPANY LIMITED  1141/2544 
September 
16,2002 0 Car selling business 236.34 
 
 
103. SAKOL CHAROENSRI COMPANY LIMITED  1135/2544 
September 
17,2002 0 Car selling business 730.19 
 
 
104. CHAROENSRI MOTOR COMPANY LIMITED       1134/2544      17,2002          0        Car selling business       1,086.69 
                                                                                                                          
 
105. UDORN CHAROENSRI (1968) COMPANY                1132/2544       September              
LIMITED                                                                                                            18,2002              0            Car selling business       4,169.41 
                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                          September 
106. PAMOLA COMPANY LIMITED                                  1133/2544         24,2002               1                                                     601.78 
                                                                                                                           
107. BANGKOK RUBBER PUBLIC COMPANY                1313/2544       November            
LIMITED                                                                                                           21,2002               1                                                  7,033.93    
 
                                                                                                                          December 
108. T.C.K. FURNITURE COMPANY LIMITED                  303/2545           3,2002               1                                                  1,275.35 
 
                                                                                                                           December 
109. DELTA ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION           1190/2544          4,2002               0             Building service              467.93 
PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED                                                                                                  
 
110. NAKORNTHAI STRIP MILL PUBLIC                    Phor.             December          
COMPANY LIMITED                                                              24/2543        11,2002             1                                                 27,233.35     
                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                            December                         Lease of unmovable  
111. SRIJULSUP COMPANY LIMITED                               194/2544            25,2002             0             property                           949.13 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
